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 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), a multi-component intervention 
within the third-wave of behavioral therapy, has been shown to improve various 
outcomes in diverse populations and administration formats.  This study utilized a 
dismantling design to investigate whether the values components of an ACT-based 
intervention for work stress add to the effects of the intervention beyond those of the 
mindfulness components and to explore possible mediators of change.  Expanding 
beyond existing studies of ACT, a broad range of outcomes were examined pre-
treatment, post-treatment, and at three follow-up assessments in a small sample (N = 16) 
of employees of a university in the Northeast.  Various factors proposed to possibly 
mediate changes in outcomes for each version of the intervention, in addition to various 
therapy process measures, were examined.   
Due to the small sample size, findings are preliminary. Results indicated that 
participants who received the complete intervention (ACT) experienced meaningful 
changes in a greater number of outcomes and process variables than did participants in 
 the abbreviated group that omitted the values components (AT). Both groups experienced 
improvements on measures of stress, mental health, quality of life, affect and cognition.  
However, participants in ACT experienced less functional interference in work and social 
activities from distress, experienced improvements in work locus of control, trait anxiety, 
mindfulness, and coping behavior. Although AT appeared to be more effective for 
reducing job stress, participants in ACT experienced greater improvement in life stressor 
impact.  Findings generally supported greater improvement in follow-up outcome scores 
for participants in the AT group and maintenance of post-treatment gains for participants 
in the ACT group. Although neither group reported meaningful changes in psychological 
flexibility, both groups reported changes in frequency of and belief in negative automatic 
thoughts and only participants in ACT experienced improvement on a measure of 
mindfulness. Correlational analyses suggested that different process variables were 
associated with different outcomes in the two groups. The possible roles values 
clarification may play in encouraging goal setting, motivation, and follow-through and 
the relation of these roles to the differential findings between groups, along with possible 
mechanisms of action in each group are discussed.
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 This project, and the many steps leading up to it, would not have been possible 
without the influence and assistance of many individuals.  I thank my doctoral mentor, 
Sandra Sigmon, Ph.D., for allowing me the opportunity to pursue a topic of personal 
interest, for imparting her knowledge, skills, and humor to assist me along the way, and 
for remaining a supportive friend throughout the long process and many challenges.  I 
also extend my gratitude to the members of my committee, for their interest, support, and 
patience.  Along with Dr. Sigmon, Dr. Jeffrey Hecker, Dr. Michael Robbins, and Dr. 
Geoffrey Thorpe have been uniquely influential throughout my doctoral studies at the 
University of Maine and I hope this thesis is only the first of many endeavors that will 
acknowledge and demonstrate the benefits of the time and effort they have invested in my 
training and development.  No less is my appreciation of the interest and guidance 
provided by Dr. John Forsyth, whose expertise fueled my interest in the topic and 
improved the quality of this work. 
 On a personal note, I would like to thank my parents, who provided the 
educational opportunities and personal ethics that made possible my academic and 
professional pursuits, and who, along with my brother, supported those pursuits no matter 
how convoluted the path became.
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ ii 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. x 
 
Chapter 
1.    INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
Philosophical and Theoretical Roots of Acceptance   
and Commitment Therapy ...................................................................................... 3 
The Third Wave of Behavioral Therapy .................................................... 3 
ACT Philosophy: Functional Contextualism ............................................. 8 
Theoretical Framework of ACT: Relational Frame Theory .................... 10 
The ACT Model of Psychopathology and Psychotherapy ................................... 13 
Factors Underlying Psychopathology ...................................................... 13 
Core Therapeutic Strategies of ACT ........................................................ 18 
Empirical Status of ACT and its Components ..................................................... 22 
Evaluations of ACT as an Intervention .................................................... 22 
Research on ACT Concepts and Components ......................................... 31 
Mindfulness and the Third-Wave Therapies ........................................................ 38 
Conceptualizations of Mindfulness .......................................................... 38 
Mindfulness as Operationalized within ACT .......................................... 39 
Empirical Status of Mindfulness-Based Treatment Approaches ............. 41 
Possible Mechanisms Underlying Effects of Mindfulness ...................... 43 
 
 
iv 
Workplace Stress Management as a Clinical Target for ACT ............................. 46 
Stress and Its Impact ................................................................................ 46 
The Transactional Theory of Stress ......................................................... 47 
Coping ...................................................................................................... 49 
Interventions for Stress Management from  
First- to Third-Wave CBTs ...................................................................... 50 
The Evolvement of Approaches Specific to Work Stress ........................ 53 
Existing Research on ACT for Stress Management at Work .................. 64 
Values in ACT: What May They Add Beyond the   
Effects of Mindfulness ............................................................................. 67 
Overview and Statement of Purpose .................................................................... 68 
Research Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 70 
2.    METHOD .................................................................................................................. 72 
Participant Recruitment ........................................................................................ 72 
Interventions ......................................................................................................... 73 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) ........................................ 73 
Acceptance Therapy (AT) ........................................................................ 74 
Procedure .............................................................................................................. 75 
Measures ............................................................................................................... 76 
Participant Characteristics ....................................................................... 76 
Demographic Questionnaire ......................................................... 76 
Work Control ................................................................................ 76 
 
 
v 
Outcome Measures ................................................................................... 77 
Job Stress Survey .......................................................................... 77 
Survey of Recent Life Events ....................................................... 78 
Beck Depression Inventory-II ....................................................... 79 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory ................................................ 79 
General Health Questionnaire-12 ................................................. 80 
The Short-Form-36 Health Survey ............................................... 80 
Quality of Life-Inventory .............................................................. 81 
Job Satisfaction Scale ................................................................... 82 
Intrinsic Job Motivation Scale ...................................................... 82 
Work Involvement Scale............................................................... 83 
Higher Order Need Strength Scale ............................................... 83 
Process Measures ..................................................................................... 83 
Work Locus of Control Scale ....................................................... 83 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale ............................................... 84 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire .......................................... 84 
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. ................................. 86 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire .............................................. 87 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire-Positive ................................ 88 
Valued Coping in Action Questionnaire ....................................... 89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
Therapy Process Measures ....................................................................... 92 
Expectations for Treatment ........................................................... 92 
Group Cohesiveness...................................................................... 93 
Skills Practice Monitoring ............................................................ 94 
3.    RESULTS .................................................................................................................. 96 
Participant Recruitment ........................................................................................ 96 
Treatment Manual Adherence .............................................................................. 97 
Adherence to Treatment Components ..................................................... 97 
Quality of Adherence to Treatment Components .................................... 98 
Adherence to Therapeutic Stance ............................................................ 98 
Evaluation of Data Characteristics & Analysis .................................................. 100 
Participant Characteristics .................................................................................. 103 
Pre-treatment Comparisons on Participants’ Expectations ................................ 105 
Intervention Evaluation Using Statistical Significance Testing ......................... 106 
Between-Group Pre-treatment Comparisons Across Measures ............. 106 
Within-Group Comparisons on Outcomes ............................................. 106 
Stress ........................................................................................... 106 
Mental Health.............................................................................. 107 
Health, Functioning, & Quality of Life ...................................... 108 
Work Attitudes ............................................................................ 108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
Within-Group Comparisons on Process Measures ................................ 108 
Locus of Control, Affect & Cognition ........................................ 108 
Mindfulness, Coping, & Values .................................................. 109 
Between-Group Comparisons Across Measures ................................... 110 
Intervention Evaluation Using Effect Size ......................................................... 111 
Between-Group Effect Sizes for Outcome Measures ............................ 112 
Between-Group Effect Sizes for Process Measures ............................... 112 
Within-Group Effect Sizes on Outcome Measures ................................ 114 
Within-Group Effect Sizes on Process Measures .................................. 114 
Associations Between Process and Outcome Measures ..................................... 116 
Stress Outcomes ..................................................................................... 116 
Mental Health Outcomes ....................................................................... 117 
Health, Functioning, & Quality of Life Outcomes ................................ 118 
Job Satisfaction ...................................................................................... 119 
Results for Group Process Measures .................................................................. 119 
Extent Expectations Were Met .............................................................. 119 
Group Cohesiveness ............................................................................... 120 
Skills Practice Monitoring ..................................................................... 121 
4.    DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................... 122 
Hypotheses One .................................................................................................. 122 
Hypothesis Two .................................................................................................. 123 
Hypothesis Three ................................................................................................ 124 
Hypotheses Four and Five .................................................................................. 126 
viii 
Hypothesis Six .................................................................................................... 127 
Hypothesis Seven ............................................................................................... 128 
Discussion of Specific Findings on Outcomes ................................................... 129 
Stress ...................................................................................................... 129 
Mental Health ......................................................................................... 130 
Health & Functional Interference .......................................................... 131 
Quality of Life ........................................................................................ 132 
Work Attitudes ....................................................................................... 133 
Discussion of Specific Findings for Process Measures ...................................... 134 
Locus of Control .................................................................................... 134 
Affect ..................................................................................................... 135 
Cognition ................................................................................................ 136 
Mindfulness ............................................................................................ 138 
Values-based Behavior .......................................................................... 141 
Study Strengths ................................................................................................... 145 
Limitations and Ideas for Future Research ......................................................... 147 
Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................. 152 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 157 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 192 
APPENDIX A. Valued Coping in Action Questionnaire, Values 
(VCAQ-V) and Action (VCAQ-A) .................................................................... 193 
APPENDIX B. Tables of Median Rank Differences Within 
and Between Groups........................................................................................... 201 
ix 
APPENDIX C. Tables of Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables   
and T4 Outcomes ................................................................................................ 219 
APPENDIX D. Tables of Means, Mean Differences, and Hedge’s g   
Effect Sizes Within and Between Groups .......................................................... 225 
APPENDIX E. Table of Expectancies for the Program and Table of   
Post-treatment and Follow-up Assessment of Skills Practice ............................ 243 
APPENDIX F. Working with Stress - Manual Adherence Checklist ................ 246 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR ................................................................................. 251 
x 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table B.1. Median rank differences within and between groups for job  
  stress (JSS) and life stress (SRLE)………….…………………………..201 
Table B.2. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for   
  depression (JBDI), state anxiety (STAIS), general distress (GHQ), 
   and general physical ill health (SF-1)……………………………….….203 
Table B.3. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups  
 for not doing work or other activities as carefully as usual due to 
emotional problems (SF-5c), interference in social activities by  
 physical health or emotional problems (SF-6), overall quality  
 of life (QoL), and work quality of life (QoL-W)……...........................205 
Table B.4. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups 
 for job satisfaction (JSAT), motivation (IJM), meaning (WIS),  
 and importance (HONS)…………..…………….……………………..207 
Table B.5. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups 
 for work locus of control (WLoC), negative affect (NAS),  
 positive affect (PAS), and trait anxiety (STAI-T)……………………..209 
Table B.6. Median differences within and between treatment groups for 
 frequency of automatic negative thoughts (ATQ-NF), belief in 
 automatic negative thoughts (ATQ-NB), frequency of automatic 
 positive thoughts (ATQ-PF), and belief in automatic positive  
 thoughts (ATQ-PB)…………………………………………………….211 
xi 
Table B.7. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups  
 for psychological flexibility (AAQ), the Willingness subscale 
 (AAQ-W), and the Action subscale (AAQ-A)………………………...213 
Table B.8. Median differences within and between treatment groups overall 
mindfulness (FFMQ) and its subscales of Nonreactivity 
 (FFMQ-NR), Observing (FFMQ-O), Acing with Awareness 
 (FFMQ-A), Describing (FFMQ-D), and Nonjudging (FFMQ-NJ)…....214 
Table B.9. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups 
 for value placed on approach coping (ApprchC-V), use of 
 approach coping (ApprchC-A), value placed on avoidance 
 coping (AvoidC-V), and use of avoidance coping (AvoidC-A)……….216 
Table B.10. Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for 
 values-to-action incongruence for all coping strategies  
 (VCAQ-VA), for approach coping (ApprchC-VA), and for 
 avoidance coping (AvoidC-VA)……………………………………….218 
Table C.1. Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Stress 
 Outcomes for Each Group……………………………………………..219 
Table C.2. Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Mental 
 Health Outcomes for Each Group……………………………………...221 
Table C.3. Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Physical 
 Illness & Functional Interference Outcomes in ACT………………….222 
Table C.4. Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Quality 
 of Life and Job Satisfaction Outcomes for Each Group……………….223 
xii 
Table D.1. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within 
 and between treatment groups for job stress (JSS) and  
 life stress (SRLE)………………………………………………………225 
Table D.2. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within 
 and between treatment groups for depression (JBDI), state 
 anxiety (STAIS), general distress (GHQ), and general physical 
 health (SF-1)…………………………………………………………...227 
Table D.3. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within 
 and between treatment groups for interference in social activities 
 by physical health or emotional problems (SF-6), overall quality 
 of life (QoL), and work quality of Life (QoL-W)……………………...229 
Table D.4. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and 
 between treatment groups for job satisfaction (JSAT), 
 motivation (IJM), meaning (WIS), and importance (HONS)………….230 
Table D.5. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within 
 and between treatment groups for work locus of control 
 (WLoC), negative affect (NAS), positive affect (PAS), 
 and trait anxiety (STAI-T)……………………………………………..232 
Table D.6. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within 
 and between treatment groups for frequency of automatic 
 negative thoughts (ATQ-NF), belief in automatic negative 
 thoughts (ATQ-NB), frequency of automatic positive thoughts 
 (ATQ-PF), and belief in automatic positive thoughts (ATQ-PB)……...234 
xiii 
Table D.7. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and 
 between treatment groups for psychological flexibility (AAQ), 
 the Willingness subscale (AAQ-W), and  
 the Action subscale (AAQ-A)………………………………………….236 
Table D.8. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and 
 between treatment groups for overall mindfulness (FFMQ) and 
 its subscales of Nonreactivity (FFMQ-NR), Observing  
 (FFMQ-O), Acing with Awareness (FFMQ-A), Describing 
 (FFMQ-D), and Nonjudging (FFMQ-NJ)…………………………….238 
Table D.9. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and 
 between treatment groups for value placed on approach coping 
 (ApprchC-V), use of approach coping (ApprchC-A), value 
 placed on avoidance coping (AvoidC-V), and use of 
 avoidance coping (AvoidC-A)…………………………………………240 
Table D.10. Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and 
 between treatment groups for values-to-action incongruence for 
 all coping strategies (VCAQ-VA), for approach coping 
 (ApprchC-VA), and for avoidance coping (AvoidC-VA)……………..242 
Table E.1. Extent Expectancies for the Program were Met Across 
 Assessments for Each Group…………………………………………..243 
Table E.2. Post-treatment and Follow-up Assessment of Skills Practice 
 for each Group…………………………………………………………245 
 
1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent years, the evolution of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) interventions 
has included the development of mindfulness- or acceptance-based approaches (Hayes, 
2004).  These interventions, termed third-wave CBTs, have been developed and are built 
on a distinct theoretical perspective regarding the source and alleviation of distress. These 
interventions emphasize changing how individuals relate to their thoughts, feelings, and 
physical experiences rather than changing the content of those experiences, in order to 
alleviate unpleasant psychological and physical experiences (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999; Linehan, 1993; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).  The effectiveness of 
these third-wave CBT approaches has been documented for a wide variety of 
psychological and physical disorders (see Baer, 2003 and Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, 
& Lillis, 2006 for recent reviews).  Several of these interventions have focused on the 
alleviation of stress related to psychological and physical disorders and their outcome 
evaluations have also indicated positive effects (e.g., Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Kaplan, 
Goldenberg, & Galvin-Nadeau, 1993). 
 Encouraged by such positive findings from research in clinical psychology and 
behavioral medicine, stress management interventions that employ psychological 
mindfulness techniques have recently entered into the empirical purview of occupational 
health psychology, and a number of interventions have shown promising outcomes (e.g., 
Bond & Bunce, 2000; Williams, Kolar, Reger, & Pearson, 2001).  One such intervention 
is based on the psychotherapy version of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT, 
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said as one word, not as letters; Hayes et al., 1999).  Theoretically grounded in the 
behavioral tradition and based on an empirical analysis of human cognition, ACT is 
unique among the third-wave mindfulness-based therapies.  Proponents of ACT 
operationalize the construct and techniques of mindfulness in cognitive-behavioral terms 
and also address the role of personal values in behavior (Hayes, 2004).   
 Further research is needed to better understand the effects of such mindfulness-
based approaches as ACT for stress management in occupational settings.  Research is 
also needed to examine whether non-mindfulness strategies incorporated within 
multimodal mindfulness interventions (e.g., values components in ACT) add to the 
effects of mindfulness toward mental and physical well-being outcomes, as well as work-
related outcomes and coping behaviors.  Furthermore, the mechanisms that may drive the 
effects achieved in ACT-based interventions are just beginning to be researched and 
warrant further examination.  
 This review focuses on the theoretical and empirical status of ACT and its 
components, as well as other mindfulness-based approaches, and their relevance for 
stress management and general well-being.  A recently developed ACT-based stress 
intervention, specifically developed for the workplace, is described and compared to 
other commonly utilized stress management programs.  Based on this review of the 
literature, it is contended that the development of mindfulness reflects an effective 
strategy to reduce workplace strain and improve mental and physical well-being as well 
as other work-related outcomes.   
 To ascertain the effects of mindfulness training and of personal values clarification 
above and beyond that of mindfulness, an intervention study was undertaken.  This study 
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evaluated a workplace stress management program based on an existing ACT-based 
protocol for the reduction of stress at the workplace.  A dismantling design was used to 
compare the effects of the complete program to an abbreviated version that omits the 
values components.  Mental and physical well-being, work-related outcomes, 
engagement in various coping behaviors, and factors hypothesized to relate to changes in 
measures of mental and physical well-being were assessed prior to and following the 
provision of the interventions, as well as at three follow-up assessments. 
Philosophical and Theoretical Roots of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
The Third Wave of Behavioral Therapy 
 The recent attention to mindfulness and its application within mental and physical 
health settings has been encouraged by the development of a new paradigm within the 
field of behavioral psychology termed the “third wave” or generation of behavior 
therapies (Hayes, 2004).  According to Hayes (2004), the first generation of behavior 
therapies represented a rebellion against the prevailing clinical conceptions of analytic 
and humanistic traditions of psychology.  The goal of the first wave was to counter the 
theoretical and scientific weaknesses of these non-empirical clinical perspectives.  
Behavior therapists argued against complex untested theorizing in interpretation of 
psychological symptoms and provided simpler explanations for behavior with the aim of 
practical utility (e.g., Ayllon, Haughton, & Hughes, 1965; Wolpe & Rachman, 1960).  
The first generation of behavior therapies, based on learning theories and a commitment 
to well-established experimental paradigms, was directly focused on problematic overt 
behavior and emotional reactions (Hayes, 2004). 
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 This narrow focus, however, led to a neglect of internal and subjective events of 
the human experience that were not amenable to examination via simple associative 
concepts of stimulus-response learning.  According to Hayes (2004), attempts by 
traditional Skinnerian behaviorists to empirically and adequately account for the 
development of language and cognition were deemed inadequate.  In this context, 
behavioral theorists of the late 1960s and early 1970s searched for more novel and 
flexible learning principles in order to address thoughts and feelings.  Early cognitive 
mediational accounts of behavior change (e.g., Bandura, 1969) evolved quickly into the 
cognitive therapy movement (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Mahoney, 1974; 
Michenbaum, 1977).   
 This second wave of behavior therapy did carry forward with it many of the 
central themes of the first wave, such as adherence to measurement and functionality.  
Also included in the second-wave CBT interventions was the focus on content changes, 
or what has been called content-focused or “first-order” change (Hayes, 2004, p. 643).   
Although targeting cognitive processes, this focus mirrored behavioral change strategies 
from the first wave, such as increasing time spent in social situations for anxious clients 
who avoided such situations (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2004).  In the 
second wave, strategies were developed with the goals of weakening or eliminating 
thoughts deemed irrational, cognitive schemas seen as pathological, and information-
processing styles categorized as faulty, via their detection, disputation, and correction 
(Beck, 1993).  Such strategies implicitly assume that changing undesirable thoughts and 
feelings will result in improved quality of and success in life. 
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 Within the past decade, a new third wave of behavior therapy has emerged, fueled 
in large part by the emergence of two notable issues (Hayes, 2004). First, the 
identification of various empirical anomalies concerning the role of cognitive variables 
has led to the reexamination of certain aspects of the second wave’s emphasis on 
cognitions over behavior.  One core assumption that has come under particular scrutiny 
and undermines the “first-order” change agenda of the first two waves of behavior 
therapy is that direct cognitive change is a necessary or primary method of clinical 
improvement in most cases (Hayes, 2004).  Specifically, results from a series of 
component analysis studies of CBT for depression revealed no additive benefit to 
providing cognitive change strategies (Gortner, Gollan, Dobson, & Jacobson, 1998; 
Jacobson et al., 1996).  In addition, researchers have found that the response to traditional 
cognitive therapy often occurs before the presumptively key features of the therapy have 
been fully implemented (Ilardi & Craighead, 1994, 1999).  Furthermore, support for the 
hypothesized mediators of change in cognitive therapy is mixed (e.g., Burns & Spangler, 
2001; Morganstern & Longabaugh, 2000). 
 The second factor influencing the development of the third wave of behavior 
therapies reflected the inadequacy of the prevalent philosophical perspectives underlying 
the second wave.  According to Hayes and colleagues (2006), the cognitive-behavioral 
therapies that emerged during the second wave were based on dominant cognitive models 
that were largely either mechanistic information processing approaches or cognitive 
developmental approaches (Hayes et al., 2006).  In addition, these perspectives were 
more focused on the nature and evolution of cognitions and their impact on other 
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experiences than they were on the specific contextual events that may regulate these 
psychological events and relate them to each other (Hayes, 2004). 
 The mechanistic stance has been utilized in second-wave interventions to argue 
that if a particular thought is associated with an undesirable effect (e.g., an aversive 
emotion), then the content of that thought should usually be directly targeted, the logical 
flaws in its content pointed out or tested, and alternative content instilled (Hayes, 2004).  
Hayes (2004) argues that this line of action presupposes that the form, frequency, or 
situational appropriateness of the thought itself is what leads directly to emotional and 
behavioral effects. 
 Hayes and Brownstein (1986) proposed that such a philosophical base has been 
deemed inadequate for empirical accounts or models of cognition because it tends to limit 
the direct applied relevance of the basic cognitive concepts that result from it.  According 
to the authors, cognitive concepts generated by information processing and 
developmental cognitive perspectives, unlike those from behavioral analysis, do not 
allow for a manipulable context that could be targeted in order to affect a dependent 
variable.  For example, a concept such as cognitive schema (Piaget, 1964), is focused on 
the organization of a specific kind of dependent variable (i.e., cognition) but it does not 
itself specify the contextual events that could alter this variable or regulate its impact on 
other forms of experience or activity. Thus, the concept of schema is inherently different 
from a behavioral analysis principle such as reinforcement, which focuses on the 
interface between action and its changeable context (Hayes et al., 2006). 
Rather than specifying a contextual term as a target of intervention for the 
purpose of improved functioning and lessened distress, the second wave of behavior 
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therapies (i.e., CBT)  has made cognitions and other internal events their targets of 
change, with mixed results and without a sound empirically-derived theoretical basis. In 
addition, Hayes and colleagues (1993) state that the rise of constructivism and similar 
postmodern theories of science have also contributed to the evolution of the third wave 
approaches by weakening the idea that scientific theories ought to identify discrete parts 
of reality that can then be organized into comprehensive models (Hayes, Hayes, Reese, & 
Sarbin, 1993).  Such a philosophical shift has further eroded the assumptive base of both 
the first and second wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies and their underlying 
theories in favor of a more instrumentalist and contextual approach (Hayes, 2004). 
 Examples of contextual therapies that developed as part of the third wave of 
behavioral therapy include Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), along with 
several mindfulness-based CBTs and related meta-cognitive approaches which will be 
reviewed in the subsequent section.  These third generation approaches have been defined 
as follows (Hayes, 2004): 
Grounded in an empirical, principle-focused approach, the third wave of 
behavioral and cognitive therapy is particularly sensitive to the context and 
functions of psychological phenomena, not just their form, and thus tends to 
emphasize contextual and experiential change strategies in addition to more direct 
and didactic ones. These treatments tend to seek the construction of broad, 
flexible and effective repertoires over an eliminative approach to narrowly 
defined problems, and to emphasize the relevance of the issues they examine for 
clinicians as well as clients (p. 658).   
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ACT is unique among the third wave approaches in that, beyond embracing a 
contextualistic philosophy of science, it is based on a basic, empirically-derived theory of 
language and cognition and an applied theory of psychopathology and psychotherapy 
(Hayes et al., 2006).   
ACT Philosophy: Functional Contextualism 
 ACT is rooted in the pragmatic philosophy of functional contextualism (Biglan & 
Hayes, 1996; Hayes, 1993; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988); a 
specific variety of contextualism that has as its goal the prediction and influence of 
events, with precision, scope and depth (Hayes, 1993). The core analytic unit of 
functional contextualism is the “ongoing act in context” (Hayes, 2004, p. 646). This 
perspective views psychological events as continuous actions of the whole organism 
interacting in and with historically and situationally defined contexts and forms the basis 
of the behavior analysis tradition from which ACT evolved (Hayes, 2004). The main 
components of functional contextualism are “(a) a focus on the whole event, (b) 
sensitivity to the role of context in understanding the nature and function of an event, (c) 
emphasis on a pragmatic truth criterion, and (d) specific scientific goals against which to 
apply that truth criterion” (Hayes, 2004, p. 646).   
 Workability represents the truth criterion emphasized in all forms of 
contextualism (Hayes et al., 1988), in other words, what is considered “true” is what 
works or is functional.  In order to know what is functional, however, one needs to know 
what is being worked toward so that such a goal is able to allow a pragmatic truth 
criterion to be applied (Hayes, 1993).  Therefore, in ACT, personal goals and values are 
integral to the assessment of workability (Hayes et al., 2006). Also in ACT, causal 
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analyses are limited to events that are directly manipulable, and thus it has a consciously 
contextualistic focus. From such a perspective, thoughts and feelings do not cause other 
actions, except as regulated by context (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes & Brownstein, 
1986). Therefore, it is possible to go beyond attempting to change thoughts or feelings so 
as to change overt behavior, to changing the context that causally links these 
psychological domains (Hayes et al., 2006).  According to Hayes (2004), the removal of a 
client’s problematic behaviors from the contexts involved (e.g., merely analyzing 
symptoms themselves) is seen as missing the nature of the problem and options to solve it 
(Hayes, 2004).  Instead, accomplishing the goal of influencing behavior is said to require 
manipulation of events, and only contextual variables can be manipulated directly (Hayes 
& Brownstein, 1986). 
 There are several key implications of functional contextualism as a philosophy of 
science that highlight the contrast to the mechanistic approach and are also echoed within 
ACT.  Hayes (2004) outlined them as follows. First, because functional contextualism 
rejects ontology on epistemological grounds, ACT does not attempt to find out what is 
objectively true or real because the world is known only through our interactions in and 
with it and such interactions are always constrained by history and context. Workability 
of the changes made via the application of ACT is instead the truth criterion.  In a parallel 
way, ACT clients are encouraged to abandon any interest in the literal truth of their own 
thoughts or judgments and instead encouraged to embrace a focus on living according to 
their life goals or values.  Second, the holistic and context-focus of functional 
contextualism emphasizes that no event affects another in a simple mechanical way.  
ACT embodies this assumption by proposing that a client adopt an open and accepting 
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stance toward all psychological events, even if those events have been labeled “negative” 
or “irrational”.  It is not their presence that is the issue to be dealt with but their 
contextually established function and meaning.  Lastly, the foundational nature of goals 
in functional contextualism is reflected in ACT’s emphasis on chosen personal values as 
a necessary part of a meaningful life and an effective course of treatment. 
Theoretical Framework of ACT: Relational Frame Theory 
 ACT is built on Relational Frame Theory, a functional contextual theory of 
human language and cognition developed from a comprehensive experimental research 
program (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). RFT has become one of the 
most actively researched basic behavior analytic theories of human behavior, with over 
70 empirical studies focused on it tenets (reviewed in Hayes et al., 2001).  
 According to RFT, the core of human language and cognition is the learned and 
contextually controlled ability to arbitrarily relate events mutually and in combination, 
and to change the functions of specific events based on their relations to others (Hayes et 
al., 2006). Hayes (2004) provides the following example to illustrate this proposition: 
Very young children will know that a nickel is larger than a dime by physical size, but 
not until later will the child understand that a nickel is smaller than a dime by social 
attribution. In addition to being arbitrarily applicable (a nickel is ‘‘smaller’’ than a dime 
merely by social convention), this more psychologically complex relation is mutual (e.g., 
if a nickel is smaller than a dime, a dime is bigger than a nickel), combinatorial (e.g., if a 
penny is smaller than a nickel and a nickel is smaller than a dime then a penny is smaller 
than a dime), and alters the function of related events (e.g., if a nickel has been used to 
buy candy, a dime will now be preferred even if it has never actually been used before).  
11 
 Hayes (2004) and colleagues (Hayes et al., 2006) note three critical features of 
RFT that lead to the applied implications of the theory.  The first feature is that human 
cognition represents a specific kind of learned behavior. For example, RFT researchers 
have recently shown that arbitrarily applicable comparative relations (e.g., the nickel and 
dime situation just mentioned) can be trained as an overarching operant in young children 
(Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Strand, & Friman, 2004).  The second feature 
is that such relations show “combinatorial entailment” (Hayes, 2004, p. 648): 
If a person learns in a particular context that A relates in a particular way to B, 
and B relates in a particular way to C, then this must entail some kind of mutual 
relation between A and C in that context.  For example, if by attribution a nickel 
is smaller than a dime and a dime is smaller than a quarter, then it will be derived 
that a quarter is bigger than a nickel and a nickel is smaller than a quarter (p. 
648). 
 The last critical characteristic of RFT is that such relations make it possible to 
change the stimulus functions among related stimuli.  For example, if an individual wants 
to purchase some candy and a dime is known to be valuable, it will be derived that a 
nickel will be less valuable and a quarter will be more valuable towards that goal, without 
necessarily directly purchasing candy with nickels and quarters.  A “relational frame” is 
said to refer to the occasion when all the three features just noted are established within a 
given type of relational responding (Hayes, 2004). 
 According to Hayes (2004), what makes relational framing clinically relevant is 
that functions given to one member of related events tends to alter the functions of other 
members.  Hayes (2004, p. 648-649) illustrates this concept in the following way: Take a 
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child who has never seen a cat. After learning that “C-A-T” → (i.e., refers to) an animal, 
and that “C-A-T” also → “cat”, the child can derive four additional relations: (1) animal 
→ C-A-T, (2)“cat” → C-A-T, (3) “cat” → animal, and (4) animal → “cat”. Now suppose 
that the child is scratched by a cat while playing, cries in distress, and runs away.  If later 
the child hears someone say “Oh, look, a cat!”, the child may cry and run away again, 
even though the child was never scratched in the presence of someone saying the words 
“Oh, look, a cat!”  Such effects may help explain why, for example, individuals who 
experience being trapped in a vehicle during an accident may later have an initial panic 
attack while “trapped” in a shopping mall, and soon find that they are worrying about 
being “trapped” in an open field or on a bridge.  According to Hayes (2004), what brings 
these situations together is not their formal properties in a simple sense, but the 
verbal/cognitive activities that relate these events together for an individual. 
 In RFT, human language and cognition are both dependent on relational frames 
(Hayes, 2004).  When we think, reason, speak with meaning, or listen with 
understanding, we do so by deriving relations among events – among words and events, 
words and words, and events and events.  According to Hayes (2004), unlike Skinner’s 
verbal operants, what makes relational operants unique is that they alter how direct 
learning processes themselves work.  This means that the changes of stimulus functions 
alters how stimulus control operates since now events can acquire functions through 
indirect, relational (i.e., cognitive) means. Thus, Hayes (2004) notes that in RFT, unlike 
Skinner’s account, it is not simply possible to but actually necessary to examine cognition 
in order to understand human behavior, and such a task requires a contextual rather than a 
mechanistic approach. 
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 The primary implications of RFT in the area of psychopathology and 
psychotherapy extend from the important features just described (Hayes, 2004; Hayes et 
al., 2001): (1) verbal problem solving and reasoning is based on some of the same 
cognitive processes that can lead to psychopathology, and thus it is not practically viable 
to eliminate these processes, (2) much as extinction inhibits but does not eliminate 
learned responding, the common sense idea that cognitive networks can be logically 
restricted or eliminated is generally not psychologically sound because these networks 
are the reflection of historical learning processes; (3) direct change attempts focused on 
key nodes in cognitive networks creates a context that tends to elaborate the network in 
that area and increase the functional importance of these nodes, and (4) given that the 
content and the impact of cognitive networks are controlled by distinct contextual 
features, it is possible to reduce the impact of negative cognitions whether or not they 
continue to occur in a particular form.  According to Hayes and colleagues (2006), taken 
together, these four implications mean that it is often neither wise nor necessary to focus 
primarily on the content of cognitive networks in clinical intervention, and as an 
alternative they suggest that it is quite possible instead to focus on their functions. 
The ACT Model of Psychopathology and Psychotherapy 
Factors Underlying Psychopathology 
 In ACT, virtually every component of the protocol is connected conceptually to 
RFT (Hayes et al., 2006). From an ACT/RFT point of view, although psychological 
problems can emerge from the general absence of relational abilities (e.g., in the case of 
mental retardation), a primary source of psychopathology (as well as a process 
exacerbating the impact of other sources of psychopathology) is the way that language 
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and cognition interact with direct contingencies to produce an inability to persist or 
change behavior in the service of long-term valued ends (Hayes et al., 2006). According 
to Hayes (2004), this kind of psychological inflexibility or rigidity is argued to emerge 
from two main processes, cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance, both of which are 
direct consequences of human language and cognition itself, although amplified by 
culture and learning experiences (Hayes, 2004).  
 Cognitive fusion refers to excessive or improper regulation of behavior by verbal 
processes, such as rules and derived relational networks (see Hayes, Strosahl et al., 1999 
for further details). Relational networks are extremely difficult to break up, even with 
direct, contradictory training (Wilson & Hayes, 1996).  This difficulty is due in part to 
numerous derived relations that are available to maintain and reestablish a given 
relational network. In addition, the actual experience of learning and deriving relational 
networks that make sense or allow an individual to solve a problem in essence provide 
automatic reinforcement for the act of deriving such relations (Hayes, 2004).  According 
to Hayes (2004), the result of this difficulty (i.e., in altering established language and 
cognition processes and the reinforcing nature of these processes) is that stimulus 
functions from relational frames typically dominate over other factors capable of 
regulating behavior and do so with little or no awareness of these processes.   
 Hayes (1989) also contends that in contexts that foster cognitive fusion, human 
behavior is guided more by relatively inflexible verbal networks of rules and evaluations 
than by contact with here-and-now experiences and the direct environmental 
contingencies therein (Hayes, 1989). Thus, an individual is unaware of the relational 
processes themselves. For example, the fearful client who constructs a fearful 
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environment will act as if that fearsomeness has been somehow discovered and is outside 
of the individual, rather than as being assembled cognitively (Hayes, 2004).  As a result, 
individuals may act in a way that is inconsistent with their chosen life values and goals. 
Because behavior governed by relational networks is extremely insensitive to 
contradictory experiences (e.g., Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb, & Korn, 1986), 
verbal formulations can continue to create distress even when little environmental 
support exists for them (Hayes, 2004). From an ACT/RFT point of view, the form or 
content of cognition is not directly troublesome, unless contextual features lead this 
cognitive content to regulate human action in unworkable or dysfunctional ways (Hayes 
et al., 2006). 
 According to Hayes and colleagues (2006), the functional contexts that tend to 
have such deleterious effects are largely sustained by the social/verbal community and 
come in several forms. For example, a context of literality treats symbols (e.g., the 
thought, ‘‘life is hopeless’’) as one would referents or literal truths (i.e., a truly hopeless 
life). A context of reason-giving bases action or inaction excessively on the constructed 
‘‘causes’’ of an individual’s own behavior, especially when these processes point to non-
manipulable ‘‘causes’’ such as conditioned ways of thinking or patterns of emotional 
reactions (Addis & Jacobson, 1996; Zettle & Hayes, 1986).  Individuals then assume that 
to change how they act or do not act, they must change the cause, the painful thought or 
feeling.  A context of experiential control focuses on the manipulation of emotional and 
cognitive states as a primary goal and metric of successful living.  
 These contexts are interrelated, which helps explain why cognitive fusion 
supports the second main process purported to underlie psychopathology according to 
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ACT, experiential avoidance – the attempt to alter the form, frequency, or situational 
sensitivity of private events even when doing so causes behavioral harm (Hayes, Wilson, 
Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). An individual does not have the option of trying to 
avoid psychological pain or distress, as they could a situation that had caused physical 
pain in the past. According to Hayes (2004), relational frames allow such distress to 
occur in almost any situation via a transformation of stimulus functions and their 
arbitrary contextual control does not allow the use of simple avoidance of the situation as 
an effective solution.  Due to the temporal and comparative relations present in human 
language, so-called ‘‘negative’’ emotions are verbally identified, evaluated, and avoided 
(Hayes et al., 2006).  Experiential avoidance is based on this natural language process—a 
capacity to relate events via language and engage in verbal rules that is not inherently 
problematic.  The process does become maladaptive, however, when amplified by the 
culture into a general focus on ‘‘feeling good’’ and avoiding pain. Unable to control pain 
by situational means, humans may try to avoid the painful thoughts and feelings 
themselves with excessive verbal regulation that becomes inflexible to feedback from its 
dysfunctional consequences.   
Unfortunately, many attempts to avoid uncomfortable private events (e.g., 
suppression) tend to increase their occurrence and behavioral impact (Cioffi & Holloway, 
1993; Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987).  This result 
occurs because such control efforts may ultimately themselves come to cue the avoided 
event or strengthen the underlying relational frames.  In other words, attempts at not 
thinking of being anxious or avoiding situations similar to the situation which brought on 
the experience of being anxious will serve as a contextual cue for anxiety and the 
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thoughts and feelings associated with the actual event that this anxiety is related to 
(Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 2006).  Short-term feelings of control over painful private 
events, coupled with social pressure to “feel good” and be free of difficult psychological 
pain may, however, reinforce and encourage use of such avoidance strategies.  Reliance 
on avoidance strategies further narrows the range of behaviors that an individual is 
willing to engage in given that many behaviors might evoke these feared private events 
(Hayes et al., 2004). 
 According to Hayes and colleagues (2006), cognitive fusion and experiential 
avoidance fuel each other and hamper engagement in alternative coping efforts as they 
strengthen.  Contact with the present moment decreases as individuals begin to live ‘‘in 
their heads” and become more and more “fused” with their cognitions.  The past and 
future, and even the self, are seen in conceptualized terms and gain more regulatory 
power over behavior, further contributing to psychological inflexibility (Hayes et al., 
2006). For example, it can become more important to be right about who is responsible 
for personal pain, than it is to live more effectively with the history one has.  Similarly, it 
can become more important to defend a verbal view of oneself (e.g., being a victim, 
never being angry, being broken, etc.) than to engage in more workable forms of 
behavior that do not fit that verbalization.  
 According to this model, in the world of overt behavior, long-term desired 
qualities of life (i.e., values) take a backseat to more immediate and self-soothing goals of 
being right, looking good, feeling good, and defending a conceptualized self.  Patterns of 
action emerge from habitual engagement and gradually dominate an individual’s 
repertoire of behaviors, even as they prolong or exacerbate psychological distress and 
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move the individual further and further away from long-term desired qualities of living 
(Hayes et al., 2006).  
Core Therapeutic Strategies of ACT 
 The general clinical goals of ACT are to undermine fusion with the literal verbal 
content of cognition that encourages behaviors aimed at avoidance and to construct an 
alternative context in which behavior is in line with one’s values and is more likely to 
occur (Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999).  To counteract psychological rigidity and to 
promote psychological flexibility, the ACT intervention model is defined by: mindfulness 
processes, aimed at encouraging present-focused acceptance of and defusion from 
cognitive content, and values processes, aimed at identifying personal values to direct 
behavioral choices and developing commitment to those choices.  In other words, the 
goals of ACT are to enhance the ability to contact the present moment more fully and to 
change or persist in behavior when doing so serves valued ends (Hayes et al., 2006; 
Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson, & Gifford, 2004). According to this model, psychological 
flexibility is established through the following six core ACT processes: Acceptance, 
cognitive defusion, being present, self as context, values, and committed action.  Each of 
these areas is conceptualized as a positive psychological skill, not merely as a method of 
avoiding psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2006), and is described below in the order 
presented in the original ACT protocol (Hayes et al., 1999). 
 Taught as an alternative to experiential avoidance, acceptance refers to the 
willingness to experience all psychological events (i.e. thoughts, feelings, and 
sensations), including those which are negatively evaluated (e.g. anxiety) without 
changing, avoiding, or otherwise controlling them (Hayes, 1987; Hayes et al., 1996).  By 
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accepting these internal events, individuals can more effectively use their energies, 
formerly given over to resignation, avoidance, or control of these events in order to act in 
a way that is congruent with their values and goals.  ACT promotes acceptance by 
training individuals to be aware of their thoughts and feelings. For example, clients with 
anxiety disorders are taught to feel anxiety, as a feeling, fully and without defense, 
whereas clients with chronic pain are given methods that encourage them to let go of a 
struggle with pain (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Hayes et al., 2006). Acceptance is also 
fostered as a method of increasing values-based action. Thus, ACT clients are encouraged 
to feel good (i.e., do a good job of feeling fully what there is to be felt), as opposed to 
feeling good (i.e., changing one’s goal-directed actions in order to experience feelings 
that are evaluated as “good;” Hayes et al., 1996).  
 Cognitive defusion techniques attempt to alter the undesirable functions of 
thoughts and other private events, rather than trying to alter their form, frequency or 
situational sensitivity (Hayes et al., 2006). The goal of cognitive defusion is to change the 
way one interacts with or relates to thoughts by creating contexts in which their unhelpful 
functions are diminished. There are numerous techniques of defusion that have been 
developed for a wide variety of clinical presentations (Hayes & Strosahl, 2004). For 
example, a negative thought could be observed dispassionately, repeated out loud until 
only its sound remains and its meaning lost, or treated as an external event to be observed 
by giving it a shape, size, color, speed, or form.  An individual could thank his or her 
mind for such an interesting thought, label the process of thinking (‘‘I am having the 
thought that I am no good’’), or examine the historical thoughts, feelings, and memories 
that occur while he or she experiences that thought. Such procedures attempt to reduce 
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the literal quality of the thought, weakening the tendency to treat the thought as what it 
refers to (‘‘I am no good’’) rather than what it is directly experienced to be (e.g., the 
thought ‘‘I am no good’’).  The result of defusion is usually a decrease in believability of, 
or attachment to, private events rather than an immediate change in their frequency 
(Hayes et al., 2006). 
 In techniques aimed at encouraging clients to be present, ACT promotes ongoing 
non-judgmental contact with psychological and environmental events as they occur. The 
goal is to have clients experience the world more directly so that their behavior is more 
flexible and thus their actions are more consistent with the values that they hold (Hayes et 
al., 2006). Direct experiential contact then allows evaluation of the consequences of 
actions (or nonactions based on experiential avoidance) in terms of their workability with 
respect to valued ends.  In addition, language is used not to evaluate but as a tool to note 
and describe events in order to bring such events and their consequences into awareness. 
A sense of self called ‘‘self as process’’ is actively encouraged via the defused, non-
judgmental ongoing description of thoughts, feelings, and other private events (Hayes et 
al., 2006). 
 Related to this “self as process” and as a result of relational frames such as “I 
versus You”, “Now versus Then”, and “Here versus There”, human language leads to a 
sense of self as a locus or perspective, and provides a transcendent, spiritual side to 
normal verbal humans (Hayes et al., 2006).  In this vein, if “self as process” reflects the 
act of observing experience, then “self as context” reflects the observer that does the 
observing.  This concept represents one of the core seeds from which both ACT and RFT 
grew (Hayes, 1984); and there is now growing evidence of its importance to language 
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functions such as empathy, theory of mind, and sense of self (e.g., see McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004). In brief, the idea is that ‘‘I’’ emerges over large sets 
of exemplars of perspective-taking relations (i.e., what are termed in RFT ‘‘deictic 
relations’’). However, since this sense of self is a context for verbal knowing, not the 
content of that knowing, its limits cannot be consciously known. According to Hayes and 
colleagues (2006), self as context is important in part because from this standpoint one 
can be aware of one’s own flow of experiences without attachment to them or an 
investment in which particular experiences occur; thus defusion and acceptance is 
fostered. Self as context is developed in ACT by mindfulness exercises, the use of 
metaphors, and experiential processes. 
 Values in ACT represent chosen qualities of purposive action that can never be 
obtained as an object but can be instantiated moment by moment. ACT uses a variety of 
exercises to help a client choose life directions in various domains (e.g., family, career, 
spirituality) while undermining verbal processes that might lead to choices based on 
avoidance, social compliance, or fusion (e.g., ‘‘I should value X’’ or ‘‘A good person 
would value Y’’ or ‘‘My mother wants me to value Z’’, Hayes et al., 1999). In ACT, 
acceptance, defusion, and being present are not ends in themselves but rather reflect 
methods to clear the path for a more vital, values consistent life (Hayes et al., 2006; 
Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson, & Gifford, 2004). 
 Finally, ACT encourages the development of larger and larger patterns of 
effective action linked to chosen values, or committed action. In this regard, ACT looks 
very much like traditional behavior therapy, and almost any behaviorally coherent 
behavior change method can be fitted into an ACT protocol, including exposure, skills 
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acquisition, shaping methods, and goal setting (Hayes et al., 2006; Strosahl et al., 2004). 
Unlike values, which are constantly enacted but never achieved as an object, concrete 
goals that are values-consistent can be achieved.  ACT protocols almost always involve 
therapy work and homework linked to short, medium, and long-term behavior change 
goals (e.g., Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Hayes et al., 1999).  Significantly, behavior change 
efforts in turn may lead to contact with psychological barriers that are then addressed 
through the previous listed ACT processes. The core ACT components are both 
overlapping and interrelated and taken as a whole, each supports the other and all target 
psychological flexibility (Hayes et al., 2006). 
Empirical Status of ACT and Its Components 
Evaluations of ACT as an Intervention 
 ACT has been delivered in both individual and group psychotherapy formats.  
Because the conceptualization behind it is based on natural processes of human language 
and cognition (Hayes et al., 1996; Hayes et al., 2001), if the theory is correct, ACT 
should have broad applicability.  Support for this contention has been found within 
research evaluations of ACT applied to a wide variety of psychological and physical 
disorders.  Interestingly, the length of the ACT protocol utilized has varied greatly 
between extant published studies, from 48 sessions over 16 weeks to four sessions over 
three weeks (Hayes, Masuda, Bissett, Luoma, & Guerrero, 2004).   
 Examination of the literature indicates that ACT has been compared to a 
structured intervention and a control group in 11 randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and 
to wait-list, placebo, or treatment as usual conditions in six RCTs.  Four of these studies 
were not available to the present author for review given that they were dissertations 
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(Block, 2002, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006; Gregg, 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006; 
Lundgren, 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006), a manuscript in press (Gratz & 
Gunderson, in press, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006), or a paper presented at a conference 
(Branstetter, Wilson, Hildebrandt, & Mutch, 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006).  Data 
from these sources will be presented based on information provided within the recent 
review by Hayes and colleagues (Hayes et al., 2006).  Two RCTs specifically focusing on 
stress at the workplace (i.e., Bond & Bunce, 2000; Dahl, Wilson, & Nilsson, 2004) will 
be discussed in a later section. Beyond focusing on changes in outcomes, several of these 
studies have also either conducted formal mediational analyses, using the prominent 
procedures introduced by Judd and Kenny (1981), or have reported processes of change 
data using less stringent criteria, or have had their data reanalyzed for the purpose of 
mediational analysis. 
 The present review will begin with a discussion of the handful of studies that have 
directly compared ACT and traditional CT or CBT (Block, 2002, as cited in Hayes et al., 
2006; Branstetter et al., 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006; Zettle & Hayes, 1986; Zettle 
& Rains, 1989).  One of the first intervention studies to test the ACT model compared an 
early version of ACT called comprehensive distancing (CD) to two variants of cognitive 
therapy (CT) for depressed clients delivered in a 12 week individual protocol (Zettle & 
Hayes, 1986). Given that the two variants were virtually identical in outcomes, the two 
groups were combined for the main comparison. Results indicated that CD was superior 
to CT on depression outcomes at post-treatment and at a 2-month follow-up.  No 
significant differences were found between the CD and CT group on the reported 
frequency of automatic depressogenic thoughts.  However, clients were also asked to rate 
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the believability of these same thoughts when they occurred (i.e., a measure of cognitive 
fusion).  Results indicated that the CD group had lower cognitive fusion scores than those 
of the CT group at post-treatment and at follow-up. The groups also differed on a 
measure of reason-giving.  Specifically, individuals in the CD group reported reduced 
validity ratings for reasons given by hypothetical others for their dysfunctional actions 
from pre-treatment to post-treatment, whereas individuals in the CT group reported 
increased ratings.  With regard to validity ratings of their own reasons for engaging in 
hypothetical dysfunctional actions, the CD group evidenced a large reduction in validity 
ratings from post-treatment to follow-up, with a significant proportion reporting 
decreased ratings from pre-treatment through follow-up.  In contrast, CD participants 
reported only a slight reduction in ratings from pre-treatment to follow-up and a more 
noticeable increase from pre- to post-treatment. 
A formal mediational analysis was not reported in the original study, however, 
Hayes and colleagues (2006) reanalyzed the data.  At the mid-point of treatment (week 
6), individuals in the CD and CT groups did not differ significantly in their depression 
scores scores, but they did differ significantly in their cognitive fusion scores. Hayes and 
the other reviewers (2006) found that mid-point cognitive defusion scores did indeed 
mediate the decrease in depression scores at post-intervention and at follow-up. Thus 
greater changes in the believability of depressogenic thoughts mediated the superior 
outcomes achieved by ACT versus CT in this study. 
Subsequent to the study conducted by Zettle and Hayes (1986), Zettle and Rains 
(1989) further examined the early version of ACT (i.e., CD) versus CT for depression.  A 
sample of 31 women with moderate to severe depression were randomized to one of three 
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different group therapies: (a) complete cognitive therapy (CCT), involving procedures 
aimed at cognitive distancing, cognitive restructuring, and behavioral hypothesis-testing; 
(b) partial cognitive therapy (PCT), which omitted distancing procedures; or (c) 
comprehensive distancing (CD). All three groups showed significant, but equivalent, 
reductions in depression from pretreatment through follow-up.  Although a comparison of 
adjusted means revealed a lower score for CD than for either CCT or PCT, individuals in 
the CCT and PCT groups reported significant reductions in dysfunctional attitudes 
compared to individuals in the for CD group.  The authors concluded that these findings 
indicate different underlying therapeutic processes between the ACT-based and the 
cognitive therapy-based treatments. 
 Researchers in a separate lab (Block, 2002, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006) 
conducted a small randomized trial comparing ACT, cognitive-behavioral group therapy 
(CBGT), and a wait-list control group in the treatment of social phobia. Results indicated 
that both treatment groups were superior to the control condition on most outcome 
measures. Furthermore, participants in the ACT group participated longer in an arranged 
public speaking situation and reported larger reductions in distress during the speech than 
those in the other groups at post-treatment. The primary process variable, willingness to 
experience anxiety during exposure, also increased more pre to post-treatment for ACT 
than for CBGT and declined in the wait-list condition.  However, the differences among 
groups at baseline approached significance; ACT participants were generally more 
severely phobic.  Therefore, regression to the mean may represent a possible explanation 
for these results.  Examining only the post-treatment scores on the primary outcome 
variable (i.e., length of time in a public speaking situation), however, the effect sizes for 
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the differences in the outcome between ACT and either CBGT or the control group were 
large, which is particularly supportive given the trends at baseline. 
 More recently, ACT was compared with a traditional CBT intervention focusing 
on relaxation and cognitive restructuring.  In this study, the distress of individuals with 
end-stage cancer was targeted (Branstetter et al., 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006).  
Twelve sessions of each treatment were delivered to randomly assigned cancer patients 
during chemotherapy appointments or other medical visits.  By session 12, ACT 
produced significantly greater reductions in distress, anxiety, and depression in the 
patients compared to individuals in the traditional CBT group.  Conducting a mediation 
analysis, the researchers found that reductions in the Mental Disengagement subscale of 
the COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; e.g., ‘‘I go to movies or watch TV, to 
think about it less,’’) mediated the reduction in distress. Only the ACT condition resulted 
in reductions in mental disengagement, whereas the CBT condition actually resulted in 
increases this coping strategy (Hayes et al., 2006). 
 Between condition effects sizes (using Cohen’s d) across these four studies 
comparing ACT with CT or CBT were medium to large at post-treatment and large at 
follow-up in favor of ACT (Hayes et al., 2006).  On primary process of change measures 
specified from the ACT model (i.e., psychological acceptance), the between condition 
effect sizes in these studies were large at post-treatment and at follow-up. Thus, these 
early data tentatively suggest that ACT and traditional CBT may impact change processes 
differently and that ACT may have superior outcomes under certain circumstances 
(Hayes et al., 2006). 
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 Apart from such comparisons between ACT and comprehensive CT or CBT 
protocols, other studies have examined ACT compared to or in conjunction with 
intervention strategies falling within the behavior therapy tradition.  For example, Zettle 
(2003) contrasted ACT and systematic desensitization for math anxiety and found 
equivalent reductions.  However, greater change in trait anxiety was found with 
systematic desensitization. In a more recent randomized study, ACT plus another 
behavioral strategy, habit reversal, was compared to a wait-list control for the treatment 
of trichotillomania (Woods, Wetterneck, & Flessner, 2006). Results indicated that self-
reported and objectively verified hair pulling decreased significantly with the active 
treatment, was maintained at a 3-month follow-up, and correlated with changes in 
experiential avoidance to a large extent. 
 ACT has also been contrasted with various other intervention strategies in the area 
of substance abuse treatment. One study compared ACT to Nicotine Replacement 
Therapy (NRT) for smoking cessation (Gifford et al., 2004).  Although no differences 
were found in quit rates between conditions at post-treatment, the ACT condition had 
better outcomes at 6-month follow-up (23% quit rate for ACT versus 11% quit rate for 
NRT) and significantly better outcomes at 1-year follow-up (35% quit rate for ACT 
versus 15% quit rate for NRT). Mediational analyses indicated that scores on a measure 
assessing smokers’ endorsement of the need to avoid smoking-related thoughts and 
feelings in order to maintain abstinence accounted for the effects of ACT on abstinence 
outcomes. 
 Addressing more severe substance issues, Hayes and colleagues (2004) examined 
the treatment of polysubstance abusing individuals being maintained on methadone 
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(Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004). Participants were randomly assigned to either ACT, 
Intensive Twelve-Step Facilitation, or to a methadone maintenance only control 
condition. Participants in the two active treatments received 32 individual and 16 group 
sessions. At the 6-month follow-up, participants in the ACT condition demonstrated a 
greater decrease in objectively measured (i.e., through monitored urinalysis) total drug 
use than did methadone maintenance alone; and greater decreases in self-reported total 
drug use than both of the other conditions. ITSF includes a significant acceptance 
component and there were few process differences between ACT and ITSF. However, 
there were a number of process differences between ACT and the control condition, 
including extent of believability in automatic thoughts and reason-giving for using drugs.  
 Focusing on therapists working with substance abusing individuals and 
addressing more interpersonal outcomes, a recent study compared ACT, multicultural 
sensitivity training (MT), and education about the biology of addiction, each 
administered via a 6-hour workshop (Hayes, Bissett, et al., 2004). At follow-up, ACT, but 
not MT, was superior to the education condition regarding frequency of stigmatizing 
attitudes toward clients; ACT was also significantly better than MT in reducing burnout. 
Mediational analyses found that a measure of cognitive defusion from stigmatizing 
thoughts toward substance abusing clients mediated both counselor burnout and 
stigmatizing attitudes in the ACT group but not the MT group. 
 Speaking to its effectiveness with particularly difficult to treat conditions, ACT 
has also been used to treat individuals with personality disorders and to those struggling 
with psychosis. In a small randomized trial on self-harm and emotional dysregulation 
among individuals diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder, Gratz and Gunderson 
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(in press, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006) compared TAU to a condition consisting of ACT 
and Dialetical Behavior Therapy (DBT). Hayes and colleagues (2006) note that about 
two-thirds of the sessions appeared to have been drawn from ACT.  The ACT/DBT 
intervention resulted in large between group effects at post-treatment in reduction of self-
harm and emotional dysregulation. Furthermore, a very large effect size was found for 
experiential avoidance but correlations between process and outcome were not reported 
by the study authors (Hayes et al., 2006). 
 Focusing on helping inpatients cope with positive psychotic symptoms, Bach and 
Hayes (2002) compared four 45-min sessions of ACT to treatment as usual (TAU) in a 
randomized trial.  Although, overall symptom reduction was less in the ACT group 
compared with the TAU group, patients in the ACT condition exhibited half the rate of 
rehospitalization over a 4-month follow-up period compared with the TAU condition. 
Moreover, ACT resulted in lower believability ratings of psychotic symptoms (e.g., 
rating whether the delusions/hallucinations were literally true) at the 4-month follow-up.  
According to the authors, this pattern may be interpreted as an indication that ACT 
undermined denial and thus symptom admission was an indication of greater acceptance 
in the ACT group.  
In a replication study, Gaudiano and Herbert (2006a, 2006b) focused on coping 
with hallucinations or delusions among inpatients hospitalized with a primary psychotic 
disorder or mood disorder with psychotic features.  At discharge from the hospital, 
participants in a three-session ACT plus TAU condition showed significantly greater 
improvement in affective symptoms, overall improvement, social impairment, and 
distress associated with hallucinations than a TAU only condition.  In addition, the 4-
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month rehospitalization rates were 38% lower in the ACT group.  Believability of 
hallucinations was found to mediate the relationship between frequency of hallucinations 
and associated distress at post-intervention in the ACT condition. 
 Beyond mental health applications, a series of ACT intervention studies have 
provided support for its effectiveness within behavioral medicine.  In a study comparing 
ACT to an attention-placebo control condition, researchers found that in a sample of 
poor, institutionalized South Africans with epilepsy, ACT produced reductions of more 
than 95% in the average time spent per month seizing at post-treatment and at a 6- month 
and 1-year follow-up (Lundgren, 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006).  Although 
improvement in overall quality of life was not found at post treatment, increases were 
found at 6-month follow-up, and showed large and significant changes by the 1-year 
follow-up. Hayes and colleagues (2006) further indicated that ACT produced very large 
improvements at post-treatment and both follow-ups on a measure of experiential 
avoidance specific to epilepsy.  Scores on this measure fully mediated 1-year follow-up 
outcomes for both frequency of seizures and quality of life.  The quality of life result is 
seen as particularly important given that post-treatment changes in experiential avoidance 
occurred several months before significant quality of life changes were observed (Hayes 
et al., 2006). 
 In a separate recent study, the efficacy of ACT plus diabetes education was 
compared to that of only diabetes education in a trial that randomized newly diagnosed 
diabetics to a one-day workshop of one approach (Gregg, 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 
2006). As Hayes and colleagues (2006) indicate, at 3-month follow-up, ACT 
outperformed the control condition on changes in self-management behaviors and blood 
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glucose, particularly among those participants with a high blood glucose value. A 
measure of experiential avoidance specific to diabetes-related content was found to 
mediate the improvement in self-management behaviors but not the changes in blood 
glucose scores (Hayes et al., 2006).  
 Hayes and colleagues (2006) reviewed the between-condition effect sizes for 
these RCTs of ACT and comparison conditions. Summarizing across the existing 
literature, the review indicated that ACT has produced between condition effect sizes 
(using Cohen’s d) of .66 at post (N = 704) and .66 at follow-up (N = 519). Average effect 
sizes for comparisons between ACT and active, well-specified treatments that were 
deliberately provided to affect the targeted problem were .48 at post-treatment (N = 456) 
and .63 at follow-up (N = 404).  For comparisons with a wait-list condition, treatment as 
usual, or placebo treatments, the effect sizes were .99 at post-treatment (N = 248) and .71 
at follow-up (N = 176).  Thus, preliminary evidence supports the use of ACT across a 
number of different populations, across multiple outcomes, and with diverse methods of 
delivery. 
Research on ACT Concepts and Components 
 The ACT process that has garnered the most attention and research is experiential 
avoidance.  Evidence for the ACT model of psychopathology has come largely from 
correlational studies examining the relationship between measures of various 
psychological outcomes and the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, 
Strosahl, Wilson, et al., 2004). The AAQ was developed by the originators of ACT and 
purports to assess level of experiential avoidance.  The AAQ was constructed by having 
ACT therapists generate a pool of statements exemplifying the types of clinical processes 
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targeted by ACT.  The resultant self-report instrument ostensibly measures the degree to 
which an individual fuses with their thoughts, avoids unpleasant feelings, and is unable to 
act in the presence of difficult private events (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, Hayes and colleagues (2006) note that although the AAQ is usually referred 
to and utilized in research as a measure of experiential avoidance, they contend that it is 
actually a more general measure of several ACT processes that all bear on psychological 
flexibility (Hayes et al., 2006).  Still others have conceptualized it as a measure of 
psychological acceptance (e.g., Bond & Bunce, 2000). 
Although the nature of the construct that is tapped by the AAQ is arguably 
ambiguous, numerous investigations have utilized the measure in a variety of 
applications. In order to determine the extent to which the AAQ and various 
psychological outcomes are related, Hayes and colleagues (2006) recently performed 
several meta-analyses on data from 32 studies that investigated the relationship between 
the AAQ and various constructs.  Results indicated that in general and to a moderate 
extent, higher levels of psychological flexibility (as assessed by the AAQ) are associated 
with better quality of life and outcomes, including lower probabilities of having a 
psychiatric disorder, less depression, and less anxiety (Hayes et al., 2006). In other 
studies, high levels of psychological flexibility has been found to predict less computer 
errors by stressed workers at a call center (Bond & Bunce, 2003), as well as to correlate, 
to a greater degree than actual pain ratings, with less disability, better work status, more 
daily “up” time, less use of analgesics, and fewer health-care related visits in patients 
with chronic pain (McCracken, 1998; McCracken, Vowles, & Eccleston, 2004). 
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Recently, researchers (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006) attempted to 
distinguish the processes tapped by the AAQ from a variety of other strategies (e.g., 
maladaptive coping, emotional response styles, and controllability).  Results indicated 
that the effects of all of these other strategies on anxiety ratings were partially mediated 
by the AAQ.  Moreover, the AAQ completely mediated the effects of two emotion 
regulation strategies (i.e., suppression and reappraisal) on daily negative and positive 
experiences.  Experiential avoidance (as assessed by coding the AAQ so that higher 
scores reflect the opposite of psychological flexibility or acceptance) was also associated 
with diminished daily positive affective experiences and healthy life appraisals, 
diminished frequency of positive events and more frequent negative life events, and 
greater negative affective experiences. These results add to the correlational evidence 
supporting the role of experiential avoidance as a core mechanism in the etiology of 
psychological distress (Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 
1996).  These results also suggest that cognitive reappraisal (i.e., a primary process of 
traditional cognitive-behavior therapy) was much less predictive of the quality of 
psychological experiences and events in everyday life compared with psychological 
flexibility (Kashdan et al., 2006). 
 To date, no dismantling designs have been utilized to ascertain the individual 
effects of experiential avoidance, psychological flexibility, or ACT’s other components. 
Rather, experimental research has been conducted mainly via micro-studies to examine if 
each is psychologically present and works in accordance to the theory underling ACT 
(Hayes et al., 2006).  Several such studies have been conducted and have focused on the 
processes of acceptance and cognitive defusion. 
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 The impact of a cognitive defusion technique (i.e., the Milk–Milk Exercise; 
Hayes, Strosahl et al., 1999) on negative self-referential thoughts was investigated by 
Masuda and colleagues (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004).  In this exercise, a 
thought is rapidly repeated out loud until it loses all meaning and is experienced as an 
abstract sound (e.g., repeating the word “milk” over and over). In this study, the impact 
of word repetition on the discomfort and believability of self-relevant negative thoughts 
was investigated as compared to a distraction task (i.e., reading about Japan) or to a 
thought control task (i.e., involving abdominal breathing training and instructions to shift 
attention to more pleasant thoughts). Results indicated that the cognitive defusion 
technique reduced both discomfort and believability of the negative thoughts to a greater 
degree than did the comparison approaches.  
 ACT mindfulness techniques have also been examined with respect to their 
effects on the tolerance of individuals to exposure to carbon dioxide (CO2)-enriched air 
(Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003).  In this study, college students scoring high 
or low on the AAQ, were randomly assigned either to a computerized acceptance-based 
condition that taught participants to observe and let go of a struggle with feelings during 
the exposure to CO2-enriched air or a similar condition that instructed participants to 
suppress their feelings during the CO2 inhalation. In the suppression condition but not the 
acceptance condition, individuals with high experiential avoidance reported greater levels 
of anxiety relative to those with low experiential avoidance. Participants with high 
experiential avoidance in comparison to those with low experiential avoidance reported 
greater levels of anxiety and affective distress, but not physiological arousal, in the 
exposure to the CO2. Similarly, researchers (Eifert & Heffner, 2003) found that a 10-min 
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acceptance condition (i.e., accepting and mindfully observing feelings; Hayes, Strosahl et 
al., 1999) compared to an emotional-control condition (i.e., controlling psychological 
experiences by abdominal breathing) or a no-instruction condition, resulted in less 
behavioral avoidance, less reported intense fear, fewer negative thoughts, and greater 
willingness to experience the CO2-inhalation procedure again. 
 The impact of a brief acceptance task on the exposure of individuals with panic 
disorder to CO2-enriched air has also been examined (Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 
2004). Patients were randomly assigned to one of three 10-min audiotaped interventions: 
acceptance, suppression or distraction. The acceptance-based condition was drawn 
directly from the ACT manual (Hayes, Strosahl et al., 1999) and focused on the futile and 
paradoxical nature of experiential control, as well as the importance of focusing on 
behavior change in alignment with one’s values. The acceptance group showed 
significantly greater levels of willingness to participate in the CO2-inhalation again and 
lower level of anxiety than those is comparison groups. 
 Another study examined the impact of a 90-min ACT protocol focusing on 
acceptance and defusion strategies on pain tolerance in a cold pressor task (Hayes, Bissett 
et al., 1999).  The ACT protocol addressed the paradoxical effects of emotional control 
and defusion of thoughts and feelings from the self and was compared to a traditional 
CBT pain management condition (i.e., training in applying the gate theory of pain) and to 
a placebo condition consisting of discussion of a behavioral approach to pain. No 
differences were found in the intensity of pain at post-intervention between groups, but 
participants in the ACT condition were able to keep their hand in the cold water 
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significantly longer than the other conditions at post-test and also reported lower levels of 
belief in pain-oriented reasons for action than the other groups. 
 This cold pressor methodology was extended in a subsequent study that attempted 
to determine whether an acceptance and defusion rationale would make a similar 
difference even if combined with more traditional CBT exercises, rather than ACT 
acceptance and defusion exercises (Takahashi, Muto, Tada, & Sugiyama, 2002). An 
ACT-based acceptance and defusion rationale was combined with ACT exercises 
designed to undermine the literal impact of difficult private events or with exercises 
designed to control pain. Participants were randomly assigned to either of these two 
conditions or to an attention-placebo control. Participants in the ACT condition but not 
those in the other two conditions evidenced positive changes in pain tolerance, suggesting 
that ACT exercises, and not merely the rationale, were necessary to produce the effect. 
Another pain tolerance study (Gutierrez, Luciano, & Fink, 2004) examined the impact of 
a 20-min long ACT protocol encompassing acceptance, defusion and values components 
as compared to a cognitive and emotional change intervention. ACT participants reported 
significantly higher tolerance of pain, and significantly greater willingness to persist even 
after they said the pain levels had reached very high levels. 
 In summary, research is supportive of the processes of acceptance and cognitive 
defusion and the concept embodying the opposite of both – experiential avoidance.  
Significantly, Hayes and colleagues (2006) acknowledge that no other aspects of the 
ACT model have been specifically investigated within extant ACT component studies, 
either via experimental or treatment outcome designs.  The authors vaguely note in their 
most recent review that “targeted [micro] studies are underway or completed on all of the 
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other components (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 14) and that “values-based procedures are just 
beginning to be tested” (p. 15). 
 Given the relatively early stages of ACT research and the lack of empirical 
attention to many aspects of ACT processes and the underlying model (Hayes et al., 
2006), it may be fruitful to examine constructs similar to those found in ACT as a way to 
further understand its processes and techniques. As Hayes and colleagues (Hayes et al., 
2006; Strosahl et al., 2004) have noted, the processes within ACT are not unique to ACT.  
A wide range of concepts and measures seem to overlap with the ACT model, and 
researchers are beginning to explore connections with such concepts as distress tolerance 
(Brown, Lejuez, Kahler, & Strong, 2002), thought suppression (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000), and decentering (Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000).   
Another construct frequently associated with ACT is that of mindfulness (Baer, 
2003).  There are several reasons for continued research on the construct of mindfulness 
as a means to greater understanding of the processes underlying ACT: (1) the first four 
components of ACT have been defined as the functional behavioral equivalent of 
mindfulness (Fletcher & Hayes, in press), (2) the majority of ACT strategies are 
consistent with the general construct of mindfulness and Buddhist psychology in terms of 
goals and strategies (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Hayes, 2002, 2004), and (3) ACT is 
frequently identified as one of the mindfulness-based interventions within the third wave 
of behavioral therapies (Baer, 2003, 2006).  Thus, the conceptual and empirical bases of 
this construct and its implications for ACT deserve discussion.   
 A potential benefit of a strategic integration of the ACT and mindfulness 
literatures, given the present extent and growth of the latter, is greater elucidation of 
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especially the first four processes inherent in ACT in terms of conceptual and empirical 
understanding. Another potential implication of such convergence may be the usefulness 
of newly developed and complex measures of mindfulness in assessing more clearly 
these processes beyond that afforded by the vaguely-defined AAQ.  Such implications 
may prove particularly fruitful in attempts at dismantling the mindfulness-related 
components of ACT from those concerned with values, the focus of the proposed 
research. 
Mindfulness and the Third-Wave Therapies 
Conceptualizations of Mindfulness 
 The development of a mindful state reflects a primary practice utilized within past 
and present Buddhist traditions, in which conscious attention and awareness are actively 
cultivated via meditation practice (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  Mindfulness has been defined 
in various ways by Western practitioners and scientists.  However, most descriptions hold 
true to many of the concepts embodied by original Buddhist writings of mindfulness.  
Common themes among the most utilized definitions include 1) awareness/attention, 2) 
present-centeredness, and 3) acceptance of experience, or refrain from judgment.  One of 
the most utilized definitions is that of “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, 
in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4).   
 Western researchers and clinicians who have introduced mindfulness practice into 
mental health interventions have done so usually by teaching meditative skills 
independently of the religious and philosophical traditions of their origins (Baer, 2003; 
Kabat-Zinn, 2000).  Meditation practices aimed at increasing mindfulness have been 
viewed as the intentional self-regulation of attention from moment to moment (Kabat-
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Zinn, 1982; Goleman & Schwartz, 1976).  Significantly, phenomena that enter the 
individual’s awareness during mindfulness practice, such as perceptions, cognitions, 
emotions, memories, plans, sensations, or any other experience that comes into the field 
of awareness, are observed carefully but are not evaluated by any criteria (Marlatt & 
Kristeller, 1999).  Mindfulness-based interventions include many methods for teaching 
mindfulness.  Some of theses represent formal meditation practices in which participants 
sit quietly for periods of time, whereas other practices represent less formal exercises 
emphasizing mindfulness in everyday routine activities (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006).   
 As an outgrowth of the enhanced and open attention to and awareness of current 
experience, acceptance of the present experience is therefore seen as being inherent in 
mindfulness (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, et al., 2004).  This acceptance, however, is 
differentiated from a more layperson’s definition of acceptance that signifies a sense of 
resignation to a present condition of being.  Rather, the acceptance fostered by 
mindfulness practice is a state of acknowledgment that such is the present, that it is not 
inherently good or bad, and that the individual, rather than being reactive to it, aught to 
act according to higher-level directives (Hayes et al., 1999; Kabat-Zinn, 1990).   
Mindfulness as Operationalized within ACT 
 Although mindfulness has most clearly been associated with meditative practices 
(e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1990), the developers of ACT have proposed that the most scientific 
way to approach the present-centered willingness to be open to experience as it unfolds 
that defines the construct of mindfulness is at the level of the psychological processes 
involved (Hayes & Shenk, 2004).  They point out that the construct of attention, from a 
behavioral point of view, represents a way of speaking about patterns of stimulus control.  
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Attention viewed in this way is not something an individual has, but rather a quality of a 
situated action.  Furthermore, both “attention to the present moment” and “an attitude of 
acceptance”, the two components of a prominent operational definition of mindfulness 
(Bishop et al., 2004), are undermined by normal verbal/cognitive processes according to 
RFT (Hayes & Shenk, 2004).  Conversely, Hayes and colleagues (2004) contend that 
mindfulness is needed precisely because individuals (1) excessively take language, and 
therefore their thoughts, literally, and (2) have difficulty attending without constant 
evaluation of what we consider desirable or undesirable because language-based 
evaluation represents a natural process that affords such immediate benefits as problem-
solving and reduction of undesirable experiences (Hayes & Shenk, 2004). 
 From an ACT perspective, operationally defining mindfulness as a functional 
process allows any technique that produces this process (i.e., attention to the present 
moment and an attitude of acceptance) to be considered a mindfulness technique (Hayes 
& Shenk, 2004).  Hays and Shenk (2004) acknowledge that meditation offers one 
particular context for such a process to develop.  Through an ACT perspective, 
meditation teaches an individual that entering into the relational network literally 
interferes with open contact with the present moment and allows the process of thinking 
itself to come to the fore, without focus on the content of thought itself.  Stated in other 
words, “meditation creates a context in which experiential avoidance interferes with the 
process of meditation itself” (Hayes & Shenk, 2004, p. 252).  In addition, mindfulness 
meditation in particular creates a context in which a much broader range of stimulus 
events are contacted psychologically. Thus, it encourages awareness of all aspects of 
experiences, even whilst one or more particular aspects may be brought into immediate 
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focus.  The stimulus control exerted by literal language weakens and results in an 
expansion of the available events, from physical sensations to personal life priorities, in a 
given situation that may be used to regulate behavior (Hayes & Shenk, 2004).   
 Proponents of ACT, along with other mindfulness researchers (e.g., Brown & 
Ryan, 2004), argue that meditation may not be critical to the development of mindfulness 
and that mindfulness represents an inherent, possible, and natural capacity.  What has 
been deemed necessary is the creation of contexts in which new behaviors can be learned 
that are not normally fostered by the social/verbal contexts that surround day to day 
language and cognition (Hayes & Schenk, 2004).  Mindfulness exercises in ACT do not 
rely on meditation per se, yet have been characterized as perhaps the most numerous and 
varied strategies out of all the mindfulness-based intervention programs (Baer & 
Krietemeyer, 2006).  They include metaphors, imagery, and experiential exercises.  
Similar to all mindfulness approaches, the techniques of ACT encourage individuals to 
step out of the struggle or war with their internal experience and give up ineffective 
experiential avoidance strategies by focusing on the impact of, and response to, thoughts, 
feelings, and sensations (Bishop et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 1999). 
Empirical Status of Mindfulness-Based Treatment Approaches 
 Over the past 20 years, mindfulness and the various techniques employed to 
develop it, have been incorporated by Western scientist-practitioners within several 
specific third-wave cognitive-behavioral interventions.  Each approach similarly 
conceptualizes mindfulness practice as a set of skills that may be learned via instruction 
and developed through continued utilization.  Examples of interventions specifically 
based on mindfulness training include the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction program 
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(MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990), developed in a behavioral medicine setting for 
individuals with a wide rage of chronic pain and stress-related disorders, and 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression (MBCT; Teasdale, Segal, and 
Williams, 1995; Segal, Williams, & Taesdale, 2002), based largely on MBSR and aimed 
at preventing relapse of major depressive episodes.  Both interventions have 
demonstrated positive outcomes in empirical studies at post-treatment and follow-up on 
their targeted outcomes across both clinical and nonclinical populations (see Baer, 2003 
for a review).   
 There are also several interventions that incorporate mindfulness training within a 
cognitive-behavioral theoretical framework.  These include Dialectical Behavior Therapy 
(DBT; Linehan, 1993), a multifaceted approach to the treatment of borderline personality 
disorder.  Although the components of the protocol have not been individually evaluated 
via dismantling research, DBT has been associated with decreased parasuicidal behavior, 
psychiatric hospitalization, and anger, and with increased client retention, level of 
functioning, overall social adjustment, and employment performance (see Scheel, 2000, 
for a recent review).  In addition, mindfulness has recently been incorporated with 
established cognitive-behavioral strategies aimed at substance abuse relapse prevention to 
form Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention (Witkiewitz, Marlatt, & Walker, 2005; 
Marlatt, 1994).  Preliminary outcomes of this approach include decreased frequency and 
quantity of drinking and drug use and improvements of substance-use related problems 
(Witkiewitz et al., 2005). 
 Mindfulness and acceptance-based strategies have also been examined with 
respect to specific types of pathology, such as anxiety disorders (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; 
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Orsillo & Roemer, 2005).  The evidence base for the most researched mindfulness 
treatments indicates they are effective at reducing various types of distress in diverse 
populations (Baer, 2006).  In addition, one meta-analysis of the literature specific to 
MBCT, MBSR, or variants of MBSR, suggests that on average, mindfulness-based 
interventions have yielded at least medium-sized effects, with some effects falling within 
the large range (Baer, 2003)  However, most of these approaches represent 
multicomponent interventions and, similarly to ACT, have yet to undergo empirical 
scrutiny of their individual components. 
Possible Mechanisms Underlying Effects of Mindfulness 
 The authors and subsequent researchers of the various mindfulness-based 
treatment approaches have suggested several mechanisms that may explain how 
mindfulness skills can lead to symptom reduction and behavior change.  Some of the 
more commonly discussed mechanisms of action include relaxation, exposure, self-
regulation, and acceptance (Baer, 2003; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006).   
 The induction of relaxation through various meditation strategies has been well 
documented (e.g., Benson, 1975) and some researchers have suggested that meditation 
often induces relaxation, which may contribute to the management of certain stress-
related or medical disorders (Goldenberg et al., 1994; Kabat-Zinnn et al., 1998).  
However, the relationship between meditation and relaxation is complex.  Specifically, 
the purpose of mindfulness training is not the induction of relaxation, but nonjudgmental 
awareness of present experience, which may include autonomic arousal, racing thoughts, 
muscle tension, or other phenomena incompatible with relaxation states (Baer, 2003).  In 
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addition, evidence suggests that relaxation effects are not unique or necessary to 
meditation, but are so with respect to many relaxation strategies (Shapiro, 1982). 
 Mindfulness has been hypothesized by some (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1984; Kabat-
Zinnn et al., 1992; Linehan, 1993) to act through the process of exposure given that it 
involves prolonged exposure to various distressing thoughts and sensations with active 
withholding of emotional reactivity to them.  Although such a process is similar to the 
cognitive-behavioral strategy of interoceptive exposure (e.g., Barlow & Craske), its 
occurrence within mindfulness training does not include the deliberate induction of 
distressing symptoms.  Given that the attention encouraged by mindfulness meditation is 
one of nonjudgmental observation and non-reactance to what is observed, it appears to 
allow an individual to observe and over time become desensitized from the impact of 
aversive thoughts, feelings, and sensations.  This desensitization weakens the influence of 
private events on behavior and is hypothesized to lead to the extinction of fear responses 
and avoidance behaviors previously elicited by these stimuli (Baer, 2003; Segal, 
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). 
 Mindfulness, particularly as a meditative strategy, has long been viewed as a self-
regulation technique. Initial examination of meditation from a behavioral analysis 
framework originated in the 1960s and 1970s (see Shapiro & Zifferblatt, 1976 for 
review).  The practice of discriminating a stimulus (e.g., wandering attention) developed 
in meditation may generalize to situations involved in behavioral self-control strategies.  
An individual may increase his or her skills at detecting distracting/disinhibiting stimuli 
as soon as such stimuli are present and be able to avoid reacting to them automatically 
(Shapiro & Zifferblatt, 1976).  More recent evaluations have also suggested that the 
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improved self-observation that results from mindfulness practice may facilitate an 
individual’s ability to recognize internal and external cues throughout the day, cues that 
may represent early signs of a depressive episode (Teasdale et al., 1995) or encourage 
substance use (Marlatt, 1994).  Such improved self-observation may also aid the 
individual in recognizing the consequences of specific actions, which may lead to more 
effective coping and behavioral choices (Linehan, 1993).   
  As discussed previously, acceptance represents the intentional stance adopted 
during mindfulness practice.  All mindfulness-based interventions include acceptance of 
pain, thoughts, feelings, urges, and other bodily, cognitive, and emotional phenomena, 
without trying to change, escape, or avoid them.  For example, acceptance of thoughts as 
“just thoughts”, rather than reflections of truth or reality, may lead to decreased 
avoidance behaviors (Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990), and a novel and insightful way of relating 
to cognitions in general (Teasdale et al., 1995). Such acceptance may also be applied to 
the experience of self-regulation itself and unpleasant states (e.g., anxiety, frustration) 
which may occur during that context.  For example, acceptance of unpleasant thoughts or 
feelings may be helpful during a stressful situation involving difficult and unchangeable 
circumstance, when action is needed irrespective of the presence of internal distress.  In 
addition, previous research has also suggested that if individuals can learn to focus on the 
task at hand (e.g., by learning acceptance), then they are better able to notice and respond 
effectively to even subtle changes in contingencies of reinforcement (e.g., situations in 
which they have and can use control, e.g., Catania, Shimoff, & Matthews, 1989; Hayes, 
Zettle, Rosenfarb, 1989). 
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Workplace Stress Management as a Clinical Target for ACT 
Stress and Its Impact 
 The concept of “stress” has been examined in numerous ways since Hans Selye 
(1956), who gave momentum to much of the early stress research, defined stress as the 
nonspecific response of the body to any demand.  Stress is now generally defined as the 
product of an imbalance between appraisals of environmental demands and individual 
resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  Thus, the term “stress” has been differentiated 
from the construct of a “stressor”, or the objective or perceived demand on an individual 
itself.  In addition, stressors have also come to be operationally differentiated from 
“strains”, or the negative psychological and physical responses to these demands (Jones 
& Bright, 2001). 
 Over the past two decades, there has been a growing recognition of the 
relationship between human psychological and physical health (Cohen & Herbert, 1996; 
Herbert & Cohen, 1993).  Psychological functioning, and in particular exposure to 
stressful life experiences and associated emotional reactions, has been implicated as a 
potential contributor to a wide range of mental and physical diseases and symptoms 
(Lovallo, 1997).  Negative outcomes associated with stress include higher blood pressure, 
elevation in cholesterol levels, ulcers, and coronary heart disease (Goodspeed & DeLucia, 
1990; Krantz & McCeney, 2002; Levi, 1996).  Chronic psychological stress has been 
most frequently implicated in maladaptive immune functioning and ill health (Kiecolt-
Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Natelson, 2004).  
 Numerous negative psychological correlates of stress have also been identified.  
The most commonly observed psychological strains include depression (Dinan, 1994; 
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Hammen, 2005) and anxiety (Friedman, Clark, & Gershon, 1992).  In addition, research 
suggests that a general negative affective style, marked by tendencies toward depression 
and anxiety, is associated with increased stress hormone levels (Anisman & LaPierre, 
1982) and somatic complaints (Costa & McCrae, 1987).  Moreover, coping reactions to 
stress that focus on avoidance of distressing emotions or concerns and bringing about 
immediate pleasurable experience, such as use of psychoactive substances (e.g., alcohol 
and tobacco) or emotional eating, have been shown to be maladaptive in the long-term 
for both psychological and physical well-being (Dunn, Fargher, Thorogood, et al., 1999; 
Fletcher, 1988; Greeno & Wing, 1994; Ingledew, Hardy, & Cooper, 1996; Morley, 
Levine, & Rowland, 1983; Roskies, 1991; Willis, 1990)  
The Transactional Theory of Stress  
 One of the most supported theories of stress, the transactional theory developed 
by Lazarus and colleagues (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen & Delongis, 1986; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), conceptualizes the stress process as an individual experience in which 
context represents the crucial factor.  According to this model, psychological stress 
represents “a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is 
appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his 
or her well-being” (Lazarus & Folkman 1984, p. 19).  This approach implies that stress is 
a dynamic process rather than a static occurrence, given that the interaction between the 
individual and the environment changes as either factor varies over time and over 
different contexts.   
 According to the transactional model of stress, appraisal (i.e., the evaluation the 
individual makes of the demands and resources available to deal with them) represents a 
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key ingredient in the stress process.  The theory proposes that a transaction between the 
person and the environment is stressful only when it is appraised as a harm, threat or 
challenge to that person’s well-being (Lazarus, 1995).  In this definition of stress, harm is 
defined as damage that has already occurred (e.g., death of a spouse or loss of a job), 
whereas threat refers to a harm that has not yet happened but is anticipated to occur.  An 
individual will appraise a situation as a challenge when he or she believes that he or she 
has the capacity to master high demands, overcome obstacles, and grow as an individual.  
The appraisal of challenge, then, allows one to feel enthused and engaged, and experience 
personal growth, whereas an appraisal of harm leads to feeling endangered, defensive, 
and self-protective (Lazarus, 1995). This conceptualization of stress allows for positive 
outcomes to result from stress, not just negative effects, and has implications for stress 
interventions in terms of targeting the appraisal process for better well-being outcomes in 
the face of stressors.   
 In addition, it is within the appraisal process that personal values and goals play a 
role in stress and its outcomes.  Lazarus and Folkman (1984) propose that secondary 
appraisal, in which coping options for dealing with harm, threat, or challenge are 
assessed, is integrated with a primary appraisal process.  Primary appraisal concerns 
whether or not there is any personal stake in the encounter in order to ascertain in the first 
place whether it is perceived as a harm, threat, or challenge, or, if the situation is 
perceived as not significant for one’s well-being, as requiring no action.  The 
idiosyncratic nature of personal goals and beliefs coupled with the complexity and 
ambiguity of environments leads individuals to attend selectively to experience and 
evaluate it in diverse ways (Lazarus, 1995). The transactional process model of stress is 
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thus similar to ACT’s process-oriented contextual approach and emphasis on personal 
values. 
Coping 
 According to transactional theories of the stress process, various strategies are 
likely to be made in response to sources of pressure as an individual attempts to cope 
with the psychological and physical demands. Coping has been defined as “the person's 
cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage (reduce, minimize, master or tolerate) the 
internal and external demands of the person-environment transaction that is appraised as 
taxing or exceeding the person's resources” (Folkman et al., 1986, p. 572).  It is when 
these coping strategies fail that an individual will experience negative stress outcomes, 
such as physical or mental ill-health (Lazarus & Folkman, 1991). 
 Coping itself leads to many changes within the stress process because it provides 
new information that feeds back to the individual and alters subsequent appraisals 
(Lazarus, 1995). Coping also has a profound effect on psychological stress and emotional 
states (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988a, 1988b). Coping ability plays a significant role in the 
appraisal process, which is always the proximal cause of reactions to stressors (Lazarus, 
1995).  Research has shown that certain patterns of coping vary from one stressful 
encounter to another and over time (e.g., seeking social support), whereas some strategies 
(e.g., positive thinking) may remain relatively stable (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; 
Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986; Folkman, Lazarus, et al. 
1986; Lazarus, 1995).  Thus, coping and appraisal are both central to the stress process 
and its outcomes for the individual in terms of adapting to demands. They interact and 
influence an individual’s self-regulation of the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
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actions taken (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus, 1995; Scheier & Carver, 
1988).    
Interventions for Stress Management from First- to Third-Wave CBTs  
 Individual-focused stress management training, as an intervention approach, 
encompasses a wide assortment of techniques.  The majority of traditionally employed 
approaches fall under the categories of meditation, biofeedback, muscle relaxation, and 
cognitive-behavioral skills training (Jones & Bright, 2001).  The development and 
relative use of the various interventions has paralleled the development of cognitive-
behavioral therapies from the first through the second and now into the third generation.  
During the 1970s, interventions first began to incorporate relaxation techniques stemming 
from systematic desensitization (e.g., Goldfried, 1971; Wolpe, 1958), one of the first 
generations of behavior therapies (Newman & Beehr, 1979; Peters, Benson, & Porter, 
1977).  Subsequently, the development of cognitive-based approaches by Beck (1976) 
and Ellis (1962) heralded in a second generation.  Since the 1980s, the principles and 
procedures from these cognitive therapies have become central to common utilized stress 
management interventions (e.g., stress inoculation training: Michenbaum, 1985; 1993; 
Saunders, Driskell, Johnson, & Salas, 1996). Presently, the third-wave of cognitive-
behavioral therapies has ushered in a novel perspective on stress and intervention 
approaches.  
  The nature of mindfulness makes it particularly suitable to approaches aimed at 
the self-regulation of reactions to stressors.  Following practice, the core characteristic of 
mindfulness may become reflected in regular or sustained consciousness of ongoing 
events, the individuals’ reactions to those events, and the consequences of those reactions 
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(Brown & Ryan, 2004).  Mindfulness may, in fact, with practice, increase feelings of 
control as an individual realizes his or her previous negative reactions to such cues were 
in fact automatic and “mindless”, rather than self-controlled and “conscious”.   
 As mindfulness involves receptive attention of not just physical, but also 
cognitive and emotional aspects of the present, individuals attempting self-regulation of 
their stress response may become more aware of their internal thoughts and emotional 
reactions.  Significantly, rather than attempting to then challenge and augment them (as is 
the case in cognitive restructuring techniques), an individual practiced in mindfulness can 
acknowledge their presence and maintain focus on even higher-level priorities, such as 
values, when deciding how to react.  Interestingly, mindfulness is distinguishable from 
other forms of self-awareness, including that espoused in self-control theory (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981) and self-monitoring strategies (Snyder, 1974).  Such forms of self-
awareness do in fact reflect cognitive operations on aspects of the self through self-
examination, processes collectively termed “reflexive consciousness” (Baumeister, 
1999).  Mindfulness directed inward differs from such approaches in that its mode of 
functioning is perceptual or “pre-reflexive”, operating on, rather than within, thought, 
feeling, and other contents of consciousness (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  In such a manner, 
mindfulness in effect can “free” individuals struggling with the cognitions and emotions 
that influence their ability to self-regulate behavior, whether it is in response to a stressor 
or any other experience.     
As previously discussed, ACT heavily encompasses mindfulness constructs and 
differs from the change-based stress management interventions of cognitive restructuring 
and relaxation training in its theoretical basis and techniques utilized.  Traditional 
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cognitive restructuring focuses on identifying and challenging distortions in individuals’ 
thought content, beliefs regarding their coping abilities, and what affects their well-being, 
in order to change their emotional reactions to a situation (Beck, 1993).  However, as 
noted previously, research has indicated that direct change in thought content is not 
necessary for positive outcomes.  
 Traditional relaxation training also has as its focus the reduction of unpleasant 
experience.  Specifically, it targets the physiological arousal that occurs as a response to 
perceived stress.  Outcome research indicates positive effects on indices of physical 
arousal from relaxation training (e.g., Borkovec & Whisman, 1996; Keable, 1985), as 
well as positive outcomes in individuals dealing with headache (Holroyd & Penzien, 
1994), chronic pain (Wilson & Gil, 1996), and insomnia (Lichstein & Riedel, 1994).  
However, this approach treats physiological aspects of stress once they have already 
occurred, rather than attempting to prevent such symptoms of strain from occurring. 
Thus, such a technique does little to help empower the individual to react differently to 
stress so that strain and its physical symptoms do not occur or, if they occur, their impact 
on actual behavior is minimal.  
 In contrast to the teaching of different forms of control and struggle with 
unpleasant internal experience that underlies virtually all common stress management 
interventions, an ACT-based approach to stress entails the inherent premise that it is not 
the content of thoughts, feelings, or sensations per se that directly leads to stress-related 
disorders, but how individuals relate to this content and experience (i.e., the context; 
Bond, 2004).  Specifically, stress will lead to problems when people (1) “fuse” or 
completely buy into the literal meaning of their thoughts (e.g., if I have the thought, “I 
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can’t handle this task”, then I can’t handle this task) and (2) avoid the experiences that 
come about in response to or along with their thought content (e.g., anxiety).  According 
to the ACT model, fusion together with avoidance “causes” stress as much as the stressor 
itself because it helps determine whether experience with a stressor (e.g., a new job 
assignment is evaluated as “not fair”) leads to stressful reactions (e.g., anger and anxiety), 
maladaptive coping (e.g., denial), and even additional stressors from chosen behaviors 
based on avoidance (e.g., wanting to quit or yell at supervisor; Bond, 2004). 
 Given that the mindfulness components within ACT and other third-wave 
interventions encourage individuals to relate differently to their thoughts, feelings, and 
sensations (i.e., via psychological acceptance and defusion rather than attempts to 
challenge, change, or control them), such approaches may be particularly suitable for 
interventions aimed at stress management. Specifically, psychological acceptance of and 
distancing from unpleasant thoughts and emotions may be the most effective (if not the 
only) strategy when such thoughts and emotions stem from unalterable stressors (e.g., an 
unavoidable deadline).  In addition, given that context rather than content is the focus of 
ACT and it has proven effective across diverse mental and physical health domains, ACT 
should be applicable to the dynamic and idiosyncratic experience of stress.  Furthermore, 
utilizing an ACT conceptualization of mindfulness and its less-meditation oriented 
techniques may allow for easier dissemination to and adherence by a wider population 
than contemplative-based approaches, such as MBSR.   
The Evolvement of Approaches Specific to Work Stress  
 Considering that individuals who work full-time spend more of their waking 
hours at work than anywhere else, it is not surprising that work represents a major, if not 
54 
the most significant, source of stress for many individuals. Nationally representative data 
obtained from the General Social Survey in 1998 indicated that 36% of US workers 
reported their jobs to be "often" or "always" stressful, similar to 39% in 1989 (General 
Social Survey 1972-2000 Cumulative Codebook, 2002, as cited in Murphy & Sauter, 
2003).  Similarly, the Families and Work Institute's 1997 National Study of the Changing 
Workforce in the United Kingdom reported that 26% of workers said they were "often" 
or "very often" burned out or stressed by their jobs (Bond, Galinsky, & Swanberg, 1998). 
In addition, research in occupational health has found that exposure to work-related stress 
is associated with increased risk of infectious disease (e.g., Cohen & Williamson, 1991; 
Schaubroeck, Jones, & Xie, 2001), musculoskeletal complaints (Lundberg et al., 1999; 
Carayon, Smith, & Haims, 1999), asthma, ulcers, and stroke (Quick, Quick, Nelson, & 
Hurrell, 2001). 
 Beyond physical complaints, perceived work stress has also been associated with 
mood disorders (e.g., depression and anxiety; Griffiths, 1998; Revicki, Whitley, Gallery, 
1993; Wang, 2004, 2006) that are associated with the development of a broad range of 
diseases (e.g., coronary artery disease, asthma, headache, ulcers, arthritis; Brydon, 
Magid, & Steptoe, 2006; Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Johnson & Indvik, 1997). 
Beyond causing individual workers considerable suffering, the symptoms of stress also 
significantly affect absenteeism and productivity levels within organizations (Levi, 
1996).   
Stress has also been shown to contribute to job burnout, ill-health, high workforce 
turnover, lowered morale and reduced efficiency and performance (Sutherland & Cooper, 
1990), as well as lower levels of job satisfaction and motivation (Goodspeed & DeLucia, 
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1990).  As a result, the financial impact on employers due to physical and psychological 
illness among their employees is tremendous and various estimates of that impact 
abound. For example, Greenberg and colleagues (Greenberg, Finkelstein, & Berndt, 
1995) estimated the direct costs associated with work-related stress and depression at $12 
billion a year.  Other researchers have found that an employer’s insurance and disability 
expenditures can be reduced when fewer employees suffer from chronic illnesses 
(Gebhardt & Crump, 1990).  The cost of psychological disorders in the workforce is also 
significant. The individual- and work-related consequences of depression, a previously 
noted correlate of stress, include absenteeism, job turnover, cognitive difficulties, 
coronary heart disease, decreased productivity, and increased alcohol intake (Johnson & 
Indvik, 1997; Sheffield, Dobbie, & Carroll, 1994). 
 The implementation of employee stress management or wellness programs is one 
contemporary approach utilized to address such individual and organizational costs of 
workplace stress. Reviews of the scientific literature over the past 20 years reveal a 
steadily increasing number of studies regarding stress interventions (Bunce, 1997; 
Murphy, 1984, 1996; Newman & Beehr, 1979; Van der Klink, Blonk, Schene, & van 
Dijk, 2001).  These reviews point out that most worksite stress intervention studies 
involve efforts to help employees manage stress (i.e., stress management) with only an 
occasional intervention directed towards reducing the actual sources of stress at work 
(i.e., stressor reduction).   
  Influential in interventions aimed at stressor reduction, the construct of job 
control is arguably the most researched work characteristic in occupational stress 
research (e.g., Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Karasek, 1979). Job 
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control has been defined as a perceived ability to exert some influence over one’s work 
environment in order to make it more rewarding and less threatening (Ganster, 1989). 
Terry and Jimmieson (1999, p. 131) noted, in their review of the research literature on 
this construct, that there appears to be “consistent evidence” that high levels of worker 
control are associated with low levels of stress-related outcomes, including anxiety, 
psychological distress, burnout, irritability, psychosomatic health complaints, and alcohol 
consumption. Furthermore, Bond and Bunce (2001) found that a work reorganization 
intervention could improve workers’ mental health, absenteeism levels, and self-rated 
performance by increasing their job control. 
 Although influencing worker levels of behavioral control over the characteristics 
of their jobs represent a commonly espoused approaches to organizational-level stress 
reduction (e.g., Quick et al., 1997), individualized stress management interventions are 
more prevalent than stressor reduction interventions (e.g., Ganster & Murphy, 2001; 
Giga, Cooper, & Faragher, 2005).  This finding may be due in part to the prevalent belief 
in US organizations that stress is a personal, not work-related, problem (Murphy & 
Sauter, 2003).  Also, research suggests that stressor reduction approaches are not 
routinely effective in lowering worker levels of stress, producing small or insignificant 
effects on levels of distress (e.g., Murphy, 1996; Parkes & Sparkes, 1998; Van der Klink 
et al., 2001).  In addition, organizations are reluctant to make global organizational 
changes due to the cost and disruption of implementing such strategies given the 
relatively small percentage of employees who exhibit truly impairing stress conditions 
(Cooper & Payne, 1992).   
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 Conversely, Flaxman and Bond (2006) note a number of features of the stress 
process that support the use of individual-focused worksite interventions.  First, some 
work-related stressors (i.e., deadlines and difficult customers) cannot realistically be 
removed or augmented.  Second, there are numerous sources of stress that stem from 
outside the workplace and are not amendable via organizational-level interventions, yet 
nevertheless can have a detrimental impact on an employee’s well-being.  Finally, the 
authors note the ever-growing use of the transactional model of stress, with its emphasis 
on intra-individual processes, in workplace interventions (e.g., Cummings & Cooper, 
1979).  
 Numerous individual difference factors have been investigated in relation to stress 
in general and in the field of occupational psychology (see Cooper & Payne, 1991, and 
Jex, 1998 for reviews).  Two of the most prominently studied dispositional factors that 
have been specifically examined in ACT-based and other interventions for workplace 
stress include negative affectivity and locus of control (Payne, 1988).   
 The term negative affectivity describes an aversive (e.g., angry, scornful, fearful, 
depressive) emotional style or trait that can exist even in the absence of objective 
stressors (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989).  Some individuals are predisposed to perceive 
themselves in a negative light, that is, they are high in negative affectivity (Watson & 
Clark, 1984), and are, therefore, more likely to perceive certain situations as stressful. 
Research has indeed found that individuals high in negative affectivity are more likely to 
report stress symptoms (Moyle, 1995; Parkes, 1990).  Parkes (1990) suggests that 
negative affectivity has a moderating influence on the stress-strain relationship, making 
high negative affectivity individuals more vulnerable to perceived stress.   
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 In some respects a forerunner of the idea of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, the 
construct of locus of control (Rotter, 1966) has been commonly examined with relation to 
stress (Hurrell & Murphy, 1991; Jones & Bright, 2001).  As a psychological construct, 
control has been broadly defined as the perception that an individual has a response 
available that can influence the aversiveness of an event (Thompson, 1981). Researchers 
have been concerned with the effects of perceived control over important outcomes for 
several decades (e.g. Rotter, 1966).  Numerous investigations suggest that, in general, 
control is associated with a myriad of positive outcomes, and lack of control with various 
forms of ill-health (see Miller, 1979 and Thompson, 1981, for reviews).  
 Furthermore, the evidence suggests that just the belief that one can exercise 
control may be sufficient to reduce strain when exposed to uncontrollable events 
(Gatchel, 1980).  Such evidence has particular implications for stress management 
interventions aimed at situations in which stressors may not be subject to the individual’s 
attempts at change, such as a work environment that offers the worker little job control. 
Engagement in control strategies may still be potentially effective, however, if they are 
targeted towards an individual’s reactions, emotional and cognitive, to present 
circumstances.  Thompson (1981), for example, has developed a typology of control that, 
beyond behavioral control, also includes the concept of cognitive control. Behavioral 
control refers to a belief that a behavioral response is available that can terminate the 
event, make it less probable or less intense, or change the duration or timing.  Cognitive 
control is defined as the belief that a cognitive strategy is available that can affect the 
aversiveness of an event.  This type of control may be said to be an ultimate aim of 
mindfulness-based approaches. Such approaches view private events (i.e., thoughts and 
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feelings) as the more direct cause of distress than the environmental stressor and 
strategies. Within those approaches, the manner in which an individual relates to such 
cognitive and emotional reactions is targeted.   
 Locus of control describes the extent to which individuals believe that they 
influence events in their lives, and so relates to cognitive control. Individuals with an 
internal locus of control perceive that they can manage situations with their decisions and 
behaviors.  Individuals with an external locus of control believe that what happens to 
them is beyond their influence—a result of luck, fate, or other circumstance (Rotter, 
1966). People with the latter orientation are thought to be most at risk for experiencing 
mental ill-health and poor functioning (Newton & Keenan, 1990; Rotter, 1966; Spector, 
1986; Spector, 1988).  Hurrell and Murphy (1991), for example, argue that individuals 
with an internal locus of control suffer from fewer stress symptoms as they are more 
likely to define stressors as controllable and take proactive steps to cope with them. 
 Furthermore, research has shown that locus of control, as well as negative 
affectivity, have the potential to bias, or distort, individual’s self-reports on a wide range 
of variables, from work characteristics (e.g., job control) to well-being (e.g., mental 
health, job satisfaction) to coping behaviors (e.g., problem- or emotion-focused coping; 
Parkes, 1991; Siu, Spector, Cooper, Lu, & Yu, 2002; Spector, 1986). Specifically, people 
with higher levels of negative affectivity (who perhaps already feel depressed or anxious) 
may discount the extent to which they accept their unwanted thoughts and feelings. 
Likewise, individuals with an external locus of control may underestimate the degree to 
which they are able to take action (or manage situations), especially in the face of 
unpleasant internal events.  
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 Taking such factors into account, individual-oriented, stress management 
interventions directly address the idiosyncratic nature of stress more than job-oriented 
stress interventions. Individual-focused strategies are generally designed to enhance 
workers’ personal resources for coping and to reduce the negative symptoms, or strains, 
of stress. Such individual-focused programs have been found to be generally effective in 
reducing both physical and psychological manifestations of strain in workers (Murphy, 
1984; van der Klink et al., 2001). For example, in a recent meta-analysis, van der Klink 
and colleagues (2001) reviewed 43 worksite stress management intervention studies and 
found a medium effect size for both cognitive-behavioral interventions and multimodal 
programs that consisted of a mixture of cognitive-behavioral therapy and relaxation 
techniques across a variety of psychological health and coping measures.  The 
researchers also found a small effect size for relaxation training.  Individual stress 
management training has not, however, been found to cause significant changes in job 
satisfaction (Bunce, 1997; Murphy, 1996; Van der Klink, et al., 2001). 
 When examining worksite stress management programs over the last three 
decades, their changes in content and intervention strategies have mirrored the evolution 
within the cognitive-behavioral paradigm in clinical psychology discussed previously 
(Flaxman & Bond, 2006).  In view of such a synchronous relationship between cognitive-
behavioral therapies and stress management, it would seem that the development of third-
wave mindfulness-based approaches has significant implications for individual-focused 
stress interventions aimed at the workplace (Flaxman & Bond, 2006). 
 Despite its growing popularity and its inclusion in third-wave cognitive 
behavioral interventions, the concept of mindfulness is only just beginning to have an 
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impact on occupational health psychology.  Recent research, however, has shown the 
potential benefits for specifically applying mindfulness to the work context.  For 
example, Williams and colleagues (Williams, 2006; Williams, Kolar, Reger, & Pearson, 
2001) have found that the MBSR program resulted in significant decreases in daily 
hassles, psychological distress, and medical symptoms for a sample of 104 “stressed-out” 
university employees at post-treatment and to an even greater extent at 3-month follow-
up compared to a control group.  In addition, a small uncontrolled investigation that 
combined MBSR and values clarification (Scardapane, Walling, Mittal, et al., 2005) for 
university employees also indicated improvement in numerous symptoms. 
 Moreover, psychological acceptance, as operationalized in ACT, has been 
investigated as a moderator between job control and occupational health and productivity 
in a large sample of call center employees (Bond & Bunce, 2003; Bond & Flaxman, 
2006).  Another goal of this research was to determine whether mental health, job 
satisfaction, and work performance also predicted levels of acceptance and job control 1 
year later. Such “reciprocal” relationships run contrary to relevant theories (e.g., Hayes, 
1987; Karasek & Theorell, 1990). 
 Using structural equation modeling within a design in which data were obtained 
on two occasions from the same set of participants, the researchers found that acceptance 
did interact with job control.  Specifically, findings from this study suggested that higher 
levels of acceptance at Time 1 serve to increase the association between higher levels of 
job control at Time 1 and better mental health, performance, and ability to learn new 
computer software skills at Time 2. This strengthening effect is consistent with the model 
of acceptance (Hayes et al., 1999) in that individuals who do not try to avoid or control 
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psychological events have more attentional resources and engage in less avoidant 
behavior (Bond & Hayes, 2002). Bond and Bunce (2003) suggest that these individuals 
are better able to notice the degree to which they have control in a given work situation.  
Moreover, because they are less avoidant, they may, through experience, learn how they 
can most effectively use the control that they have to promote their mental health. 
Through this same trial and error mechanism, individuals can also maximize their work 
performance, if they value and have the goal of performing well at work.  The results for 
acceptance in this study reflect the findings from the randomized controlled outcome 
study by Bond and Bunce (2000). 
 In addition, results from the study by Bond and Bunce (2003) indicated that 
higher acceptance levels predicted better mental health and performance 1 year later.  The 
longitudinal effects of acceptance were unidirectional, in that mental health, input errors, 
and job satisfaction at Time 1 were not associated with acceptance at Time 2.  These 
findings are consistent with acceptance theory (Bond & Hayes, 2002; Hayes, 1987; 
Hayes et al., 1999). Moreover, in addition to its interaction with acceptance, job control 
also produced several main effects in the study. Specifically, higher job control levels at 
Time 1 predicted better mental health, job satisfaction, and performance at Time 2.  None 
of the three outcomes at Time 1, however, predicted job control at Time 2.  These main 
effects for job control are consistent with models of occupational health and performance 
(e.g., Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Karasek, 1979) and with previous findings suggesting 
that the longitudinal effects of job control are unidirectional in nature (e.g., DeJonge et 
al., 2001). 
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 Contrary to one of their hypotheses, however, the authors did not find that 
acceptance longitudinally predicted job satisfaction, either directly or indirectly through 
an interaction with job control. The authors account for this nonsignificant finding by 
noting that the relationship between acceptance at Time 1 and job satisfaction at Time 2 
was calculated after controlling for relationships that the other predictors have with these 
two variables (Bond & Bunce, 2003). Given the strong relationship between job control 
and job satisfaction, it is possible that Time 1 acceptance could not account for a 
significant amount of residual variance in job satisfaction once job control was taken into 
account. In other words, acceptance may well be associated with job satisfaction, but this 
relationship becomes nonsignificant once job control, a more important predictor of job 
satisfaction, is taken into account.  
 The authors also controlled for negative affectivity and locus of control as 
possible confounds in this study. The authors did in fact find that higher negative 
affectivity at Time 1 predicted greater levels of mental ill-health, job dissatisfaction, and 
decreased performance at Time 2. These findings are consistent with those from previous 
research (e.g., Brief & Roberson, 1989; DeNeve & Cooper, 1998).  In addition, consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Jex, 1998; Parkes, 1991), Bond and Bunce (2003) found that 
individuals with a greater external locus of control at Time 1 experienced lower levels of 
job satisfaction at Time 1 and worse mental health at Time 2.   
 Including negative affectivity and locus of control in the study allowed the 
authors to control for any spurious associations that they may have caused between the 
variables of interest.  In doing so, the researchers were able to demonstrate incremental 
validity of acceptance in terms of its ability to predict mental health and job performance, 
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both directly and when interacting with job control. As a result, it appears that the 
predictive effects of acceptance are independent of those that stem from negative 
affectivity and locus of control.  
Existing Research on ACT for Stress Management at Work 
  To date, a handful of studies have examined ACT for workplace stress.  One 
randomized but preliminary trial focused on physical strain from work stress (Dahl et al., 
2004).  The authors compared medical treatment as usual (MTAU) with four 1-hour 
weekly sessions of ACT in addition to MTAU for nineteen public health service workers 
reporting chronic stress or pain who were at risk for high sick leave utilization.  Results 
indicated that those receiving ACT had fewer sick days and fewer medical visits than 
those in the MTAU-only condition at post-treatment and, to an even greater extent, at 6-
month follow-up.  Furthermore, these improvements could not be accounted for by 
remission of stress and pain in the ACT group, as no between-group differences were 
found for these symptoms.   
 The remaining studies of ACT for workplace stress have focused on 
psychological well-being as well as work-related outcomes.  These studies have 
evaluated a manualized stress intervention for use in the work environment developed 
from the strategies and techniques found in the psychotherapy version of ACT (i.e., 
Hayes et al., 1999).  The first study to evaluate this ACT-based worksite stress 
management intervention was conducted by Bond and Bunce (2000).  To test the efficacy 
of ACT using a brief, group-based implementation method conducive to the workplace, 
the authors of this and the subsequent two trials of the intervention (Flaxman & Bond, in 
preparation) utilized a “2+1” method of delivery in the trials.  This method entails having 
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participants receive three, three-hour sessions, two on consecutive weeks, and a third 
session three months later, with a follow-up assessment three months after that.   
 The initial trial by Bond and Bunce (2000) compared ACT with a wait-list control 
group and a problem-focused intervention (IPP).  The goal of IPP is to encourage people 
to identify and change stressors in their workplace rather than changing their emotional 
reactions to those stressors.  ACT significantly improved general health from the second 
to the third session and the first to the fourth session, and general health scores were 
significantly better at the third session and at follow-up compared to those of the IPP 
group and control group.  The ACT group also evidenced significantly lower depression 
levels between the second and third session and significantly higher scores on a work-
related variable (propensity to innovate) from the second to the third and from the first 
session to the follow-up assessment.  According to Cohen’s (1977) criteria for the effect 
size index of eta-squared (η2), these improvements ranged from medium (for depression) 
to large (for general mental health and propensity to innovate) magnitudes of effect.  In 
this study, ACT did not influence level of job satisfaction or motivation. 
 There have been two subsequent randomized controlled trials of ACT for work 
stress management (Flaxman & Bond, in preparation). The first study compared ACT to 
a traditional cognitive-behavioral stress management program based on stress inoculation 
training and a wait-list control condition.  Individuals in both treatment groups reported 
large improvements in mental health between baseline and at session 3 and again 3 
months after that.  Increases in psychological acceptance mediated mental health 
improvements for the ACT group whereas reductions in dysfunctional (i.e., negative) 
cognitions served as the mediator for the CBT group.   
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The second study, comparing ACT to a control group, found that, similar to the 
CBT group, ACT produced large improvement in general mental health, as well as 
significant reductions in frequency of dysfunctional cognitions (especially between 
baseline and 6 month follow-up).  Again, a reduction in dysfunctional thoughts was not 
found to be the mechanism behind improved mental health for the ACT group.  Instead, 
this improvement was mediated by increases in psychological flexibility (as assessed by 
the AAQ).  However, this finding indicates that an acceptance-based intervention may 
not only initially change how employees relate to their thoughts but also that, in the long 
term, may result in changes to thought content as well. 
  Thus, there is now both a longitudinal panel study and three longitudinal, 
experimental outcome studies that indicate the importance of psychological acceptance to 
mental health and performance in different organizations within different industries.  
Moreover, these positive results are maintained even when accounting for job control, 
negative affectivity, and work locus of control. Coupled with the other reviewed 
applications of ACT and MBSR in the workplace, it appears that mindfulness has clear 
benefits for decreasing psychological and physical strain symptoms and improving work-
related outcomes, with psychological acceptance as a main mechanism of action. 
 Limitations of the existing literature on ACT for workplace stress are plentiful, 
however.  For example, Bond and colleagues did not utilize assessment of out-of-session 
practice of intervention skills and only used limited assessment of work-related and non-
work-related stressors, well-being and work-related outcomes, and possible mediating 
factors beyond that of acceptance/flexibility (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Flaxman & Bond, 
2006).  Moreover, these studies, as well as others examining ACT as an intervention for 
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other applications, have not examined if and how the values components of the ACT 
protocol adds to the effects of the intervention beyond that of the mindfulness 
components.   
Values in ACT: What May They Add Beyond the Effects of Mindfulness 
 As noted above in the discussion of the processes in ACT, the last two 
components of the ACT protocol involve the identification of personal values in various 
life domains and the setting of and follow-through on goals based on these values.  
Participants use skills learned within the mindfulness components as aids to maintain 
behavioral commitment to such goals (Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 2006).  However, 
these components have not undergone any empirical evaluation within the ACT 
literature.  Moreover, some researchers (Shapiro et al., 2006) have suggested that the 
open, intentional awareness cultivated by mindfulness practice may by itself lead 
individuals to act in ways that are more congruent with their values and interests.  One 
possible mechanism of such an effect may be the expansion of an individual’s repertoire 
of possible behaviors, coupled with increased awareness of their distinct consequences 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997). 
 Theoretically, the strategies and aims of the values components of ACT are in line 
with those of values clarification and goal-setting strategies examined in various areas of 
the psychology and occupational literatures.  For example, personal values clarification 
has been viewed as a significant factor within theories of motivation (e.g., expectancy-
value theory; Atkinson, 1964), including work-related motivation and attitudes (e.g., 
Latham & Pinder, 2005).  Related to these literatures, goals have been an integral 
construct within theories of self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; 
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Martin & Tesser, 1996) and behavioral task performance and commitment (e.g., Goal-
Setting Theory; Lock & Latham, 1990; Value-Affirmation; Lydon & Zanna, 1990).   
 Moreover, consistent with the transactional theory of stress, values have been 
found to impact appraisals of meaning of stressful situations (e.g., Cooke & Rousseau, 
1983), including work-related stress (e.g., Bocchino, Hartman, & Foley, 2003; Britt, 
Stetz, & Bliese, 2004; Carlson & Kaemar, 2000).  Giving attention to personal values has 
also been shown to dampen the physiological reactions to stress (e.g., Creswell et al., 
2005) and affect the coping strategies used to deal with stressful situations (e.g., Kelly & 
Stone, 1987; Post & Weddington, 1997).  Personal values have also been linked to 
various work-related outcomes, such as satisfaction, commitment, and motivation (e.g., 
Butler, 1983; Jans, 1989; Knoop, 1994; Latham & Pinder, 2005; Robey, 1974), as well as 
engagement in healthy and unhealthy behaviors (Kristiansen, 1986; Oxford et al., 2002).  
Although values appear to be related to several work-related variables and have positive 
effects on strain and coping behaviors, the extent and mechanisms of these effects is not 
clear.  More importantly, how the values component of ACT relates to such diverse 
literatures has not been empirically examined and no clear hypotheses regarding its 
individual effect on the outcomes of ACT can be made. 
Overview and Statement of Purpose 
 The current study aimed to investigate the effects of dismantling the Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) protocol to ascertain the effects of ACT-based 
mindfulness and to examine whether and how ACT’s values components significantly 
add to its effects beyond those of the mindfulness components.  Although research 
examining certain specific strategies within ACT exists, its coverage is limited and no 
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study has attempted to dismantle ACT.  Previous research has suggested that outcomes in 
applications of ACT for various types of physical and psychological distress (Hayes et 
al., 2006) and for workplace stress (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Flaxman & Bond, in 
preparation) are mediated by level of psychological acceptance, the opposite of which is 
experiential avoidance.  Such acceptance could be conceptualized as representing the 
result of the first four of ACT’s six intervention components.  These processes have been 
referred to in whole as a behavioral definition of mindfulness (Fletcher & Hayes, in 
press), a construct defined in large part by psychological acceptance.  Given this research 
and the theoretical underpinnings of ACT, the contribution of the values components of 
ACT to observed outcomes has yet to be elucidated.  
 How the effects of an intervention come about represents an important area for 
further investigation. Therefore, in addition to primary outcome measure, differences 
between the full and the abbreviated versions of the ACT intervention on variables 
hypothesized to be possible mediators (i.e., mechanisms) of change were also examined.  
These process variables included not only psychological acceptance, but also other 
mindfulness factors recently identified, variables related to how participants’ relate to 
their cognitions and affect, work locus of control, and extent of skills practice outside of 
sessions.   
 The ACT protocol dismantled in the present study was based on the intervention for 
stress management at work originally developed by Bond and colleagues (Bond & 
Bunce, 2000; Flaxman & Bond, in preparation).  An intervention duration shorter than 
the original 14 weeks that comprises Bond et al.’s 2+1 method of delivery was utilized.  
Establishing the effectiveness of a shorter program has significant logistical and cost 
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implications for organizations.  Also, limitations of the extant studies of ACT for 
workplace stress (i.e., lack of stress and coping assessment, limited measures of outcome 
and potential mediating variables) were addressed.  
A dismantling experimental research strategy, in which the full version of ACT, 
composed on two components (i.e., mindfulness & values), was compared with a reduced 
version which omits the values component, was utilized.  In such a design, the effect of 
the full program reflects the main effect of each component taken separately plus the 
interaction among the components.  The effect of the reduced version of the program 
reflects only the main effect of the component that is present, namely mindfulness.  To 
the extent that the reduced version of the program produces outcomes that do not differ 
from the comprehensive program, it may be concluded that the addition of the omitted 
component does not appreciably add to the effectiveness of the comprehensive program 
over and above that of the reduced version (West & Aiken, 1997). 
Research Hypotheses 
The present study tested the following hypotheses: 
1. Participants in the full ACT group (“ACT”) and participants in the abbreviated ACT 
group (“AT”) were expected to experience significant improvements from pre-treatment 
to post-treatment on all outcome and process measures, except for those assessing 
frequency of life and job stressors, which are not under the control of the individual 
unless significant changes in lifestyle or work environment occur.   
2. The improvements pre- to post-treatment in AT and ACT would be equivalent on all 
measures. However, participants in the ACT group were expected to report: a) greater 
improvement in the Action subscale of the AAQ, b) greater use of active coping and less 
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use of avoidance coping, c) higher overall value-to-action congruence in coping, and d) 
higher levels of job satisfaction, meaning, motivation, and importance, due to the 
proposed influence of values clarification on these variables.   
3. At each follow-up assessment, improvements in measures seen pre- to post-treatment 
were expected to be maintained for participants in AT, but to increase further for 
participants in ACT, due to the proposed influence of values clarification on motivation 
and maintaining commitment to therapy skills.  
4. Furthermore, it was proposed that for both the ACT and the AT group, improvements 
in outcome measures would be mediated by improvements in process measures.  These 
associations were expected to remain significant even when mediation by negative 
affectivity and work locus of control was controlled for. 
5.  It was also proposed that the predicted associations between the improved outcome 
measures and the Action subscale of psychological flexibility, use of approach coping, 
use of avoidance coping, approach coping values-to-behavior congruence, and avoidance 
coping values-to-behavior congruence would be greater for the ACT than for the AT 
group. 
6. Participants in the ACT group were expected to report greater post-program 
engagement in the practice of the mindfulness intervention skills than participants in AT, 
due to the theorized effects of values clarification on behavioral commitment.  
7. Lastly, based on previous research, it is hypothesized that for both the ACT and the AT 
group, any improvement in job satisfaction would be mediated by pre-treatment levels of 
work control, negative affectivity, and work locus of control.  
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Chapter 2 
METHOD 
 
Participant Recruitment 
 Participant recruitment targeted employees of four large employers and the 
general Orono/Bangor, Maine, community.  Three of the employer sites were in Maine 
and initially included the University of Maine (UM) and Husson College, and Eastern 
Maine Medical Center (EMMC).  After limited participant enrollment occurred from 
efforts at these sites, the University of Florida and its affiliated hospital Shands 
Healthcare (UF/Shands), in Gainesville, Florida, were added as a fourth recruitment site.  
Recruitment at these sites was conducted via flyers hung in common campus areas and 
buildings and an emailed announcement posted within departmental, administrative, and 
employee-specific online conferences and folders.  Flyers were placed in the community 
as well.   
In addition, recruitment was also conducted at UM via a print and online 
employee newsletter, online university-wide news release, and a general press release.  
At UF/Shands, recruitment was also conducted via print and online versions of hospital- 
and university-wide newsletters, print and online versions of the university employee-
specific magazine, direct emailed contact with department chairs and center directors, a 
university-wide newspaper, and a month-long run of an announcement on local public 
radio.   
 Other than an age minimum of 18 years, no exclusionary criteria for enrollment 
were used. Current literature suggests that ACT can be beneficial for employees with 
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“normal” levels of mental health, as well as for those who are experiencing moderate to 
high levels of psychological distress (Flaxman & Bond, 2006).  Although initially not 
specifically targeted, funded graduate students at UM and Husson were directly recruited 
in an attempt to increase enrollment.  
Interventions 
A treatment manual was developed for both intervention versions.  Each version 
is highly structured in format and content.  The programs were not identified to the 
participants as “Acceptance and Commitment Therapy” or ACT, nor were these terms 
used within the program. This was done, primarily, in order to avoid having participants 
in the abbreviated program learn about the omitted components should they by chance 
have prior knowledge of ACT or investigate it by name (e.g., on the internet) while in the 
study.  The program, in both versions, was instead referred to as “Working with Stress”.  
The consent indicated that both programs included content related to how individuals 
think about and experience things that cause them stress and what kinds of things they do 
in reaction to these stressors.  This goal was also restated during the first session of each 
program version. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) 
The ACT-based protocol for stress management, originally developed and validated by 
Bond and colleagues (Bond, 2004; Bond & Hayes, 2002; Flaxman & Bond, 2006), served 
as the basis for the full ACT group program, termed “Working with Stress-Program A” in 
study materials, and was supplemented with material from the original ACT protocol 
(Hayes et al., 1999).  All six components of ACT were administered in the full version of 
the intervention.  Although the meeting duration, timeline, and number of sessions 
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differed between the study manual and the manual of Bond and colleagues, the total time 
of group-therapist contact remained the same (i.e., 10 hours).  Participants met once a 
week for six weeks for two hours at a time, allowing for each of the six components to be 
administered for approximately 1.5 hours. 
Acceptance Therapy (AT) 
 The abbreviated version of the program, termed “Working with Stress-Program 
B” in study materials, consisted of the first four components of the full ACT protocol 
(i.e., the mindfulness aspects) and omitted the last two components (i.e., the values 
components).  The manualized content of AT was identical to the content used for the 
first four components of ACT.  Participants met once a week for four weeks for two 
hours, allowing for each of the four components to be administered for approximately 1.5 
hours.   
  Both interventions were administered in group format.  The principal 
investigator, an advanced graduate student trained and experienced in CBT (e.g., 
including progressive relaxation training) and ACT techniques conducted the majority of 
the research (e.g., responding to recruitment inquiries, administering the interventions, 
data collection).  The investigator also has experience administering the psychotherapy 
version of ACT with various individual clients and has participated in a 1-day 
experiential ACT training workshop focusing on ACT for anxiety disorders.  In addition, 
she has participated in numerous professional trainings and workshops on mindfulness 
approaches, has developed and administered an experimental mindfulness-based group 
intervention for self-regulation of eating, and has been a regular practitioner of 
mindfulness meditation for half a decade.  A second intervention facilitator was an 
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advanced clinical graduate student, who participated in the third of three series of groups 
administered at UM.  The administration of the interventions was supervised by licensed 
psychologist, Dr. Sandra Sigmon.  Dr. Sigmon is an experienced CBT and ACT clinician 
and researcher in the field of health psychology. 
Procedure 
 Individuals who consented to participate in the study and completed pre-treatment 
measures were assigned to one of the two treatment conditions.  Assignment was made 
randomly to the extent possible while giving consideration to participants’ availability to 
attend particular days of the week and times of the day.  In total, 3 series of the 
intervention were run, with each series consisting of a group for each program version.  
Each session of each of the two programs was audio recorded for manual adherence 
evaluations by two undergraduate research assistants at UM blind to the program 
condition.  
 Self-report questionnaires were used to assess demographic information, outcome 
variables, and group process variables.  All questionnaires responses were anonymous 
with each participant assigned a unique identification number.  Participants completed a 
packet of measures before the initial intervention session (Pre-treatment), after the last 
intervention session (Post-treatment), and at 3 follow-up assessments. A complete listing 
and description of the outcome and process measures in the packet is given below.  
Participants completing paper packets were provided with pretreatment packets at the 
time of the consent procedures, at post-treatment, and copies for the 3 follow-up sessions 
were given at the last treatment session.  Participants returned the packets via campus 
mail.  Participants who chose to answer the questionnaires online were emailed 
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instructions to access SurveyMonkey and their ID number following consent procedures.  
Each participant received a reminder email a week before the first session and a week 
after the last session to complete their questionnaires.      
 To test the durability of the interventions’ effects, follow-up assessments of the 
outcome and process measures occurred at 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months following 
the last (i.e., fifth) intervention session. Each participant received an email a week before 
each follow-up time-point reminding them to complete their set of measures. The six-
month criterion for follow-up is frequently suggested as the adequate period necessary to 
ascertain minimum long-term treatment effectiveness (Glasgow & Rosen, 1978; Kazdin 
& Wilson, 1978).  
Measures 
Participant Characteristics 
 Demographic Questionnaire.   A demographic questionnaire was included as part 
of the pre-treatment packet and used to assess age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, 
education level, income range, and occupation.     
Work Control. The Work Control Scale (WCS; Dwyer & Ganster, 1991) is a 22-
item measure assessing a range of areas over which individuals can have control at work: 
variety of tasks performed, the order of task performance, pacing, scheduling of rest 
breaks, procedures and policies in the workplace, and arrangement of the physical 
environment. This measure was used to control for the degree of job control experienced 
by participants in the present study.  Each item (e.g., “How much control do you have 
personally over the quality of your work?”) is rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from (1) “very little” to (5) “very much”. Higher scores indicate greater levels of control. 
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Psychometric properties of this scale appear adequate and reveal a single factor of control 
(Ganster, 1989). In Bond & Bunce (2003), alpha coefficients for this scale were .88 and 
.90 for Times 1 and 2, respectively. Alpha coefficient for the present study was 0.91 at 
pre-treatment.   
Outcome Measures 
Job Stress Survey.   The Job Stress Survey (JSS; Vagg & Spielberger 1998) is a 
30-item instrument based on a transactional approach to stress and designed to assess the 
perceived intensity (i.e., severity) and frequency of occurrence of work characteristics 
that may adversely affect the psychological well-being of workers.  The JSS permits 
assessment of 30 generic job stressors (e.g., “excessive paperwork”, “poorly motivated 
coworkers”) that are encountered in a variety of work settings and across gender and 
occupational level (Vagg & Spielberger, 1999).  For the present study, respondents were 
asked to first indicate how frequently each experience was a part of their life over the past 
month on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from (0) “Not at all” to (4) “Very frequently”, 
and then to indicate the level of negative impact or stress that each experience had on 
their well-being on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from (0) “None” to (4) “Very High”.  
Summing the ratings across all 30 items yielded an Overall Frequency (JSS-F) score and 
an Overall Impact (JSS-I) score.  An Overall Job Stress Index (JSS-X) was then 
calculated by summing the cross-products of the frequency and impact scores.  
Using a similar scoring scheme, Spielberger and Vagg (1999) reported a 
reliability coefficient of .87 for the Overall Job Stress score.  Moreover, several studies 
have verified the construct validity of the JSS (e.g., Spielberger & Reheiser, 1994; 
Turnage & Spielberger, 1991). Alpha coefficients for the present study were .87, .88, .93, 
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.87, and .89 for JSS-F and .87, .87, .95, .92, and .94 for JSS-I at each of the assessment 
times (pre-treatment, post-treatment, first follow-up, second follow-up, and third follow-
up, respectively). 
Survey of Recent Life Events.  The Survey of Recent Life Events (SRLE; Kohn 
& Macdonald, 1992) is a 51-item measure formulated to assess exposure to a variety of 
daily hassles.  This measure was developed as an alternative to earlier measures (e.g., 
Daily Hassles Scale (DHS); Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981), which were 
criticized for being contaminated by items and a response format that may reflect 
subjective distress rather than predict it (Green, 1986; Kohn & Macdonald, 1992).  The 
SRLE has been found to demonstrate high internal consistency (α = .91).  In addition, the 
measure has been shown to correlate significantly with perceived stress, trait anxiety, 
psychiatric symptomatology, and minor physical ailments (e.g., Kohn, Gurevich, 
Pickering, & Macdonald, 1994).   
The SRLE utilizes a Likert scale format for respondents to indicate the extent to 
which an item was part of his or her life during the past month (1 = not at all, 4 = very 
much).  The sum of responses is calculated, with higher scores indicating a greater 
experience of daily hassles over the past month. In addition to the assessment of extent of 
occurrence for each item, participants in the present study were asked to also rate each 
item on the level of negative impact or stress it had when it did occur, using a 5-point 
Likert scale, ranging from (0) “None” to (4) “Very high”.  Thus, similar to the scoring 
scheme of the JSS, a Life Stressor Frequency score (SRLE-F), a Life Stressor Impact 
score (SRLE-I), and an Overall Life Stressor Index computed from their cross products 
(SRLE-X) were ascertained.   Alpha coefficients for the present study were .90, .93, .93, 
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.94, and .96 for SRLE-F and .94, .93, .89, .91, and .97 for SRLE-I at each of the 
assessment times, respectively. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II.   The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item self-report inventory designed to assess cognitive, 
affective, and somatic symptoms commonly reported in depression.  Respondents are 
asked to indicate the severity of their depressive symptoms “for the past week” on a “0” 
(i.e., neutral severity) to “3” (i.e., maximum severity) scale and scores are added to give a 
total ranging from 0 to 63.  The BDI-II has demonstrated adequate internal consistency, 
short-term test-retest reliability, and convergent validity (Beck et al., 1996).  The BDI-II 
is often used in research on mood disorders and has been utilized in previous 
investigations of ACT for stress, with adequate psychometric characteristics (see Hayes 
et al., 2006 for a review of ACT studies utilizing the BDI).  Alpha coefficients for the 
BDI-II in the present study were .78, .89, .87, .84, and .90 at each of the assessment 
times, respectively. 
 The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1982) is a 40-item self-report measure 
assessing “state” and “trait” anxiety.  “State” anxiety refers to an individual’s level of 
anxiety at the time of assessment and is assessed by having individuals rate 20 items of 
the STAI on how they currently feel on a 0 (“not at all”) to 4 (“very much so”) scale. 
Trait anxiety refers to an individual’s general level of anxiety and is assessed by having 
individuals rate the other 20 items of the STAI on how they generally feel on a 0 (almost 
never) to 4 (almost always) scale. As would be expected, test-retest reliability values for 
the state anxiety scale and the strait anxiety scale range from .16 to .54 and from .73 to 
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.86, respectively (Spielberger et al., 1982).  Both versions have been used extensively in 
clinical and occupational psychology research.  Alpha coefficients for the STAI-S in the 
present study were .88, .95, .96, .86, and .96 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Alpha coefficients for the STAI-T in the present study were .86, .91, .81, .87, and .94 at 
each of the assessment times, respectively. 
 General Health Questionnaire-12. The General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; 
Goldberg, 1972) is a 12-item scale that is widely used for measuring general distress 
(McDowell & Newell, 1996).  Respondents are asked to indicate to what extent they have 
recently (i.e., “over the past few weeks”) experienced the medical complaints listed, 
using a 4-point Likert scoring system, ranging from “not at all” (0) to “much more than 
usual” (3).  Items include: “. . . felt constantly under strain?”, “. . . lost sleep over 
worry”, and “. . . loosing confidence in yourself?”  Higher scores indicate poorer general 
mental and physcial health.  Alpha coefficients for the GHQ-12 range from .82 to .90 in 
one review (Vieweg & Hedlund, 1983), whereas in Bond and Bunce (2000), Cronbach 
alphas were .73, .75, .76, and .75 from T1 to T4, respectively.  Alpha coefficients for the 
GHQ in the present study were .82, .91, .87, .72, and .72 at each of the assessment times, 
respectively. 
The Short-Form-36 Health Survey.   The 36-item short form of the Medical 
Outcomes Study questionnaire (SF-36; Ware & Sherbourne, 1992) was designed as a 
generic indicator of health status for use in population surveys, health policy evaluations, 
and as an outcome measure in clinical practice and research.  The measure includes 
multi-item scales to measure the following eight dimensions: physical functioning, role 
limitations due to physical problems, bodily pain, social functioning, general mental 
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health, role limitations due to emotional problems, vitality, energy, and fatigue, and 
general health perceptions.  The SF-36 has demonstrated reliability and validity in a 
variety of disease groups, as well as in the general population. It has also proven to be 
useful in estimating the relative health burden of different conditions, including mental 
disorders, and in assessing the impact of associated treatments (Garratt, Ruta, Abdalla, 
Buckingham, & Russell, 1993; Nerenz, Repasky, Whitehouse, & Kahkonen, 1992).   
Due to the large number of items in the SF-36 and variables within the study 
overall, it was decided that only selected items of the SF-36 seen as most informative for 
the study aims were included in analyses.  These included item 1 (SF-1, a Likert-scale 
item assessing general physical health, with higher scores indicative of poorer health), 
item 5c (SF-5c, a “yes” or “no item assessing whether emotional problems have caused 
the individual to accomplish less than they would like in their work or other regular 
activity), and item 6 (SF-6, a Likert-scale item assessing the extent to which physical 
health or emotional problems interfered with the individual’s normal social activities, 
with higher scores indicative of greater interference).  
 Quality of Life-Inventory.  The Quality of Life-Inventory (QOLI; Frisch, 1988, as 
cited in Frisch, Cornell, Villanueva, & Retzlaff, 1992) assesses overall life satisfaction 
based on weighted scores in 17 domains or areas of life.  Each area is rated by 
respondents in terms of its importance to their overall happiness and satisfaction, using a 
3-point scale (0 = not at all important, 1 = important, 2 = extremely important), and in 
terms of their satisfaction with the area, on a 7-point scale (-3 = very dissatisfied to 3 = 
very satisfied).  The product of the importance and satisfaction ratings for each area yield 
weighted satisfaction ratings, ranging from -6 to 6. An overall satisfaction score was then 
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obtained by summing the weighted ratings for a total score.  The overall QOL score 
(QOL), as well as the work-domain QOL (item 5) was examined (QOL-W). The QOLI 
has been found to be psychometrically sound (Frisch, Cornell, Villanueva, & Retzlaff, 
1992). Alpha coefficients for the weighted satisfaction items of the overall QOL in the 
present study were .91, .90, .88, .89, and .92 at each of the assessment times, respectively.  
Job Satisfaction Scale.   The Intrinsic Job Satisfaction Scale is a 16-item measure 
found within the Work and Life Attitudes Survey (Warr, Cook, & Wall, 1979), reflective 
of the appraisals workers make of their jobs and of work.  The scale explores the degree 
of satisfaction that workers derive directly from their work. The items include "the 
recognition you get for good work” and “your rate of pay”.  Responses are recorded on a 
7-point Likert scale from (1) “extremely dissatisfied” to (7) “extremely satisfied”.  Test-
retest correlation coefficient for this scale was found to be .63 by the authors (Warr et al., 
1979).  Bond and Bunce (2000) found Cronbach alpha coefficients for this measure from 
T1 to T4 to be .79, .82, .80, and .79, respectively. Alpha coefficients for the JSAT in the 
present study were .89, .91, .94, .88, and .94 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Intrinsic Job Motivation Scale.   This scale is one of the scales from the Work and 
Life Attitudes Survey (Warr, Cook, & Wall, 1979).  It is a six-item scale measuring 
respondents' wishes to work to the best of their ability (e.g., "I take pride in doing my job 
as well as I can").  Each item is anchored to a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) 
strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.  In the study by Bond and Bunce (2000), 
Cronbach alphas for this measure from T1 to T4 were .72, .74, .78, and .75, respectively 
(Warr et al., 1979). Alpha coefficients for the Intrinsic Job Motivation Scale (IJM) in the 
present study were .82, .71, .65, .91, and .72 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
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Work Involvement Scale.   This is another scale from the Work and Life Attitudes 
Survey (Warr, Cook, & Wall, 1979). This scale is a six item measure of meaning placed 
on work in general (e.g., “Having a job is very important to me”).  Participants asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each statement on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.  Alpha coefficients 
for the Work Involvement Scale (WIS) in the present study were .69, .69, .65, .87, and 
.91 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Higher Order Need Strength Scale.  This is a third scale from the Work and Life 
Attitudes Survey (Warr, Cook, & Wall, 1979). This scale is a six-item scale measuring 
the level of importance a respondent places on a variety of job characteristics.  Example 
items include “Achieving something that you personally value” and “Challenging work“.  
A 7-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) Not at all important to (7) Extremely important.  
Test-retest correlation coefficient for the scale was 26 (Warr et al., 1979).  The authors 
acknowledge that the observed test-retest reliability of the HONS is undesirably low and 
note that this concept has presented problems of operationalization to other investigators, 
with scope for further improvement. Alpha coefficients for the HONS in the present 
study were .89, .74, .84, .82, and .93 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Process Measures 
Work Locus of Control Scale.   The 16-item Work Locus of Control Scale 
(Spector, 1988) assesses the extent to which people expect that rewards, reinforcements, 
and other outcomes in the work domain are controlled either by one’s own actions or by 
others. Responses to each of the 16 items (e.g., “Promotions are usually a matter of good 
fortune”) are scored on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree very much) to 6 (agree 
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very much).  The questionnaire was scored so that higher scores indicate a greater internal 
locus of control. Research indicates that this measure predicts work outcomes (e.g., job 
satisfaction) better than Rotter’s (1966) general locus of control scale (Spector, 1988).  
Bond and Bunce (2003) found alpha coefficients at Times 1 and 2 of .73 and .77, 
respectively. Alpha coefficients for the WLoC in the present study were .83, .84, .87, .83, 
and .86 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale.    The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) lists 10 adjectives that describe negative 
moods (e.g., distressed, guilty, hostile, irritable, and nervous) and 10 that describe 
positive moods (e.g., interested, strong, enthusiastic, and inspired). Participants indicate 
the extent to which they generally feel or have felt each mood on a 5-point scale ranging 
from (1) “not at all” to (5) “extremely”. For the present study, the time period was the 
“past few weeks”.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of negative and positive 
affectivity. Watson et al. (1988) found that this measure demonstrates good psychometric 
properties. In the study by Bond and Bunce (2003), Times 1 and 2 alpha coefficients for 
the Negative Affect Scale were .87 and .89, respectively.  Alpha coefficients for the 
Negative Affect Scale in the present study were .87, .89, .85, .85, and .85 at each of the 
assessment times, respectively. Alpha coefficients for the Positive Affect Scale in the 
present study were .94, .96, .93, .79, and .94 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire.    The 19-item AAQ was utilized in this 
study and scoring was based on the 16 items that make up the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-16 (AAQ-16; Hayes et al., 2002). This scale assesses people’s willingness 
to accept their undesirable thoughts and feelings while acting in a way that is congruent 
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with their values and goals.  Items on the 16-item AAQ tap various domains, including 
cognitive defusion (e.g., “When I evaluate something negatively, I usually recognize that 
this is just a reaction, not an objective fact”), negative evaluations of internal experiences 
(e.g., “Anxiety is bad”), negative self-evaluation (e.g., “When I compare myself to other 
people, it seems that most of them are handling their lives better than I do”), inability to 
take action due to the influence of thoughts and feelings (e.g., “I am unable to take action 
on a problem if I am uncertain what is the right thing to do”), and the need for control 
over one’s thoughts and feelings (e.g., “I worry about getting my anxieties, worries, and 
feelings under control”). A 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never true) to 7 (always 
true), is used to rate responses. The AAQ has been keyed both positively and negatively 
in the literature, depending on whether the focus was on experiential avoidance or 
acceptance/psychological flexibility (Hayes et al., 2006).  In the present investigation, the 
questionnaire was scored in such a manner so that higher scores indicate greater 
psychological flexibility. 
 Research thus far indicates that the 16-item AAQ has adequate internal 
consistency, criterion-related, predictive, and convergent validities (Bond & Bunce, 
2003; Hayes et al., 2004). Regarding convergent validity, Hayes et al. (2004) found in 
two studies that the AAQ was significantly and negatively associated with the White 
Bear Suppression Inventory, a measure of individual’s tendency to suppress (i.e., not 
accept) unwanted thoughts (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). In addition, Donaldson-
Feilder and Bond (2004) found that the AAQ was significantly and positively associated 
with the Clarity Scale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
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Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). The TMMS scale assesses the degree to which people allow 
themselves to experience, and hence not avoid, both desirable and undesirable feelings. 
 Tests of construct validity have demonstrated that the 16 items of the AAQ load 
onto two continuous factors: “willingness to experience internal events” (Willingness 
subscale, AAQ-W), tapping acceptance and mindfulness concepts, and “ability to take 
action, even in the face of unwanted internal events” (Action subscale, AAQ-A), 
assessing values-based action (Bond & Bunce, 2003).  Both of these scales load on a 
second-order factor termed psychological flexibility (Bond & Bunce, 2003; Hayes et al., 
2006).  In Bond and Bunce (2000), Cronbach alphas for the AAQ total score from T1 to 
T4 of .89, .91, .92, and .90, respectively, were obtained. In Bond & Bunce (2003), Times 
1 and 2 alpha coefficients for this measure were .79 and .72, respectively.  For the present 
study, both the Willingness subscale and the Action subscale, along with the total AAQ 
scale were utilized.  Alpha coefficients for the AAQ total in the present study were .79, 
.79, .74, .72, and .72 at each of the assessment times, respectively. Alpha coefficients for 
the AAQ-W subscale in the present study were .70, .75, .65, .72, and 69 at each of the 
assessment times, respectively. Alpha coefficients for the AAQ-A subscale in the present 
study were .72, .65, .66, .68, and .76 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire.   The Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) is a 39-item 
measure of mindfulness derived from a combined pool of items from existing 
mindfulness questionnaires and is currently the only one that assesses all five facets of 
mindfulness.  These facets correspond to the five factors of the FFMQ, derived via 
exploratory and then confirmatory factor analyses, and include the following: 1) 
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Nonreactivity to inner experience (α = .75; e.g., “I perceive my feelings and emotions 
without having to react to them”), 2) Observing (α = .83; “I pay attention to sensations, 
such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face”), 3) Acting with awareness (α = .87; “I 
find myself doing things without paying attention”), 4) Describing (α = .91; “I’m good at 
finding the words to describe my feelings”), and 5) Nonjudging of experience (α = .87; “I 
think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them”).  
Respondents are asked to rate each item in the questionnaire, using a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from (1) “never or very rarely true” to (5) “very often or always true”.  
Convergent and discriminate validity analyses indicated expected relationships between 
each factor scale and various related constructs (Baer et al., 2006).  
In the present study, alpha coefficients for the FFMQ were .86, .92, .93, 88, and 
.92 at each of the assessment times, respectively. Alpha coefficients for each of the 
subscales at T1 through T5 were .66, .81, .85, .85, and .76 for Nonreactivity (FFMQ-NR), 
.86, .89, .90, .87, and .90 for Observing (FFMQ-O), .89, .85, .83, .87, and .96 for Acting 
with Awareness (FFMQ-A), .87, .85, .84, .87, and .91 for Describing (FFMQ-D), and .87, 
.83, .90, .91, and .87 for Nonjudging (FFMQ-NJ).   
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire.   The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
(ATQ-N; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a 30-item questionnaire designed to assess the 
frequency of automatic negative thoughts often associated with depression.  Example 
items include “I’m worthless”, “Wish I could just disappear”, “What’s the matter with 
me?”, “I’m a loser”, and “My life is a mess”.  Respondents are asked to rate the 
frequency with which these self-statements occurred over the period of the past week, 
using a 5-point Likert scale, raging from (1) never to (5) all the time.  In addition to this 
88 
assessment of frequency (ATQ-NF), respondents may also be asked to rate the degree to 
which they believed each item when it occurred, using a 5-pont Likert scale, ranging 
from (0) “Not at all” to (4) “Very much”.  This believability scale, termed the ATQ-NB, 
was used as a measure of cognitive defusion within a previous investigation of ACT 
(Zettle & Hayes, 1986) and was utilized in the present study.   
 Previous research indicates acceptable reliability and validity of the ATQ (Hollon 
& Kendall, 1980).  Subsequent investigations have given additional positive support 
regarding the measure’s psychometric properties, with alpha coefficients ranging above 
.80 and hypothesized relationships with other related measures found to be as expected 
(e.g., Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Harrell & Ryon, 1983).  Moreover, the ATQ has also 
proven valuable as a sensitive measure of the cognitive change associated with cognitive-
behavioral clinical interventions (e.g., Bisno, Thompson, Breckenridge, & Gallagher, 
1985; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). In the present study, alpha coefficients for the 
frequency of negative automatic thoughts (ATQ-NF) were .96, .97, .97, .95, and .96 at 
each of the assessment times, respectively.  Alpha coefficients for the believability of 
negative automatic thoughts (ATQ-NB) were .90, .99, .94, .92, and .96 at each of the 
assessment times, respectively. 
 Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire-Positive.   The Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire-Positive (ATQ-P; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988) is a 30-item inventory similar 
in format to the ATQ that was designed to assess the occurrence of positive automatic 
cognition.  Example items include “I am a lucky person”, “I am respected by my peers”, 
“I’m fun to be with”, “I deserve the best in life”, and “I have many useful qualities”.  
Similar to the ATQ, respondents are asked to rate the frequency with which these self-
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statements occurred over the period of the past week, using a 5-point Likert scale, raging 
from (1) never to (5) all the time.  To parallel the believability rating scale that will 
accompany the ATQ, a similar believability scale for the ATQ-P was utilized for the 
current study (i.e., the ATQ-PB) by having participants rate the believability of each 
ATQ-P statement along with rating its frequency. 
The ATQ-P has shown high internal consistency in its initial development study 
(coefficient alpha of .94) and in subsequent investigations (alphas all above .80; e.g., 
Burgess & Haaga, 1994; Ingram, Johnson, Bernet, Dombeck, & Rowe, 1992).  The 
validity of the ATQ-P has also been found to be adequate. Specifically, the ATQ-P 
inversely and moderately correlates with measures of depressive and anxiety symptoms 
(Burgess & Haaga, 1994; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988)  In addition, findings indicating that 
the measure adequately discriminates clinically and subclinically depressed or anxious 
individuals from nondistressed individuals, and that ATQ-P scores are specific to 
psychological distress rather than distress stemming from physical conditions not 
accompanied by psychological distress (for a review, see Ingram, Kendall, Siegle, 
Guarino, & McLaughlin, 1995). ). In the present study, alpha coefficients for the 
frequency of positive automatic thoughts (ATQ-PF) were .97, .96, .97, .96, and .98 at 
each of the assessment times, respectively.  Alpha coefficients for the believability of 
positive automatic thoughts (ATQ-PB) were .97, .96, .96, .94, and .98 at each of the 
assessment times, respectively. 
Valued Coping in Action Questionnaire.  The Valued Coping in Action 
Questionnaire (VCAQ) is a measure specifically designed for the present investigation as 
a way to assess values-based action, as described within ACT (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999).  
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It utilizes the items of the COPE, a measure of 60-items designed to identify adaptive and 
problematic coping reactions (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989).  It is comprised of 
15 subscales of four items each: 1) Active coping (α = .62; e.g., “I concentrate my efforts 
on doing something about it.”); 2) Planning (α = .80; “I try to come up with a strategy 
about what to do.”); 3) Suppression of competing activities (α = .68; e.g., “I put aside 
other activities in order to concentrate on this.”); 4) Restraint coping (α = .72; “I force 
myself to wait for the right time to do something.”); 5) Seeking social support for 
instrumental reasons (α = .75; “I ask people who have had similar experiences what they 
did.”); 6) Seeking social support for emotional reasons (α = .85; “I talk to someone about 
how I feel”); 7)  Positive reinterpretation and growth (α = .68; “I look for something good 
in what is happening.”); 8) Acceptance (α = .65; “I learn to live with it.”); 9) Turning to 
religion (α = .92; “I seek God’s help.”); 10) Focusing on and venting of emotions (α = 
.77; “I get upset and let my emotion out.”); 11) Denial (α = .71; “I refuse to believe that 
it has happened.”); 12) Behavioral disengagement (α = .63; “I give up the attempt to get 
what I want”); 13) Mental disengagement (α = .45; “I go to movies or watch TV, to think 
about it less.”); 14) Alcohol-drug disengagement (i.e., “I drink alcohol or take drugs, in 
order to think about it less.”); 15) Humor (i.e., “I made jokes about the situation”).  The 
COPE subscales have demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, with only one 
subscale having an alpha coefficient below .60.  This exception was the mental 
disengagement scale and is not unexpected, given that it differs from the others in being 
more of a multiple-act criterion (Carver et al., 1989). The COPE has also demonstrated 
adequate convergent and discriminant validity (Carver et al., 1989).   
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Using the items of the COPE, the VCAQ entails a Values version and an Action 
version.  The Values version (VCAQ-V; see Appendix A) asked participants to indicate 
the extent they find each coping response to stress as a good thing, as something to strive 
for in their own behavior.  The Action version (VCAQ-A; see Appendix A) asked 
participants to indicate the extent they generally engaged in each coping response in 
response to difficult or stressful situations at work in the past few weeks and items were 
worded in the active first person.  To prevent participants from easily referring between 
the scales should they have wanted to align their responses in some particular manner, the 
items in the Values version of the VCAQ were presented in a different order than those of 
the Action version.   
Congruence was ascertained by calculating the absolute difference between the 
corresponding Value and Action items, with lower values indicative of greater 
congruence between valuing and utilizing a certain coping strategy and higher values 
indicative of lower congruence between valuing and utilizing a certain coping strategy.  
A total congruence score (VCAQ-VA) was calculated by summing the 15 individual 
congruence values. Alpha coefficients for this congruence scale were .67, .81, .76, .76, 
and .67 at each of the assessment times, respectively. 
Rather than examine changes in each of the many subscales, the present study 
focused on two newly devised subscales.  These novel scales aimed to focus on responses 
that were thought to be most closely aligned with the ACT approach, in that they 
measured active or approach-type strategies versus disengaged or avoidance-type 
strategies.  Specifically, the Active Coping and Positive Interpretation/Growth subscales 
were summed to create a novel scale, termed Approach Coping, based on the content of 
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the items within each subscale, the extent of association between the subscales and 
findings that these two subscales have been found to correlate positively with measures 
of optimism, internal locus of control, self-esteem, and stress hardiness (Carver et al., 
1989).  The second novel scale was termed Avoidance Coping and represented the total 
of the Denial and Behavioral Disengagement subscales, which also correlated to a 
significant and large extent and have been found to associate negatively with measures of 
optimism, internal locus of control, self-esteem, and stress hardiness (Carver et al., 1989).  
 A Values and an Action version of each subscale was devised. Alpha coefficients 
at T1 through T5 were .67, .66, .64, .76, and .63 for the Values version of the Approach 
Coping subscale (ApprchC-V), .90, .89, .87, .86, and .82 for the Action version of the 
Approach Coping subscale (ApprchC-A), .73, .77, .76, .84, and .66 for the Value version 
of the Avoid Coping subscale (AvoidC-V), and .68, .68, .68, .64, and .85 for the Action 
version of the Avoid Coping subscale (AvoidC-A). 
Therapy Process Measures 
Expectations for Treatment.  As part of the pre-treatment assessment, participants 
were asked about their expectations for treatment.  Specifically, they were asked to 
indicate, using a 7-item Likert scale ranging from (1) “not at all” to (4) “some” to (7) “a 
great deal”, 1) the extent they expected that this program would 1) help reduce the 
distress they experience from work-related stressors, 2) help reduce the distress they 
experience from stressors outside of work, 3) help them experience more satisfaction or 
fulfillment in their work, and 4) help them experience more satisfaction or fulfillment in 
their life.  At the post-treatment assessment, participants responded to the same four 
items, with wording of the items being in the past tense (i.e., “To what extent did this 
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program help…”).  As an additional measure of program effects, at each follow-up 
participants again responded to these four items.  However, wording of this measure at 
the follow-up assessments asked the extent of change participants experienced in each 
domain, and thus their responses do not necessarily reflect any effect attributable to the 
treatment. 
Group Cohesiveness.   At post-treatment, participants completed the Schutz 
(1966) Cohesiveness Questionnaire, as modified for therapy groups by Lieberman, 
Yalom, & Miles (Feelings About the Group; 1973), is a 12-item, Likert-type scale 
designed to measure the attractiveness of a group for its members and the degree of 
perceived belongingness or acceptance by other members in the group. Participants were 
asked to respond on items asking about their participation in the group, liking of the 
group, inclusion in the group, and feelings about the facilitator. The version of the 
measure used in one study had a coefficient alpha of .82 (Lieberman et al., 1973). This 
measure is widely used to measure group cohesiveness and has been found to have 
adequate content validity (Johnson & Fortman, 1988) and internal consistency (e.g., 
coefficient alpha .80, Marmarosh, Holtz, & Schottenbauer, 2005).  
For this study, item 9 from the Feelings About the Group scale, which asks how 
many members of their group would a participant exchange with other ideal group 
members, was omitted from analysis.  Item 7 was used as an individual variable 
(MtgEval) and asked participants to rate on a 5-point Likert scale how often their group 
should have met compared to how often it did meet.  Item 11 was also used as an 
individual variable (FacEval) and asked participants to rate how satisfied they were with 
the group facilitator on a 7-point Likert scale.  The remaining 8 items of the scale (items 
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1-6, 8, and 10) were summed for an overall measure of participants’ evaluation of group 
cohesiveness at the post-treatment assessment. The less than adequate coefficient alpha 
for this cohesiveness measure (.59) reflects the varied content of the items.  
Skills Practice Monitoring. Participants’ practice of activities assigned during 
administration of the intervention for completion in-between sessions was assessed via a 
questionnaire participants completed at each session following the first.  A total of 7 
mindfulness-related practices and 4 values-related practices were monitored.  Due to the 
shorter duration of treatment, participants in the AT group reported on 5 of the 7 
mindfulness practices, although each group was exposed to all exercises.  Participants in 
AT were not exposed to and thus did not monitor practice of the values-based exercises.  
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they practiced the exercise to any 
extent and then to rate, on a 1 to 5 scale, how beneficial the practice was in achieving its 
stated aim.  For analysis, the median number of mindfulness exercises practiced session 1 
to 4 for both intervention groups and the median number of values exercises practiced 
session 5 to 6 for the ACT group was calculated. 
The five mindfulness practices participants in both interventions reported on 
included 1) Attending to thoughts, feelings, and reactions to stressful situations and how 
well those reactions work, with the aim of awareness of how participants’ struggle with 
stress, 2) A Clean Pain versus Dirty Suffering Diary, with the aim of awareness of the 
difference between clean and dirty discomfort, 3) Rules of the Game of Life Exercise, 
with the aim of awareness of arbitrary rules and assumptions participants may be 
influenced by, 4) Awareness of Your Experience Meditation, with the aim of awareness 
of how easily and automatically participants evaluate or get caught up in mental activity, 
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and 5) Your Mind of a Card Exercise, with the aim of helping participants going about 
their life without having to attend to or base actions on unpleasant thoughts.  The two 
mindfulness exercises that participants in the ACT group had the opportunity to report on 
included 6) the Tin Can Monster exercise, with the aim of helping participants learn 
acceptance of various parts of experience, and 7) The Observer exercise, with the aim of 
awareness of participants’ “observer-self”. 
The four values-related practices participants in the ACT groups reported on 
included 1) Identifying work-related values and rating how well they are manifested, with 
the aim of awareness of values and current extent of instantiation in behavior, 2) 
Assessment of work-related goals, actions and barriers, with the aim to help participants 
plan the steps toward their values and awareness of barriers to these steps, 3) Attending 
Your Own Funeral exercise, with the aim of identifying what participants’ want to be 
remembered for, and 4) Full Life Values assessment, with the aim of identifying life 
values. 
Participants’ extent of practice of the various acceptance/mindfulness practices 
introduced in the program was also assessed at post-treatment and each follow-up.   
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had 1) practiced the Awareness of 
Your Experience, Your Mind on a Card, Tin Can Monster, or Observer Exercise, 2) 
engaged in any other acceptance/mindfulness practice(s) from the program or other 
practice(s) that they had made up themselves or learned outside of the program, and 3) 
engaged in any other stress reduction/management strategies.  For each affirmative 
response, the participants were asked to describe what they did and how often in their 
own words. 
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Chapter 3 
RESULTS 
 
Participant Recruitment 
Based on power analyses involving effect sizes of outcomes in line with extant 
research on ACT, a study sample size of 60, with 30 participants for each intervention 
group, was sought.  However, after 1.5 years of recruitment, only 33 individuals were 
consented across sites.  Twenty-five of these individuals came from UM, 1 from Husson, 
4 from EMMC, and 3 from UF/Shands.  Due to the fact that a minimum of 6 participants 
needed to be recruited at any one site in order to administer the intervention (for at least 3 
participants per program group), no intervention was administered with either EMMC, 
Husson, or UF/Shands employees.   
 Of the 25 individuals from UM who consented, 23 completed pretreatment 
measures.  Prior to being assigned to a treatment group, a total of 7 out of the 23 were 
discontinued.  Of these 7 individuals, 5 did not respond to contact or withdrew due to 
self-reported scheduling issues that prevented them from participating in the program and 
discontinued their participation prior to group assignment, while 2 participants withdrew 
after assignment to a group due to self-reported lack of time.  The final sample size for 
the study was 16, with 8 participants in each of the two intervention groups.  Six 
intervention groups in total were run; 2 of three participants each and 1 of two 
participants each, for each of the two intervention versions.  Each participant attended 
each treatment session (i.e., zero attrition during treatment provision).  However, 4 
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individual sessions occurred for four participants who were unable to attend their 
respective groups due to scheduling or illness.   
Treatment Manual Adherence 
 Out of the 30 group sessions, 12 were evaluated for treatment manual adherence 
by two raters blind to the treatment condition.  Tapes were chosen in such a manner that 
each rater evaluated one session from each treatment group within each of the 3 cohorts 
of participants.  Rater A reviewed session 1, 3, and 4 from the AT intervention and 
session 2, 5, and 6 from the ACT intervention.  Rater B reviewed session 1, 2, and 3 from 
the AT intervention and session 4, 5, and 6 from the ACT intervention.   
 The raters listened to the entire session tape and on a checklist devised for this 
study (see Appendix F) indicated 1) whether or not a particular therapy concept out of a 
list of 53 concepts was discussed, 2) the extent the discussion of each present concept 
followed the wording and action specified in the manual, rated either 1 = minimal, 2 = 
moderate, or 3 = high, and 3) the extent to which the facilitator(s) ran the session 
according to 7 attributes based on the basic therapeutic stance of ACT, rated either 0 = 
not at all, 1 = minimal, 2 = moderate, or 3 = high.  The items of the checklist were based 
on the concepts of the manual devised for this study and based on the original ACT 
protocol, as well as the ACT Core Competency Self-Rating Form (available at 
http://www.contextualpsychology.org).    
Adherence to Treatment Components 
 Results indicated 100% integrity of treatment components across sessions, with 
both raters indicating with 100% agreement that each session of each treatment contained 
discussion of all appropriate concepts, as listed within the checklist. Raters indicated that 
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none of the first four AT sessions contained discussion of any concepts from sessions 5 
and 6 of the ACT manual, but that the first 4 sessions of the ACT intervention did contain 
discussion of all the concepts discussed in the first 4 sessions of the AT intervention.  
Thus, adherence to the manual during delivery allowed for high intervention 
discrimination to be attained. 
Quality of Adherence to Treatment Components 
 With regard to the quality or extent of adherence to the manual in session 
discussion wording and actions, Rater A indicated that, on the 1 to 3 scale, mean quality 
of adherence was 2.75 across all her reviewed 6 sessions, while mean quality of 
adherence for Rater B was 2.94 across all her reviewed 6 sessions. Mean quality of AT 
sessions was 2.75 for Rater A (2.75, 2.80, and 2.67 for sessions 1, 3, and 4, respectively) 
and 2.90 for Rater B (3.00, 2.75, and 3.00 for sessions 1, 2, and 3).  Mean quality of ACT 
sessions was 2.75 for Rater A (2.58, 2.78, and 3.00 for session 2, 5, and 6) and 3.00 for 
Rater B (3.00, 3.00, and 3.00 for sessions 4, 5, and 6).  Thus, both raters indicated that 
discussions followed wording and actions as specified in the manual to a moderately high 
to high extent.  
Adherence to Therapeutic Stance 
 Across AT sessions, the facilitator 1) discussed homework to a moderate-to-high 
extent [Rater A M = 2.50, Rater B M = 3.00], 2) expressed the idea that she is in the same 
boat as participants to a moderate degree [Rater A M = 2.00, Rater B M = 2.00], 3) was 
compassionate and avoided judgment to a high degree [Rater A M = 3.00, Rater B M = 
3.00], 4) encouraged participants to pay attention to their own experience to a high extent 
[Rater A M = 3.00, Rater B M = 3.00], 5) argued or attempted to convince participants 
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nearly not at all [Rater A M = 0.33, Rater B M = 0.33], 6) explained the meaning of 
metaphors rather than having the group figure them out to a high degree [Rater A M = 
2.67, Rater B M = 3.00], and 7) disclosed personal experiences appropriate to the 
discussion to a less than minimal degree [Rater A M = 1.00, Rater B M = 0.33].   
 Ratings across ACT sessions for the facilitator were very similar.  The largest 
inter-rater difference was on the first item, on which Rater A indicated that the facilitator 
discussed homework to a minimal-to-moderate extent [M = 1.33], whereas Rater B 
indicated that she did so to a high degree [M = 3.00].  For the remaining items, the 
facilitator 2) expressed the idea that she is in the same boat as participants to a moderate-
to-high degree [Rater A M = 2.67, Rater B M = 2.00], 3) was compassionate and avoided 
judgment to a high degree [Rater A M = 3.00, Rater B M = 3.00], 4) encouraged 
participants to pay attention to their own experience to a high extent [Rater A M = 3.00, 
Rater B M = 3.00], 5) argued or attempted to convince participants nearly not at all [Rater 
A M = 0.00, Rater B M = 0.33], 6) explained the meaning of metaphors rather than 
having the group figure them out to a high degree [Rater A M = 3.00, Rater B M = 3.00], 
and 7) disclosed personal experiences appropriate to the discussion to a minimal degree 
[Rater A M = 1.00, Rater B M = 1.00].   
 Thus both AT and ACT interventions were administered in a manner that adhered 
to the ACT core therapeutic stance to a moderate to high degree.  Of exception and 
contrary to the stance are the observations that the facilitator frequently explained the 
meaning of metaphors to the groups and minimally disclosed personal experiences.  
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Evaluation of Data Characteristics & Analysis 
Prior to analysis, the extent to which the study data met assumptions of tests being 
considered was evaluated.  Apart from attention to level of measurement, this process 
involved evaluation of the normality of each variable’s distribution, homogeneity of 
variance, and sample size adequacy.  The study samples involved are very small, with 
data on 8 participants per intervention group at pre- and post-treatment. Thus issues 
regarding meeting the assumptions of parametric tests arose.   
Results of the Shapiro-Wilks and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors statistical tests 
for normality on each continuous variable at pre-treatment across the study sample and 
by condition indicated that the distributions of the vast majority of variables (e.g., 38 out 
of 41 at pre-treatment) were not significantly different from a normal distribution.  As 
both of these statistics are extremely sensitive to departures from normality, Pearson 
skewness coefficients and Fisher kurtosis coefficients for the 8 variables with suspect 
distributions were examined and indicated that several of these distributions were in fact 
not significantly different from a normal distribution.  Results of Levene tests on each 
continuous variable at pre-treatment indicated that only 2 (job motivation and overall 
value-to-action congruence in coping) out of the 41 variables had significantly different 
variances between the treatment groups.  
Two additional issues considered in determining which statistical approach to 
utilize (i.e., parametric or nonparametric) were the absolute size of the study sample and 
whether there are equal numbers of participants in the subgroups being examined (Pett, 
1997).  In the statistical literature, there does not appear to be definitive agreement about 
size requirements when choosing between parametric and nonparametric tests. In 
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addition, the definition of “small” sample size is also not clear (e.g., Hays, 1994; Siegal 
& Castellan, 1988). Unequal cell sizes in subgroups are not prohibitive for simple 
between one-way group comparisons, particularly if the condition of homogeneity of 
variance is met.  However, unequal sample cell size do give rise to the problem of 
confounding of main effects in factorial designs (e.g., repeated measures analyses), 
whether parametric or nonparametric (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Given these considerations, the level of measurement of the variables (i.e., 
ordinal), the small sample size for both conditions (n = 8), and further reduction in 
sample size that decreased further during the follow-up period, it was decided that 
nonparametric tests would be most appropriate statistical strategy for the study data. As a 
result, planned analyses of treatment effects using ANOVA and mediational procedures 
recommended by Judd and Kenny (1981) and Baron and Kenny (1986) were not 
undertaken.   
Instead, data analyses involved the following tests of statistical significance: 1) 
the Mann-Whitney U test (i.e., the nonparametric counterpart to the independent samples 
t-test) to examine between-groups comparisons of outcomes at pre-treatment, post-
treatment, and each follow-up; 2) the Wilcoxon rank test (i.e., the counterpart to the 
paired-samples t-test), was used to test within-group pretreatment to each follow-up 
differences, and 3) within treatment groups, mediation of outcomes by process variables 
was investigated by examining the degree of association, using Kendall’s tau-b (τ) 
correlational coefficients. This statistic was used instead of Spearman’s rho because tau 
has the advantage of having its distribution approach a normal distribution more quickly 
(i.e., requires a smaller sample size) than the Spearman rho distribution. As the statistical 
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software used (SPSS 16.0) did not allow for calculation of partial τ coefficients, these 
were calculated by hand and thus no significant levels are available for these statistics. 
Given the small sample size in this study, the issue of statistical power to detect 
significant differences among groups (e.g., whether with parametric or nonparametric 
tests), was an overarching concern. As it may be unrealistic to expect any analyses to 
reach levels of conventional statistical significance, the two intervention programs in this 
study were also evaluated by examining effect sizes as a way to describe the effects 
within and between the interventions on measures. Effect size (ES) corresponds to a 
group of indices that measure the magnitude of a treatment effect. Unlike significance 
tests, these indices are independent of sample size and offer an adjunct approach to 
evaluation of the present study’s specific interventions. Although the approach is not 
inferential and precludes generalization of results to the population, it does address the 
question of how much effect did each program version have and allows comparison with 
effect sizes noted in previous related research. 
To assess between-condition differences, effect sizes on mean differences in each 
outcome between each treatment were calculated by determining the mean change in pre- 
to post-treatment scores, and dividing this by the pooled standard deviation of pre- and 
post-treatment scores, as described by Cohen (1977, p. 44).  Instead of using the standard 
deviation (σ) of either group, the pooled standard deviation (σpooled), a common practice, 
(Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996) was utilized. The formula follows for Cohen’s effect size 
determination: d = M1 - M2 / σpooled, where σpooled = √[((N1 – 1)σ1²+ (N2-1)σ2²)) / (N1+2 – 2)].  
Because Cohen’s d is inaccurate for small samples (N < 20) and the present study sample 
is small, Hedges’ g (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) was used. This procedure corrects for bias in 
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Cohen’s d.  Between- and within-condition effect sizes were calculated pre-treatment to 
post-treatment and pre-treatment to each follow-up assessment. Categorization of 
magnitude of effect sizes was done using criteria suggested by Cohen (1992), with ES < 
.5 being “small”, ES ≥ .5 being “medium”, and ES ≥ .8 being “large”.   
Some statisticians propose that to compute effect sizes for repeated measures the 
paired t-test value should be used to compute ES for correlated designs because it takes 
into account the correlation between the two scores (e.g., Rosenthal, 1991).  However, 
others have convincingly argued that the between groups t-test value, or the original 
standard deviations of the scores, should be used because if the pooled standard deviation 
is corrected for the amount of correlation between the measures, then the ES estimate will 
be an overestimate of the actual ES (Dunlop, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996). Thus, the 
original standard deviations of the scores were utilized in the ES calculations in the 
present study. 
Participant Characteristics 
 The final total sample of participants who were administered the interventions 
was 16, with 8 receiving ACT and 8 receiving AT.  The mean (SD) age of the sample 
was 40.8 (SD = 10.7) years with 15 females and 1 male.  Eight (50%) of the participants 
were married, 4 (25%) were single, 3 (19%) were partnered, and 1 (6%) was divorced.  
Fourteen participants (88%) identified as Caucasian, 1 (6%) as Latina, and 1 (6%) as 
Hispanic.  In terms of highest grade completed, 1 participant indicated high school, 6 
(38%) had Bachelors degrees, 7 (44%) had Master’s degrees, and 2 (13%) had doctoral 
degrees.  
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Results of the Lilliefors test (i.e., a modified Kolmogrov-Smirnov test), and the 
Levene test indicated that age was distributed normally and variances between the ACT 
and AT groups were not significantly different.  A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicated there were no significant differences between the 6 treatment groups 
with respect to mean age, F (5, 10) = 1.72, ns.  However, an independent samples t-test 
revealed that there was a significant difference in mean age between the two types of 
treatment, t (14) = 2.13, p = 0.046; the mean age for the ACT group was 35.5 (SD = 11.7) 
and the mean age for AT group was 46 (SD = 7.0).   
Two-way contingency analyses were used to compare the categorical 
demographic characteristics between the 6 treatment program groups and between the 
ACT and AT treatment groups overall.  Pearson χ2 statistics should be interpreted with 
caution, as numerous cells within each analysis had counts less than 5.  Across the 6 
groups, there were no significant differences in participants’ marital status [χ2 (15, N = 
16) = 16.00, p = .382], race [χ2 (10, N = 16) = 12.00, p = .285], or education [χ2 (15, N = 
16) = 16.76, p = .333].  There were, however, significant differences in income [χ2 (25, N 
= 16) = 40.89, p = .024] between the 6 groups, likely due to the many (6) categories of 
income and the small sample size.  Between the ACT and AT treatment groups, there 
were no significant differences in marital status [χ2 (3, N = 16) = 2.83, p = .418], race [χ2 
(2, N = 16) = 2.29, p = .319], or education [χ2 (3, N = 16) = 6.95, p = .3073], but there 
was a significant difference in income [χ2 (5, N = 16) = 11.20, p = .048], with more than 
half (5 out of 8) of the participants in the ACT group reporting annual income of 30,000 
or less, whereas all the participants in the AT group reported income categories of over 
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30,000.  Results of a Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the ACT and AT groups did not 
significantly differ in their level of work control [U = 23.50, p = .602]. 
 The mean (and standard deviation) time between the last treatment session and 
completion of the post-treatment measures was 7.1 (SD = 3.6) days for the ACT group 
and 9.5 (SD = 6) days for the AT group.  The mean number of days between completion 
of post-treatment measures and the first follow-up was 38.9 (SD = 8.2) for the ACT 
group (n = 8) and 34.4 (SD = 10) for the AT group (n = 8).  The mean time between 
completion of the 1st and the 2nd follow-up measures was 105.5 (SD = 15.2) days or 15.1 
(SD = 2.2) weeks or 3.75 (SD = .6) months for the ACT group (n = 6) and 98 (SD = 11.4) 
days or 14 (SD = 1.6) weeks for the AT group (n = 6). The mean time between the 2nd 
and the 3rd follow-up measures was 122.3 (SD = 28.1) or 17.5 (SD = 4.0) weeks for the 
ACT group (n = 3) and 145 (SD = 32.5) days or 20.7 (SD = 4.6) weeks for the AT group 
(n = 3). Thus, across the two groups, although the 1-month follow-up was in fact a 1-
month follow-up, the 3-month follow-up in fact occurred approximately 4.5 months after 
program end and the 6-month follow-up in fact occurred approximately 9 months after 
program end. 
Pre-treatment Comparisons on Participants’ Expectations 
 Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to evaluate if the ACT and AT groups 
differed in their pre-treatment expectations for treatment. Data was missing for one of the 
participants in the AT group. Results indicated the groups did not differ significantly in 
the extent to which they expected the treatment to 1) reduce their distress from work-
related stressors [U = 22.00, p = .428, with the median rating being 4.0 (“Some”)], 2) 
reduce distress from stressors outside of work [U = 26.00, p = .789, with the median 
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rating being 4.0 (“Some”)], 3) help them experience more satisfaction or fulfillment in 
their work [U = 25.50, p = .752, with the median rating being 4.0 (“Some”) for each 
group], and 4) help them experience more satisfaction or fulfillment in their life [U = 
20.00, p = .269, with the median rating being 4.0 (“Some”)].  In summary, participants in 
the ACT and AT groups did not differ in their expectations for treatment and both groups 
expected the intervention to have “some” positive effect on their well-being. 
Intervention Evaluation Using Statistical Significance Testing 
Results of comparisons between and within treatment groups at each assessment 
on all measures, using Mann-Whitney U tests, the Fisher Exact test (for the categorical 
variable SF-5c), Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, and the Binomial equal proportions test 
(again for SF-5c), are presented in Appendix B as Tables B1 through Table B10, rather 
than within the text, due to the large number of tables. Throughout, comparisons were 
two-tailed and were interpreted using the language of significance (** p ≤ .05) and 
marginal significance (* p ≤ .10).  Due to the volume of analyses, readers are referred to 
the tables for statistical values of the non-significant findings. 
Between-Group Pre-treatment Comparisons Across Measures 
 At pre-treatment, no significant or marginally significant median differences were 
found on any outcome or process measure or any subscale of any measure. 
Within-Group Comparisons on Outcomes 
 Stress (Table B.1).  On measures of stress, results indicated that participants 
within the AT group experienced a significant decrease in impact of job stressors pre- to 
post-treatment [z = -2.24, p = .025] while those in the ACT group did not.  This 
significant improvement continued at the first [z = -2.10, p = .036] and second [z = -1.99, 
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p = .046] follow-ups.  Contrary to expectations, there were marginally significant 
decreases in frequency of job stressors for both AT [z = -1.76, p = .079] and ACT [z = -
1.68, p = .092] groups. Furthermore, the decrease in frequency became significant for 
participants in the AT group at the first [z = -2.52, p = .012] and the second [z = -1.99, p 
= .046] follow-ups.  Although neither group experienced changes in impact of life 
stressors pre- to post-treatment, participants in the ACT group had a marginally 
significant decrease at the first [z = -1.75, p = .080] and the second [z = -1.75, p = .080] 
follow-ups.  
Mental Health (Table B.2).  Participants in the AT group reported a significant 
decrease in depression at post-treatment [z = -1.97, p = .049], whereas the reduction in 
depression for ACT group participants was marginally significant [z = -1.86, p = .063].  
This decrease in depression continued and was significant at the first follow-up for AT [z 
= -2.20, p = .028] and then maintained and became marginally significant [z = -1.76, p = 
.078] at the second follow-up.  The improvement remained marginally significant for 
ACT at both follow-ups [first: z = -1.83, p = .068, second: z = -1.83, p = .068].  State 
anxiety as well as general distress decreased significantly post-treatment for ACT 
participants [STAI-S, z = -2.03, p = .043; GHQ, z = -1.96, p = .050], but not for AT 
participants.  However, at the first follow-up, both groups reported a significant 
improvement in general distress [AT, z = -2.53, p = .011; ACT, z = -2.21, p = .027] and 
AT participants reported a significant decrease in state anxiety [z = -2.03, p = .042].  The 
improvement in state anxiety for ACT participants was marginally significant at the 
second follow-up [z = -1.79, p = .074]. 
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Health, Functioning, & Quality of Life (Table B.3).  Neither group reported a 
change in general physical health at post-treatment or first follow-up, but there was a 
marginally significant improvement for ACT participants at the second follow-up [z = -
1.73, p = .084].  On measures of impact on functioning and quality of life, ACT 
participants evidenced a marginally significant decrease pre- to post-treatment in 
interference by health or emotional problems on social activities [z = -1.82, p = .068].  
The decrease became significant at the first follow-up [z = -2.07, p = .038] and was 
marginally significant at the second follow-up [z = -1.73, p = .084].  Although neither 
group experienced a change in quality of life measures at post-treatment, the ACT group 
participants did exhibit a significant increase in overall quality of life [z = -2.02, p = .043] 
and a marginally significant increase in work-specific quality of life [z = -1.84, p = .066] 
at the second follow-up. 
Work Attitudes (Table B.4).  Neither group experienced significant changes in 
measures related to work attitudes at post-treatment.  However, at the second follow-up, 
AT participants reported a marginally significant increase [z = -1.89, p = .058] and ACT 
participants reported a significant increase [z = -1.99, p = .046] in job satisfaction.  ACT 
participants also reported a marginally significant in work importance [z = -1.84, p = 
.066], however, this finding was likely due to a decreased sample size, as median score 
was identical at each assessment. 
Within-Group Comparisons on Process Measures 
 Locus of Control, Affect & Cognition (Table B.5 and B.6).  ACT participants, but 
not AT participants, reported a marginally significant increase in work locus of control at 
the first [z = -1.87, p = .062] and second [z = -1.89, p = .058] follow-ups. With the 
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exception of a significant decrease in negative affect for participants in the ACT group [z 
= -2.52, p = .012] no changes at post-treatment were evident for either treatment group in 
any other measures of affect and cognition pre- to post-treatment. The decrease in 
negative affect for ACT remained significant at the first follow-up [z = -2.05, p = .041] 
and was marginally significant at the second follow-up [z = -1.75, p = .080].  Also for the 
ACT group, trait anxiety decreased marginally significantly pre-treatment to the second 
follow-up [z = -1.89, p = .058].  Although negative affect did not change for participants 
in the AT group pre- to post-treatment, it decreased significantly at the first [z = -2.21, p 
= .027] as well as the second [z = -2.03, p = .042] follow-up.   
Although no changes were evident pre- to post-treatment on any measures of 
automatic thinking, belief in negative automatic thoughts decreased significantly pre-
treatment to the second follow-up for both AT [z = -2.02, p = .043] and ACT [z = -2.04, p 
= .041] participants.  ACT participants also reported a marginally significant decrease in 
belief in negative thoughts at the first follow-up [z = -2.03, p = .042], and, unexpectedly, 
a marginally significant decrease in frequency of positive thoughts at first follow-up [z = 
-1.79, p = .074] and in frequency of negative thoughts at the second follow-up [z = -1.84, 
p = .066]. 
Mindfulness, Coping, & Values (Table B.7, B.8, B.9, & B.10).  Participants in 
both groups did not report significant changes in psychological flexibility (AAQ) or its 
subscales of Willingness (AAQ-W) and Action (AAQ-A) at post-treatment.  Participants 
in the ACT group reported a marginally significant increase in overall mindfulness 
[FFMQ: z = -1.89, p = .058] at post-treatment that was maintained at the first follow-up [z 
= -1.68, p = .093]. ACT participants also reported marginally significant increases at the 
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first follow-up on the Acting with Awareness subscale [z = -1.78, p = .075] and the 
Describing subscale [z = -1.81, p = .071] of the FFMQ.  Surprisingly, scores on the 
Nonreactivity subscale of the FFMQ decreased significantly pre-treatment to the second 
follow-up for the AT group [z = -2.06, p = .039].   
No significant pre- to post-treatment changes were evident for either group on the 
measures of use of coping or value placed on coping.  However, AT participants reported 
a marginally significant decrease in value placed on avoidance coping at the first follow-
up [z = -1.71, p = .087] that was maintained at the second follow-up [z = -1.76, p = .078], 
whereas ACT participants reported a marginally significant increase in value placed on 
approach coping at the second follow-up [z = -1.89, p = .059] and a decrease in 
engagement in avoidance coping at the first follow-up, [z = -1.84, p = .066]. There were 
no significant changes on the coping-related values-to-action congruence measures at any 
time for either group. 
Between-Group Comparisons Across Measures 
 There were no significant median differences between the AT and ACT groups at 
any assessment for any measure of stress, mental health, or physical health.  There was a 
significant difference between groups at post-treatment in proportion of participants 
indicating not doing work or other activities as carefully as usual due to emotional 
problems (Fisher Exact test p = .032), with 1 out of 8 ACT participants compared with 4 
out of 5 AT participants indicating an affirmative response. There was a marginally 
significant difference between groups at post-treatment [U = 8.00, p = .062] and the first 
follow-up [U = 7.00, p = .081] regarding the extent of interference in social activities by 
physical health or emotional problems. The difference became significant at the second 
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follow-up [U = 0.50, p = .035]. At each time point, participants in the AT group indicated 
greater interference.   
Job motivation was marginally higher in the ACT group at the first follow-up [U 
= 11.00, p = .090] but higher for the AT group at the third follow-up [U = 1.50, p = .070].  
At the second follow-up, negative affect was marginally significantly lower [U = 4.50, p 
= .094] and believability in negative automatic thoughts significantly lower for 
participants in the AT group [U = 4.00, p = .076]. Also at the second follow-up, 
participants in the AT group had marginally significantly higher AAQ-A scores that 
participants in the ACT group [U = 5.50, p = .081].  The only differences between groups 
on the coping and values-related measures were marginally significant greater value 
placed on approach coping at the third follow-up [U = 1.50, p = .065] and approach 
coping values-to-action incongruence at post-treatment [U = 13.50, p = .091] for 
participants in ACT than for those in AT. 
Intervention Evaluation Using Effect Size 
 Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes for within and between 
treatment groups for each outcome and process variable are presented in Tables D1 
through D10 in Appendix D. Mean differences between the groups were calculated by 
subtracting the ACT group mean from the AT group mean at each of the 5 time (T) 
points. Mean differences over time for each group were calculated by subtracting the 
mean score at pre-treatment from the mean score at each subsequent assessment. 
Throughout, comparisons were two-tailed and were interpreted using cutoffs of d < .5, 
medium, * d ≥ .5, and ** large, d ≥ .8 for effect sizes.  None of the effect sizes were 
statistically significant. 
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Between-Group Effect Sizes for Outcome Measures 
 Looking across all measures, effect sizes for differences between the AT and 
ACT groups on mean scores across measures were generally small.  There were however 
some medium size and a few large size differences. With respect to outcome measures, 
participants in AT reported lower life stressor frequency and impact at pre-treatment, 
second follow-up and third follow-up, with medium size differences.  Participants in the 
AT group also reported lower depression and anxiety at the first follow-up, while 
participants in the ACT group reported lower general distress at post-treatment, with 
medium size differences.  Mean scores on physical ill health were higher for those in 
ACT than those in AT at pre-treatment, but less for ACT than for AT at the second and 
third follow-up.  Also medium sized was the higher quality of life reported by 
participants of AT at the second follow-up and work quality of life at post-treatment and 
second follow-up.  Group differences in the large effect size range occurred for the 
measure of interference in social activities by physical health of emotional problems, in 
which ACT participants reported lower interference at post-treatment and each follow-up.  
ACT participants also reported greater levels of job motivation compared with those in 
AT at the first and third follow-up, with magnitudes of both effects being large.  
Between-Group Effect Sizes for Process Measures 
 AT participants had lower scores, with a large effect size, for negative affect at 
first and second follow-up, whereas ACT participants had lower scores in the medium 
range for trait anxiety at second and third follow-up, although there was a very significant 
difference in sample size between the groups at these time points on this measure.  
Interestingly, the ACT group reported higher means across assessments for automatic 
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negative thought frequency and believability than did the AT group, with large size 
differences at the second follow-up for each measure, whereas the AT group reported 
generally higher automatic positive thought frequency and believability than did the ACT 
group, with medium sized differences between the groups at the second follow-up for 
each measure.  
Interestingly, ACT participants had a higher AAQ Willingness mean than AT 
participants at the second follow-up with a medium size effect difference, whereas AT 
participants had a higher AAQ Action mean that ACT at the second follow-up, with a 
large effect size. On the FFMQ, the ACT group had higher means than the At group 
across assessments on overall mindfulness and nearly all subscales with the exception of 
Describing. These differences were generally in the small range, but were medium size 
for Nonreactivity at the first and second follow-up and for Nonjudging at the first and 
third follow-up.   
Across the measures of coping, differences in means between the groups were 
medium sized for several measures and large for one. Participants in ACT reported higher 
value placed on approach coping at post-treatment and third follow-up (the one large size 
effect), and lower use of avoidance coping at first follow-up.  Participants in the AT 
group reported lower value placed on avoidance coping at the second follow-up, higher 
value-to-action congruence for approach coping at post-treatment, and higher value-to-
action congruence for avoidance coping at second follow-up but lower congruence at the 
third follow-up. 
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Within-Group Effect Sizes on Outcome Measures 
 Looking within each treatment group across the assessments, participants in the 
AT group had greater sized improvements in job and life stressor frequency and impact 
than participants in the ACT group, with the exception of life stressor frequency at first 
follow-up and life stressor  impact at post-treatment and first follow-up.  Both groups had 
medium sized improvements in depression at post-treatment, and these improvements 
became large for both groups at the follow-ups.  Contrary to expectations, the AT group 
had greater alleviation in depression than ACT throughout the follow-ups.  ACT 
participants improved more in state anxiety at post-treatment than AT participants, but 
AT participants had a greater improvement at the first follow-up than participants in 
ACT.  Both groups experienced large improvements in general distress during follow-up, 
while only ACT participants had a large improvement at post-treatment.  While AT 
participants had an increase in ill health across assessments, ACT participants had 
improvements in the medium range.  The ACT group had a large improvement in extent 
of interference in social activities from problems at post-treatment, which was maintained 
at the follow-ups, while the AT group had an increase in interference.  Neither group 
experienced more than minimal improvement in work quality of life, until a medium 
sized change at the second follow-up.  The increase in job satisfaction at the second 
follow-up was large for the ACT group and medium sized for the AT group.   
Within-Group Effect Sizes on Process Measures 
 Compared with pre-treatment, participants in the ACT group improved in work 
locus of control at the first follow-up to a medium extent, while those in the AT group 
reported a minimal increase.  Although negative affect decreased to a medium extent for 
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participants in ACT and to a small extent for those in AT at post-treatment, improvement 
at the first follow-up was large for the AT group and medium for the ACT group.  
Although participants in AT reported minimal to small decreases in trait anxiety, 
participants in ACT reported medium sized decreases at post-treatment and medium to 
large improvements at the follow-up assessments.  Both groups had medium sized 
reductions in frequency of negative thoughts and large reductions in believability of 
negative thoughts at the first and second follow-up.   
The treatment groups did not appear to differ in their minimal changes on the 
AAQ and its subscales. The exception was the Action subscale, on which participants in 
ACT reported a medium-sized improvement versus a small one for those in AT at post-
treatment, while participants in AT reported a large-sized improvement versus a medium 
one for those in ACT at the second follow-up.  Across assessments, participants in ACT 
indicated medium-sized improvements in the FFMQ, compared to minimal changes 
reported by participants in the AT group.  Participants in ACT also reported large sized 
increases in the Nonreactivity subscale at the first follow-up and medium sized 
improvements on the Acting with awareness subscale at post-treatment and follow-up, 
while participants in AT did not.   
For measures of coping, participants in ACT reported no change at post-treatment 
in their use of approach coping, but did indicate a medium sized increase in use of this 
strategy at the first follow-up that maintained at subsequent follow-ups, while participants 
in AT had a small increase in use at post-treatment that maintained at follow-ups.  The 
AT group reported large decreases in value placed on avoidance coping at the second and 
third follow-up, while the ACT group did not even report small changes.  Participants in 
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ACT did, however, indicate medium sized decreases in actual use of avoidance coping at 
the first and second follow-up, while those in AT had such a decrease only at the second 
follow-up.  Overall value-to-action congruence improved to a medium extent for both 
groups at the first follow-up.  Participants in AT indicated a medium size improvement in 
congruence for approach coping at post-treatment, while participants in ACT did not 
report a medium sized increase until the first follow-up, with virtually no difference at 
post-treatment.  Participants in AT also reported a medium size improvement in 
avoidance coping congruence at the second follow-up. 
Associations Between Process and Outcome Measures 
 As mediation assumes that the mediator variable changes prior to changes in the 
outcome it is proposed to mediate and the largest improvements in outcomes and the 
greatest number of improved outcomes occurred at the second follow-up for both groups, 
correlational coefficients (Kendall’s τ) were assessed between outcomes that experienced 
a meaningful change at the second follow-up (T4) with process variables that experienced 
a meaningful change at the first follow-up (T3).  Meaningful change in a measure was 
again defined as a statistically or marginally statistically significant median change or a 
mean effect size at least medium in magnitude between pre-treatment and the specified 
subsequent assessment.  Results are presented in Tables C1 through C4 of Appendix C.   
Stress Outcomes (Table C.1) 
 Results indicated that for stress-related outcomes, no T3 process measure 
correlated even marginally significantly with frequency or impact of job stressors for 
participants in AT.  Thus these outcomes for AT was correlated with improved process 
variables at T4 and the Action subscale of psychological flexibility was found to be the 
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one significant predictor with frequency, although the association was surprisingly 
positive [τ = 0.74, p < .10], and the avoidance coping value and action scales both 
positively predicted job stressor impact to an identical degree [τ = 0.89, p < .05].  For the 
ACT group, job stressor frequency was negatively predicted by work locus of control [τ = 
-0.74, p < .10] and the Acting with Awareness subscale of mindfulness [τ = -1.00, p < 
.01], and positively by use of avoidance coping [τ = 0.91, p < .10].  After controlling for 
work locus of control, both Acting with Awareness and use of avoidance coping 
continued to correlate to a high extent with this outcome [τ = -.64 and 0.88, respectively].  
While frequency of life stressors in the AT group was associated positively with 
frequency of negative thoughts [τ = 0.80, p < .05] and overall coping congruence [τ = 
0.95, p < .05], it was positively associated with negative affect [τ = 0.80, p < .05] and 
negatively with the Nonreactivity subscale of mindfulness [τ = -0.80, p < .05] for the 
ACT group.  Negative affect [τ = 0.80, p < .05] and Nonreactivity [τ = -0.80, p < .05] also 
predicted impact of life stressors for the ACT group, while overall coping congruence [τ 
= 0.74, p < .10], but not frequency of negative thoughts, predicted life stressor impact for 
the AT group.  Nonreactivity continued to predict both frequency of life stressors [τ = -
0.68] and impact of life stressors [τ = -0.68] for participants in ACT even after the effects 
of negative affect were partially out. 
Mental Health Outcomes (Table C.2) 
 Depression was associated with negative affect [τ = 0.74, p < .10] and frequency 
of negative thoughts [τ = 0.74, p < .10] for participants in AT, but with overall 
mindfulness for participants in ACT [τ = -0.80, p < .10].  The association between 
negative thoughts and depression remained high even after controlling for the effect of 
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negative affect [τ = 0.59].  Although state anxiety did not associate with any T3 process 
variable for the AT group, it was positively related to frequency of negative thoughts at 
T4 [τ = 0.80, p < .05].  Nonreactivity negatively predicted state anxiety for the ACT 
group [τ = -1.00, p < .01].  General distress in participants of the AT group was most 
correlated with value placed on avoidance coping [τ = -0.71, p < .10], although the 
association was surprisingly negative, whereas in participants of ACT general distress 
had a significant association with Nonreactivity [τ = -0.80, p < .05], which remained high 
[τ = -0.62] even after the association with negative affect [τ = 0.60, p < .10] was 
controlled for. 
Health, Functioning, & Quality of Life Outcomes (Table C.3) 
 For the improvements reported by participants in ACT, general physical ill health 
was associated with engagement in avoidance coping [τ = 1.00, p < .01], while 
interference in social functioning due to mental or physical problems was negatively 
correlated with the Acting with Awareness subscale of mindfulness [τ = -0.76, p < .10]. 
 While the improvement in overall quality of life in participants in ACT was 
associated with Nonreactivity [τ = 0.95, p < .05], work-related quality of life in neither 
the ACT nor the AT group correlated with any T3 process variable.  Its positive 
association with T4 belief in negative thoughts in the AT group [τ = 0.74, p < .10] was 
unexpected, while its association in the ACT group with T4 frequency of positive 
thoughts [τ = .94, p < .05] and value placed on approach coping [τ = 0.89, p < .05] more 
in line with predictions.   
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Job Satisfaction (Table C.4) 
 Job satisfaction was most correlated with higher overall coping congruence for 
participants in AT [τ = -0.83, p < .05] and with lower use of avoidance coping for 
participants in ACT [τ = -0.91, p < .10]. 
 Analyses specific to Hypothesis Seven indicated that job satisfaction at the second 
follow-up did not correlate significantly with pre-treatment levels of work control, 
negative affectivity or work locus of control for the AT group [WCS, n = 5, τ = .32, p = 
ns; NAS, n = 6, τ = .28, p = ns; WLoC, N = 6, τ = .45, p = ns] or the ACT group [WCS, n 
= 6, τ = .07, p = ns; NAS, n = 6, τ = -.33, p = ns; WLoC, n = 6, τ = .47, p = ns].  As 
sample size may have been an issue, the two groups were combined and analyses rerun.  
Results indicated that although work control and negative affect continued to fail to 
correlate [WCS, N = 11, τ = .24, p = ns; NAS, N = 12, τ = .08, p = ns], work locus of 
control did emerge as a significant predictor [N = 12, τ = .54, p = .015]. 
Results for Group Process Measures 
Extent Expectations Were Met (Table E.1) 
 As noted above, participants in the ACT and AT groups did not differ in their 
expectations for treatment and both groups expected the intervention to have “some” 
positive effect on their well-being.  Results of Mann-Whitney U tests of these 
expectancies items at post-treatment indicated that the treatment groups did not differ 
significantly to the extent to which the treatment reduced distress from work-related 
stressors [U = 17.50, p = .934, with the median rating being 4.5 (“Some” to “Much”) for 
AT and 4.0 (“Some”) for ACT], reduced distress from stressors outside of work [U = 
12.00, p = .394, with the median rating being 4.5 (“Some” to “Much”) for AT and 5.0 
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(“Much”) for ACT], helped them experience more satisfaction or fulfillment in their 
work [U = 14.00, p = .589, with the median rating being 3.5 (“A little” to “Some”) for 
AT and 4.0 (“Some”) for ACT], and helped them experience more satisfaction or 
fulfillment in their life [U = 14.00, p = .589, with the median rating being 4.0 (“Some”) 
for both AT and ACT]. Thus, participants in both groups had their pre-treatment 
expectations for the program met or exceeded post-program. 
 The treatment groups did not significantly differ on any of the expectancy items at 
any follow-up assessment. Looking across follow-up assessments, both groups indicated 
continued alleviation of work-related and non-work-related stress and increase in work 
and life satisfaction to generally “a little” extent.  A comprehensive presentation of test 
statistics and median values for each group can be found in Table E.1 of Appendix E.  
Group Cohesiveness (Table E.2) 
 Analysis of the Feelings About the Group Questionnaire at post-treatment using 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the 6 program groups χ2 (5, N = 16) = 5.94, p = .312 or between the 
two treatments (U = 31.50, p = .957).  Both AT and ACT had a median score of 36.50. 
On the item asking how often their group should have met compared to how often it did 
meet, there were no significant differences between the 6 program groups χ2 (5, N = 16) = 
6.80, p = .236, or between the two treatments (U = 28.00, p = .535).  Both AT and ACT 
had a median response of 3.00 (“No more often”).  With respect to participants’ 
evaluation of the group facilitator, there were no significant differences between the 6 
program groups χ2 (5, N = 16) = 2.46, p = .782 or between the two treatments (U = 26.00, 
p = .464).  Both AT and ACT had a median response of 6.00 (“Extremely satisfied”). 
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Skills Practice Monitoring 
 During the administration of the intervention, participants in both the AT group (n 
= 8) and the ACT group (n = 7) each reported that, between session 1 and session 4, they 
engaged in a median of 3 (out of the 5) mindfulness practices, with a median level of 
benefit in terms of stated aims of 3.68 (Somewhat to Quite a bit) for the AT group and 
4.00 (Quite a bit) for the ACT group [U = 25.00, p = .722].  Participants in the ACT 
group reported at session 6 that they engaged in a median of 4 out of the 4 values-related 
practices between session 5 and 6, with a median level of benefit in terms of stated aims 
of 4.13 (Quite a bit). 
Results of participants’ reports of post-treatment and follow-up skills practice are 
presented in Table E2 of Appendix E.  There were no significant differences on any 
practice categories at any assessment except at the third follow-up, when all 3 ACT 
participants reported engagement in other stress management strategies and none of the 5 
AT participants reported such engagement [Fisher Exact test p < .05]. Although not 
statistically significant, at post-treatment and each follow-up, a greater percentage of 
participants in ACT than in AT reported use of other acceptance/mindfulness practice(s) 
from program, other practice(s) made up or learned outside of the program, and other 
stress management strategies. 
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Chapter 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
The present study had three major aims: 1) to ascertain the effects of the 
mindfulness-based components of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy without the 
values-based components, 2) to investigate whether and how ACT’s values components 
significantly add to the therapy’s effects beyond those of the mindfulness components, 
and 3) to examine factors that may serve as mediators of ACT’s effects.  Several specific 
hypotheses were examined and findings are first summarized within the context of these 
hypotheses and then discussed in greater detail in relation to extant research.  Throughout 
this discussion, meaningful change pre-treatment to the specified assessment time in a 
measure are defined as a statistically or marginally statistically significant median change 
or a mean effect size at least medium in magnitude. 
Hypothesis One 
 The first study hypothesis was that participants in the ACT group and in the 
abbreviated AT group would experience significant improvements from pre-treatment to 
post-treatment on all measures, except for those assessing frequency of life and job 
stressors.  Study findings indicated that three outcomes (frequency and impact of job 
stressors and depression) and one process variable (approach coping congruence) 
improved for participants in the AT group, while seven outcome (frequency of job 
stressors, impact of life stressors, depression, state anxiety, general distress, physical 
health, and interference in social functioning) and five process variables (negative affect, 
trait anxiety, the Action subscale of the AAQ, overall mindfulness, and the Acting with 
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Awareness subscale of the FFMQ) improved for participants in the ACT group.  Thus, 
participants in ACT experienced meaningful changes in a greater number of measures 
than did participants in the AT group.  
Hypothesis Two 
 The post-treatment improvements were expected to be equivalent for both groups 
on most measures.  Greater improvement were expected for participants in the ACT 
group on several variables that were proposed to be particularly influenced by values 
clarification, including a) the Action subscale of the AAQ, b) use of active and avoidance 
coping, c) value-to-action congruence in coping overall and each type of coping 
specifically, and d) job attitudes.  Findings were consistent with the first part of this 
hypothesis, as there were no statistically significant differences between the AT and ACT 
groups at post-treatment or other assessment for any measure of stress, mental or physical 
health, quality of life, affect or cognition, or mindfulness.  Also consistent was the 
finding that the ACT group, but not the AT group, experienced a meaningful change in 
the Action subscale of psychological flexibility.   
 However, as noted above, participants in the ACT group reported meaningful 
improvement at post-treatment in more than double the number of outcome and process 
measures than participants in the AT group.  Furthermore, the AT group, but not the ACT 
group, reported an improvement in approach coping congruence.  In terms of size of 
improvements, mean difference effect sizes pre- to post-treatment on the two outcomes 
that both groups improved on (i.e., frequency of job stress and depression) were similar. 
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Hypothesis Three 
 At each follow-up assessment, post-treatment improvements were expected to be 
maintained for participants in the AT group and to increase further for participants in the 
ACT group, due to the proposed influence of values clarification on motivation and 
maintaining commitment to therapy skills.  Findings, however, generally supported 
greater improvement in follow-up outcome scores for participants in the AT group, while 
maintenance of post-treatment gains was the case for participants in ACT.   
 For the AT group, all three of the outcomes that improved post-treatment 
continued to improve to a further extent at the first follow-up, while only one (i.e., impact 
of life stress) post-treatment outcome continued to improve for the ACT group.  Four 
outcomes (i.e., impact of job stressors, frequency of life stressors, impact of life stressors, 
and state anxiety) improved further from the first to second follow-up for the AT group, 
while only one (i.e., depression) improved further across the same period for the ACT 
group.   
 Meaningful improvements in process measures tended to persist but not improve 
further from when they initially emerged as meaningful for both groups.  Exceptions to 
this trend were further decreases from the first to the second follow-up in frequency of 
and believability in negative thoughts for participants in the AT group (from medium to 
large effect sizes) and in trait anxiety for participants in the ACT group (also from a 
medium to a large effect).  
 Of note, the number of outcomes and process measures that changed for 
participants in the AT group increased from post-treatment to the second follow-up, with 
the three at post-treatment being joined by four others (frequency and impact of life 
125 
stress, state anxiety, and general distress) at the first outcome, and those seven being 
joined by two others (work quality of life and job satisfaction) at the second follow-up.  
For participants in the ACT group, five of the seven improved outcomes at post-treatment 
remained at the first follow-up (frequency of job stress and state anxiety dropped out) and 
were joined by frequency in life stressors, but all seven reemerged at the second follow-
up and, along with frequency in life stressors, were joined by three others (overall and 
work quality of life and job satisfaction). 
 In terms of within-group effect sizes for the seven outcomes that changed for both 
groups between pre-treatment and post-treatment as well as pre-treatment and the first 
follow-up, the only difference was that that ACT group experienced large effects on 
frequency and impact of life stressors while the AT group had medium effects.  Of the 
eight outcomes that improved pre-treatment to the second follow-up for both groups, the 
AT group experienced large effects on frequency of job stressors and of life stressors, 
while effects for the ACT group were medium, but the ACT group experienced a large 
effect on job satisfaction, compared to the AT’s group medium effect. These findings are 
consistent with previous research specifically on ACT for stress that indicates effect sizes 
for outcomes in the large range (Hayes et al., 2006; Bond & Bunce, 2000).   
 Between-group effect sizes on outcome measures that did not differ (in mean 
score) at pre-treatment overwhelmingly indicated greater treatment effects for the AT 
rather than ACT group, with seven medium sized differences favoring AT, five of which 
occurred at a follow-up assessment, and only two favoring ACT.  Between-group effect 
sizes on process measures indicated ten effects in favor of AT and eight in favor of ACT.  
These between-group effect sizes were generally in line with the magnitude of those 
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reported by Hayes and colleagues (2006) of between-condition effect sizes for 
randomized controlled trials of ACT and comparison conditions (medium to large at post-
treatment and large at follow-up on outcomes and large at post-treatment and at follow-
up on primary process of change in favor of ACT).  
Hypotheses Four and Five 
 For both the ACT and the AT group, improvements on outcome measures were 
expected to be mediated by improvements in process measures. In addition, the ACT 
group was expected to experience greater associations than the AT group between 
improved outcome measures and the Action subscale of psychological flexibility, overall 
stress coping values-to-behavior congruence, use of approach coping, use of avoidance 
coping, approach coping values-to-behavior congruence, and avoidance coping values-to-
behavior congruence. 
 Kendall’s τ correlational coefficients between outcomes that changed 
meaningfully at the second follow-up (T4) and process variables that changed 
meaningfully at the first follow-up (T3) indicated that even when process variables that 
improved across both groups were considered, the same outcomes for participants in the 
AT group and in the ACT group were associated with different process variables.  Nearly 
all outcomes found significant associations with either one or two process variables from 
the previous assessment and all of these correlations were high.   
 For participants in the ACT group, five outcomes were predicted by the 
Nonreactivity mindfulness subscale, three outcomes by negative affect, three by use of 
avoidance coping, two by the Acting with Awareness mindfulness subscale, one by work 
locus of control, one by overall mindfulness, and one by Time 4 frequency of positive 
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thoughts and value placed on approach coping.  For participants in the AT group, three 
outcomes were predicted by overall coping congruence, two by frequency of negative 
thoughts, one by negative affect, one by value placed on avoidance coping, and four 
outcomes were individually associated with predictors from Time 4, which included the 
Action subscale of psychological flexibility, frequency and believability of negative 
thoughts, and value placed on and use of avoidance coping.  It must be noted, however, 
that give the small sample sizes (N = 6 for the majority of analyses), other process 
variables may have emerged as possible mediators if the study sample had been larger.   
 Thus, in terms of Hypothesis 5, the AT group, but not the ACT group, reported 
improvement in and potential mediation by the T4 Action subscale of psychological 
flexibility and experienced potential mediation by overall stress coping values-to-
behavior congruence.  Consistent with expectations, participants in the ACT group did, 
however, report improvement in and potential mediation by use of approach coping, use 
of avoidance coping, and approach coping values-to-behavior congruence.  Neither group 
experienced a meaningful change in avoidance coping values-to-behavior congruence 
post-treatment through the first follow-up. 
Hypothesis Six 
 Findings did not support the expectation that participants in the ACT group would 
report greater post-program practice of the mindfulness intervention skills than 
participants in AT.  However, at the third follow-up, all three ACT participants reported 
engagement in other stress management strategies and none of the five AT participants 
reported such engagement, a difference that did reach statistical significance. In addition, 
at post-treatment and each follow-up, a greater percentage of participants in the ACT 
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group than in the AT group reported use of other acceptance/mindfulness practice(s) from 
program, other practice(s) made up or learned outside of the program, and other stress 
management strategies.   
 Participants in ACT may have engaged in a greater variety of acceptance and 
stress management approaches and techniques than participants in AT due to the effects 
of values clarification on behavioral goal setting and follow-through, as discussed in 
greater detail below, in the section on values-related measures. 
Hypothesis Seven 
 Findings did not support the hypothesis that within both the ACT and the AT 
group, improvements in job satisfaction would be mediated by pre-treatment levels of 
work control, negative affectivity, and work locus of control.  However, when the two 
groups were combined and analyses rerun, higher pre-treatment work locus of control did 
significantly and to a high degree predict higher job satisfaction at the second follow-up.   
 The null findings are contrary to previous research on workplace stress indicating 
an association between higher levels of negative affectivity and greater levels of job 
dissatisfaction later in time (e.g., Brief & Roberson, 1989; DeNeve & Cooper, 1998), 
including work by the authors who initially investigated ACT and its constructs in the 
context of workplace stress (Bond & Bunce, 2003), as well as previous findings of the 
association between work control and job satisfaction (Bond & Bunce, 2003; Hackman & 
Lawler, 1971; Karasek, 1979).  The finding regarding work locus of control, however, is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bond & Bunce, 2003; Jex, 1998; Parkes, 1991) that 
found that individuals with a lower internal locus of control at Time 1 experienced lower 
levels of job satisfaction at Time 1.  The current finding, based on longitudinal data, 
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actually expands on previous work by suggesting a possible predictive role for locus of 
control. 
Discussion of Specific Findings on Outcomes 
Stress 
 Contrary to expectations, there were meaningful decreases in frequency of job 
stressors for both AT and ACT groups, although effect sizes for changes in means were 
small.  Moreover, the improvement continued for participants in both groups, reaching a 
medium effect size for those in AT although not for those in ACT.  Frequency of life 
stressors improved meaningfully for both groups at the first follow-up, continuing to 
improve for the AT group and maintaining its gain for the AT group at the second follow-
up.  
Previous research has not assessed ACT’s effect on the frequency of stressors.  
The observed decrease in these outcomes for both treatment groups may have been due to 
a redefining of the meaning of stressor by participants. Items on the measures of job and 
life stress are worded in such a manner that the presence of distress is automatically 
implied (e.g., Assignment of disagreeable duties, Experiencing a negative attitude toward 
organization, Struggling to meet your own standards of accomplishment).  The 
intervention may have decreased participants’ tendency to negatively evaluate their 
experience, either directly or through changes in mental well-being outcomes such as 
depression.  As the intervention focused on work stress and it would have taken time for 
participants to generalize program approaches learned to other life domains, it is not 
unexpected that frequency of job stressors improved before frequency of life stressors.  
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In terms of stress impact, participants within the AT group, but not those in ACT, 
experienced a significant post-treatment decrease in impact of job stressors which 
continued at the first and second follow-ups, with medium-sized effects.  Interestingly, 
although AT appeared to be more effective for job stress, participants in ACT 
experienced greater improvement in life stressor impact post-treatment and at the first 
follow-up compared with the AT group, with medium to large effect sizes (although the 
ACT group did have a higher impact score at pre-treatment than the AT group).  Contrary 
to hypothesis three, improvements continued to increase in magnitude for a longer 
follow-up duration for the AT than the ACT group.   
 No studies to date have examined the effect of mindfulness or ACT on a specific 
measure of job stressor impact, only strain related outcomes.  However, the findings that 
both AT and ACT resulted in improvement in life stressor impact are consistent with past 
research indicated that mindfulness-based stress reduction at work decreases effect of 
daily hassles post-treatment (Williams, 2006; Williams, Kolar, Reger, & Pearson, 2001).  
However, the present investigation also suggests that the mindfulness-based intervention 
utilized (AT) results in further improvement that is large in effect size at least through the 
4.5-month follow-up.  
Mental Health 
As hypothesized, participants in both the AT group and the ACT group 
experienced an improvement in depression at post-treatment that was similar in 
magnitude of effect (medium).  Contrary to the third hypothesis, depression scores for the 
AT group continued to improve at the first follow-up and reached a large magnitude of 
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effect, while the post-treatment improvements for the ACT group were simply 
maintained.  
State anxiety decreased significantly and to a medium mean difference effect size 
for ACT but, contrary to expectations, not for AT participants at post-treatment.  The AT 
group did, however, experience a decrease in anxiety post-treatment through the second 
follow-up, with a large magnitude effect size, whereas anxiety actually increased in the 
ACT group at the first follow-up before decreasing again at the second follow-up.    
Similarly to anxiety, general distress decreased significantly and to a large extent 
for ACT but, contrary to expectations, not for AT participants at post-treatment.  Again 
contrary to the third hypothesis and similar to depression, general distress decreased to 
below post-treatment level for the AT group but remained near the post-treatment level at 
each follow-up for the ACT group.    
The findings of decreased depression at post-treatment and follow-up for AT is 
consistent with work on cognitive distancing, the early form of ACT (Zettle & Hayes, 
1986; Zettle & Rains, 1989). The current findings on mental health outcomes for ACT 
are consistent with past research showing improvements in depression, anxiety, and 
distress (e.g., Branstetter et al., 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006; Dalrymple & Herbert, 
2007; Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2007; Twohig, Shoenberger, & Hayes, 2007).  
Magnitude of effects for general distress and depression were similar to those found in 
the initial trial by Bond and Bunce (2000) of ACT for workplace stress. 
Health & Functional Interference 
 Contrary to expectations, neither group reported a statistically significant 
improvement in general physical health at post-treatment, but those in ACT reported a 
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medium size decrease in mean score that maintained at each follow-up.  Surprisingly, 
participants in the AT group actually reported higher ill health at post-treatment and each 
follow-up than they did at pre-treatment.   
Few studies have looked at physical illness and ACT.  One investigation did show 
that ACT in addition to medical treatment as usual resulted in fewer sick days and fewer 
medical visits for a sample of public health service workers reporting chronic stress or 
pain and that this effect continued to an even greater extent at 6-month follow-up (Dahl et 
al., 2004).  However, no changes in stress or quality of life were observed in that study 
but were in the present investigation.  
With respect to functional interference by distress, only 1 out of 8 ACT 
participants compared with 4 out of 5 AT participants indicated at post-treatment not 
doing work or other activities as carefully as usual due to emotional problems. Although 
the ACT group did not report any further meaningful decrease in interference, the 
participants did maintain their post-treatment gains across the entire follow-up period. 
Consistent with expectations, participants in ACT reported less interference than those in 
AT in social activities by emotional of psychical problems.  Higher functional ability has 
been found as an outcome at post-treatment and follow-up in studies of ACT for samples 
with severe anxiety or depression (Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2007) and for those with 
chronic pain (Wicksell, Melin, & Olsson, 2007). 
Quality of Life 
 Surprisingly, neither the AT nor the ACT group experienced statistically 
significant changes or meaningful mean score changes in measures related to quality of 
life at post-treatment.  Both groups did, however, report later increases in mean scores, 
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with the highest mean in general and in work-specific quality of life at the second follow-
up.  Other studies of ACT have also indicated changes in quality of life pre-treatment to 
follow-up (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007; Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2007). 
 These findings, along with the observation that work-related quality of life in 
neither the ACT nor the AT group correlated with any T3 process variable, suggest that 
changes in quality of life measures may require more time than other outcomes to 
become evident after an intervention. This was also suggested by findings from a study of 
ACT for epilepsy, in which improvement in overall quality of life was not found until the 
6-month follow-up, and showed large and significant changes by the 1-year follow-up 
(Lundgren, 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006).   The current finding also indicates that 
the values clarification is not necessary for such changes, as the AT group also 
experienced this improvement in quality of life at the follow-up. 
Work Attitudes 
 Contrary to expectations, neither treatment group experienced statistically 
significant changes nor meaningful mean score changes on measures related to work 
motivation, meaning, involvement, or satisfaction at post-treatment.  This is, however, in 
line with null findings for job motivation and satisfaction in previous research on ACT 
for workplace stress (Bond & Bunce, 2000) and on individual stress management 
interventions in general (Bunce, 1997; Murphy, 1996; Van der Klink, et al., 2001). 
 Of note, however, is the finding that participants in the present study did report 
meaningful improvements in job satisfaction at the second follow-up, with a medium 
sized effect for participants in AT and a large sized effect for participants in ACT 
participants.  As for quality of life, which also involves a rating of satisfaction, perhaps 
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changes in job satisfaction also require greater time to become evident than other 
treatment outcomes as participants learn to engage in different behaviors over time.   
Discussion of Specific Findings for Process Measures 
Locus of Control 
 Unexpectedly, neither the AT nor the ACT group experienced significant changes 
in work locus of control at post-treatment.  However, participants in ACT, but not AT, 
experienced a meaningful improvement, medium in magnitude of effect, at the first 
follow-up. Consistent with the second hypothesis, participants in the ACT group reported 
higher mean change scores than participants in AT at post-treatment and each follow-up.   
 Higher scores in this process variable at the first follow-up were predictive of 
lower frequency of job stressors at the second follow-up for participants in the ACT 
group.  Given that individuals with an internal locus of control believe that what happens 
to them is within their influence, rather than due to others, fate, or circumstance, (Rotter, 
1966), their perception of what is a stressor may differ from that of individual with an 
external locus or they may resolve stressors and potential stressor with more ease, thus 
reducing their frequency.  Furthermore, research has shown that locus of control, as well 
as negative affectivity, have the potential to bias, or distort, individual’s self-reports on a 
wide range of variables, from work characteristics (e.g., job control) to well-being (e.g., 
mental health, job satisfaction) to coping behaviors (e.g., problem- or emotion-focused 
coping; Parkes, 1991; Siu, Spector, Cooper, Lu, & Yu, 2002; Spector, 1986).  
 Although work locus of control did have associations in the predicted direction to 
a high degree with lower depression and to a medium extent with general distress, 
interference with social functioning, and job satisfaction, these were not statistically 
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significant, as previous investigations have found.  Specific to workplace stress, Bond 
and Bunce (2003) found that individuals with a lower work locus of control at one 
assessment experienced worse mental health at a subsequent time.  Occupational health 
researchers have also shown that individuals with an internal locus of control suffer from 
fewer stress symptoms, mental ill-health and poor functioning, as they are more likely to 
define stressors as controllable and take proactive steps to cope with them (Gatchel, 
1980; Hurrell & Murphy, 1991; Newton & Keenan, 1990; Rotter, 1966; Spector, 1986; 
Spector, 1988). 
Affect 
 The process variable of negative affect decreased meaningfully for participants in 
the ACT group at post-treatment and maintained at the first follow-up.  Participants in 
AT did not experience a meaningful improvement until the first follow-up, but it was in 
fact greater in effect size (large) than that of the ACT group (medium).  Neither group 
had any meaningful changes in positive affect at any assessment.   
 Lower negative affect at the first follow-up predicted lower frequency of life 
stressors, impact of life stressors, and general distress for the ACT group, and depression 
for participants in the AT group at the second follow-up. Research has found that 
individuals high in negative affectivity are more likely to report stress symptoms (Brief & 
Roberson, 1989; DeNeve & Cooper, 1998’ Moyle, 1995; Parkes, 1990) and greater 
negative affectivity at Time 1 predicted greater levels of mental ill-health at Time 2 in the 
study by Bond and Bunce (2003).  
 For participants in the ACT group, but not for those in AT, trait anxiety decreased 
meaningfully at post-treatment, maintained this gain at the first follow-up, and then 
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decreased again at the second follow-up, with a large between group effect size at this 
assessment.  This suggests that one function values clarification may play is changing 
more generalized and chronic anxiety, in addition to more immediate anxious states.  
This is in line with the role values play in self-regulation (Baumeister, Heatherton, & 
Tice, 1994; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Oxford et al., 2002) and choice of coping strategy 
(Kelly & Stone, 1987; Post & Weddington, 1997), and that goals mediate the effects of 
personality traits on performance (Locke, 1997).  Lower trait anxiety at the first follow-
up did not, however, predict any outcome for participants in ACT at the second to a 
statistically significant degree, and perhaps may be better characterized as an outcome, 
rather than a process, variable. 
Cognition 
 Although no measures of automatic thinking changed to a statistically significant 
degree at post-treatment for either group, frequency of negative automatic thoughts 
decreased consistently for each group through the second follow-up, with medium sized 
differences between mean pre-treatment and first and second follow-up scores.  At each 
follow-up, participants in both the AT and the ACT group reported meaningful 
reductions in belief in negative thoughts.  Interestingly, frequency of positive thoughts 
decreased meaningfully for participants in ACT at the first and second follow-ups and no 
meaningful changes occurred in belief of positive thoughts for either group. 
The present study thus adds to previous findings indicating that an acceptance-
based intervention, with or without values clarification, may not only initially change 
how individuals relate to their thoughts but also that, in the long term, may result in 
changes to thought content as well.  Reductions in frequency and believability of negative 
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automatic thoughts were found at post-treatment and 2 –month follow-up in one study of 
cognitive distancing, the early form of ACT that did not contain values components 
(Zettle & Hayes, 1986). One of the recent studies of ACT in the workplace (Flaxman & 
Bond, in preparation) also showed significant reductions in frequency of dysfunctional 
cognitions (especially between baseline and 6 month follow-up). 
Although lower frequency of negative thoughts was not associated with the 
observed large improvement in general mental health in the Flaxman and Bond study (in 
preparation), the present research indicated that this process variable did predict lower 
frequency of life stressors as well as lower depression (even after the association with 
negative affect was controlled for) in participants of the AT group.  At T4, lower 
frequency of negative thoughts associated significantly with lower state anxiety for the 
AT group, as did higher frequency of positive thoughts with higher work-related quality 
of life for the ACT group. 
The T3 reduction in belief in negative thoughts, an indication of cognitive 
defusion, was not found to significantly predict any outcome for either group at T4, 
although it did have high correlations with frequency and impact of life stressors for 
participants in ACT.  Cognitive defusion scores have been found to mediate the decrease 
in depression scores at post-intervention and at follow-up for cognitive distancing (Zettle 
& Hayes, 1986), as well as for ACT’s effects on other study-specific outcomes 
(Gaudiano and Herbert (2006a, 2006b; Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004). The positive 
relationship between work-related QoL and belief in negative thoughts at T4 for 
participants in AT was surprising and not easily explained.   
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Mindfulness 
 Surprisingly, participants in both groups did not report significant median changes 
or meaningful mean changes post-treatment or at any follow-up in psychological 
flexibility or its subscale of Willingness.  This is contrary to numerous studies of ACT in 
which psychological flexibility improved and was correlated or mediated mental health, 
affect, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes in clinical trials and non-intervention 
laboratory-based research (see Hayes et al., 2006 for one review; Dalrymple & Herbert, 
2007; Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2007; Lloyd & Hastings, 2008).  Specific to work 
stress, high levels of psychological flexibility have been found to predict better 
performance and increase the association between job control and better mental health 
and performance over time (Bond & Bunce, 2003; Bond & Flaxman, 2006).  It also 
correlates, to a greater degree than actual pain ratings, with less disability, better work 
status, more daily “up” time, less use of analgesics, and fewer health-care related visits in 
patients with chronic pain (McCracken, 1998; McCracken, Vowles, & Eccleston, 2004). 
 The current lack of findings in terms of meaningful change in psychological 
flexibility may be simply due to lack of adequate sample size, as both groups did 
evidence a minimal increase in the AAQ at post-treatment and the second follow-up. The 
lack of findings with respect to mediation by the AAQ may be due to several factors.  For 
one, other measures, particularly negative affect, automatic thinking, and the FFMQ and 
its subscales, that emerged as significant mediators were not controlled for in analyzing 
the association between the AAQ and outcomes.  In addition, the possibility that the 
AAQ would mediate the effects of these measures on program outcomes was not 
examined. 
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 Such underlying or indirect relationships involving the AAQ have been 
suggested.  Bond and Bunce (2003) showed that psychological flexibility increased the 
association between job control and better mental health over time (Bond & Bunce, 
2003), while other researchers (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006) recently 
demonstrated that the AAQ partially mediated the effects of maladaptive coping, 
emotional response styles, and controllability on anxiety ratings and completely mediated 
the effects of two emotion regulation strategies (i.e., suppression and reappraisal) on 
daily negative and positive experiences.  Experiential avoidance (as assessed by coding 
the AAQ so that higher scores reflect the opposite of psychological flexibility or 
acceptance) was also associated with diminished daily positive affective experiences and 
healthy life appraisals, diminished frequency of positive events and more frequent 
negative life events, and greater negative affective experiences.  
 Only one existing study of ACT was located that used a measure of mindfulness, 
the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS, Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) and 
found significant changes in the Acceptance and the Acting with Awareness subscales 
(Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2007).  The findings of the present investigation indicated 
that participants in the ACT group, but not those in AT, reported a marginally significant 
increase in overall mindfulness at post-treatment, with a medium-sized mean difference 
for this measure and for the Acting with Awareness subscale.  The ACT group 
maintained these post-treatment gains at each follow-up and also reported a medium 
sized mean increase in the Nonreactivity subscale at the first follow-up, while the AT 
group indicated decreases. Participants in AT experienced no meaningful improvements 
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on any subscale and actually indicated a decrease in the Nonreactivity and Acting with 
Awareness subscales at post-treatment and follow-up. 
The lack of change in the FFMQ for participants in the AT group may be 
conjectured due to various reasons. For one, perhaps the particular sample in the AT 
group was simply too small to detect any meaningful changes.  Second, perhaps the 
additional two sessions was a critical ingredient in affecting a measurable change in 
mindfulness, either through greater continued practice of skills, or greater use of other 
acceptance and stress management strategies, as was observed for the ACT participants.  
Third is the possibility that perhaps the first four components of ACT may not be truly 
sufficient to effect changes in measures of mindfulness as operationalized by approaches 
based on meditation, such as MBSR.  As noted, most previous studies of ACT have not 
examined effects on mindfulness measures.  As such, the values components of ACT 
may perhaps be necessary in order for changes in constructs reflected in the FFMQ, 
particularly Nonreactivity to Inner Experience and Acting with Awareness, to emerge. 
Why a concomitant change in the Willingness subscale of the AAQ for participants in 
ACT was not found, however, is not clear.  In a post-hoc analysis, the AAQ Willingness 
scale was found to correlate significantly and highly with FFMQ at T4 for participants in 
AT [τ = 0.80, p < 0.05] but not for participants in ACT [τ = .07, p = ns], suggesting that 
the measures were in fact tapping into a similar construct. 
With respect to possible mediation, mindfulness at the first follow-up correlated 
over time with a number of outcomes at the second follow-up for participants in ACT, 
thus speaking to its significance. Specifically, higher overall mindfulness predicted lower 
depression, while higher scores on the Acting with Awareness subscale predicted lower 
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job stressor frequency and lower interference in social functioning due to mental or 
physical problems.  The Acting with Awareness subscale of the KIMS was found to 
mediate changes in mental health, functioning, and quality of life outcomes in a recent 
study (Forman, Herbert, & Moitra, 2007).  Higher scores on the Nonreactivity to Inner 
Experience subscale predicted lower frequency of life stressors and lower impact of life 
stressors, even after controlling for the effect of negative affect for both.  In addition to 
these outcomes, the Nonreactivity subscale also predicted lower state anxiety, lower 
general distress, and higher overall quality of life.  The Nonreactivity to Inner Experience 
subscale has been suggested as a useful way of operationalizing acceptance and found to 
high correlate negatively and highly with experiential avoidance, with only the 
correlation with Nonjudging being greater, by the developers of the FFMQ (Baer et al., 
2006).   
Values-based Behavior 
 Meaningful mean change scores on the Action subscale of psychological 
flexibility, a proposed measure of ability to take action (towards responsibilities, 
important tasks, success, resolving a problem, and a life course) even in the face of 
unwanted internal events, occurred for both groups, though at post-treatment for the ACT 
group and at the second follow-up for the AT group.  Although values are not explicit 
within this construct, they are implicit in the wording of the items (e.g., being able to “do 
something important”, “take action on a problem”, “take care of my responsibilities”, and 
“set a course in my life”).   
 With respect to our correlational analyses, the positive correlation at T4 between 
frequency of job stressors and the Action subscale of the AAQ is counter to expectations, 
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particularly as both measures changed in the predicted direction pre-treatment to T4.  It 
may be that for these study participants, the more they pursued a valued but perhaps 
difficult goal, the more challenges and thus stressors they experienced, particularly if 
their work environment was not supportive of those goals in terms of resources and 
colleagues.  
No meaningful pre- to post-treatment changes were evident for either group on 
any coping-related values measures.  Interestingly, although AT participants reported 
marginally significant decreases in the large effect size range in value placed on 
avoidance coping at the first and second follow-up and a medium improvement in use of 
avoidance coping at the second follow-up, ACT participants reported medium sized mean 
decreases in engagement in avoidance coping and increases in engagement in approach 
coping at the first and second follow-up.  These findings suggest that changes to value-
related outcomes and coping behavior require time.   
 The findings also suggest that, although intentions may have changed for 
participants in AT and less avoidance behavior was evident later in time, the value 
components may be crucial for initiation of adaptive coping behaviors to a meaningful 
extent, in addition to decreases of maladaptive ones, and in a shorter time frame, and with 
little need to address intentions at all (engagement in the different coping approaches 
changed either without or before an concomitant change in value placed on them). As 
such, the values components may assist individuals in initiating structured behavioral 
goal planning and encourage quicker follow-through.   
 As stated in the introduction, the setting of goals have been an integral construct 
within theories of self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Martin & 
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Tesser, 1996), motivation (e.g., expectancy-value theory; Atkinson, 1964), and 
behavioral task performance and commitment (e.g., Goal-Setting Theory; Lock & 
Latham, 1990; Value-Affirmation; Lydon & Zanna, 1990).  This does not preclude the 
possibility, proposed by Hayes and colleagues, that the mindfulness components aided 
participants in maintaining behavioral commitment to goals and thus bolstered the effects 
of values clarification (Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 2006).   
 Lower engagement in avoidance coping at the first follow-up predicted lower job 
stressor frequency, lower physical ill health, and higher job satisfaction at the second 
follow-up for participants of ACT.  This is in line with the two existing studies on ACT 
that examined coping-specific behavior. One found that reductions in the Mental 
Disengagement subscale of the COPE mediated the reduction in distress in cancer 
patients (Branstetter et al., 2004, as cited in Hayes et al., 2006), while the other indicated 
that avoidance coping was positively cross-sectionally associated with depression (Lloyd 
& Hastings, 2008). Passive or avoidance-based coping has generally been found to result 
in greater psychological stress and negative emotional states (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988a, 
1988b). 
 These findings may also relate to the proposition that coping itself leads to many 
changes within the stress process because it plays a significant role in the appraisal 
process by providing new information that feeds back to the individual and alters 
subsequent appraisal, which is always the proximal cause of reactions to stressors 
(Lazarus, 1995).  Moreover, attending to values has been shown to impact appraisals of 
meaning of stressful situations (e.g., Cooke & Rousseau, 1983), including work-related 
stress (e.g., Bocchino, Hartman, & Foley, 2003; Britt, Stetz, & Bliese, 2004; Carlson & 
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Kaemar, 2000), and to dampen the physiological reactions to stress (e.g., Creswell et al., 
2005). 
 There was also a positive association of T4 value placed on approach coping with 
work-related QoL in the ACT group.  Such setting of intentions may have resulted in 
cognitive/affective changes that were not examined or did not emerge with respect to 
their relationship with work-quality of life in this study.  Personal values clarification 
plays a significant role within theories of work-related motivation (e.g., Latham & 
Pinder, 2005) satisfaction, commitment, and motivation (e.g., Butler, 1983; Jans, 1989; 
Knoop, 1994; Latham & Pinder, 2005; Robey, 1974). Research has indicated that simply 
giving attention to personal values, as the ACT but not the AT group did, has in itself 
been found to affect the strategies used to deal with stressful situations (e.g., Kelly & 
Stone, 1987; Post & Weddington, 1997) and to increase engagement in healthy and 
decrease engagement in unhealthy behaviors (Kristiansen, 1986; Oxford et al., 2002).  
Participants in AT experienced a medium sized improvement in approach coping 
congruence at post-treatment, while those in ACT did not report such an improvement 
until the first follow-up.  Although both groups reported medium sized mean 
improvements in overall values-to-action congruence at the first follow-up, it is not 
known whether this increased congruence for the AT group was due to changes in value 
or in action and in what specific approaches. 
 Higher overall coping congruence at the first follow-up was associated with lower 
frequency and impact of life stressors and higher job satisfaction in the AT group.  
Although this is consistent with the suggestion that the open, intentional awareness 
cultivated by mindfulness may by itself lead individuals to act in ways that are more 
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congruent with their values and interests (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Ryan, Kuhl, & 
Deci, 1997; Shapiro et al., 2006) and the AT group did evidence a decrease in value 
placed on avoidance coping, the finding that participants in the AT group did not report 
meaningful changes in measures of mindfulness indicates that “intentional awareness” is 
unlikely to be the source of the relationship between congruence and outcomes for the 
AT group.  
 Surprisingly, lower value placed on avoidance coping was associated with higher 
general distress in participants of the AT group.  It may be that this was simply a spurious 
association, or that even though participants recognized avoidance coping maladaptive 
(value did decrease at the follow-ups), they either continued to engage in it (use of 
avoidance coping was higher at the first follow-up than at pre-treatment or post-
treatment), thus encouraging continued distress. This latter possibility is actually in line 
with the positive association at T4 between job stressor impact and value placed on and 
use of avoidance coping for participants in AT. 
Study Strengths 
 The present investigation had several strengths and addressed several limitations 
of the existing literature on ACT for workplace stress and in general.  In attempting to 
achieve its aims, it is the only investigation of ACT to date that utilized a dismantling 
methodology.  This design also allowed for the examination of the effects of the 
mindfulness components of ACT as a stand-alone intervention.  To maximize internal 
validity, the study involved the development and administration of a manualized 
protocol, highly structured in format and content.  Moreover, the interventions were not 
identified to the participants by the therapy name and the identical rationale was provided 
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for each version.  Manual adherence assessment by blind raters indicated high adherence 
to inclusion and manner of administration of all ACT components, as well as high 
adherence to the therapeutic stance of ACT in intervention provision.  Intervention 
components in each version of the program were equitable and discrimination between 
the versions was attained to an optimal degree, thus increasing confidence in the assertion 
that any differences in effects between the groups were related to the omission of the 
values components. 
 In data collection, the study expanded significantly beyond existing studies of 
ACT.  With respect to duration of assessment, three follow-up times were included, 
allowing for greater longitudinal evaluation of program effects.  In terms of data 
collected, an extensive variety of outcome measures was utilized, including those of non-
work-related stressors, coping, quality of life, and work outcomes.  In addition, numerous 
possible mediating factors beyond that of psychological flexibility were examined.  The 
study went beyond existing ACT research in assessing mindfulness by examining not 
only the total AAQ and the Willingness subscale of the AAQ, but also the comprehensive 
Five Facet Mindfulness Scale and its five subscales. In attempting to assess values-to-
behavior congruence, the study not only used the Action subscale of the AAQ, but a 
newly devised measure related to coping behavior that specifically tapped the concepts of 
approach and avoidance that significantly defines the ACT theoretical and clinical 
framework. 
 In addition to these outcome and process measures, the study also examined 
participants’ extent of therapy skills practice at each intervention session, after program 
completion, and at the follow-ups, and in this assessment was included measurement of 
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use of non-program stress management approaches.  Findings from this monitoring 
during the program indicated that participants practiced a majority of the skills and 
indicated that they experienced a high degree of benefit in terms of aims each exercise 
was to achieve, further supporting findings of high treatment integrity.  
 Assessment of participants’ expectations for treatment and the extent to which 
these were met was also a valuable endeavor of this investigation and an infrequent 
occurrence in clinical outcome research.  This assessment not only showed that 
participants in the ACT and AT groups did not differ in their expectations for treatment 
and that both groups expected the intervention to have “some” positive effect on their 
well-being, it indicated that the intervention met or exceeded expectations for both 
groups post-program in terms of reduction in work-related and non-work stressors and 
increase in work and life satisfaction. Other measures of participants’ evaluation of the 
intervention also spoke to the finding that the program was well-received by participants, 
including positive evaluation of the frequency of sessions, high satisfaction with the 
facilitator, and zero attrition of participants during intervention administration. 
 With respect to the make-up of study participants, homogeneity was significant 
due to all individuals being employed at the same workplace, holding positions in either 
administrative or academic areas, reporting similar levels of work control, residing at the 
same geographic location, and being nearly all female.   
Limitations and Ideas for Future Research 
 In addition to its significant strengths, the present investigation is marked by 
several limitations that influence implications of its findings and offer opportunities for 
methodological improvement in future research.  The most significant limitation of this 
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study is the very small sample size.  The sample precluded planned analyses and renders 
the statistical significance of utilized approaches suspect.  Differences between the two 
intervention groups may not have been evident due to a lack of an adequate number of 
participants.  Sample size further decreased as participants failed to respond to requests 
for assessments at follow-up, which compromises the validity of comparisons of 
outcomes between assessments in which samples vary.  In addition, the number of 
analyses performed with the Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon tests likely increased the 
chances of Type II error. 
 Although statistical significance testing was supplemented with effect size 
analyses in to evaluate program effectiveness, future dismantling studies of ACT would 
benefit from sample sizes that allow for traditional parametric statistical analyses that 
allowed investigators to assess repeated-measures and, with large samples, pursue 
mediational analysis to investigate possible factors that drive ACT’s effects.  Such 
mediational analyses, as well as approaches such as structural equation modeling, offer 
additional avenues to ascertain the differential effects of ACT’s components. 
 Various factors may have accounted for the low recruitment.  One concerns the 
fact that individuals who expressed initial interest from viewing the paper or emailed 
flyer were sent detailed information about the study prior to any face-to-face meeting.   
This procedure was chosen to increase the chances that enrolled participants were truly 
committed and undoubtedly contributing to the 100% retention across intervention 
sessions.  However, it may have also deterred or overwhelmed others who were initially 
less committed.  The two-hour length and number of intervention sessions were also 
likely influences on recruitment.  
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 The choice of clinical focus, work stress, is another factor that may have 
contributed to poor enrollment and may not have been the optimal choice for an initial 
dismantling study of ACT. Work stress, unlike depression or anxiety, is seen by many 
workers as an unavoidable and “normal” experience and more related to organizational 
factors outside of a person’s control.  The experience of work stress for many individuals 
may not be adequately captured by measures of psychological distress, such as 
depression or anxiety.  Low-level yet recurrent strain from work-related stressors may 
instead manifest as functional interference in performance, attitudes, and relationships 
with coworkers and the organization (Goodspeed & DeLucia, 1990; Levi, 1996; 
Sutherland & Cooper, 1990).  This phenomenon could have led to less significant 
changes on outcomes in the current study than may have been seen with a sample 
reporting more significant levels of strain. Thus, future studies of work stress and ACT 
may want to assess the level of concern or impact participants experience from work 
stressors and limit inclusion criteria to samples reporting significant distress.  In addition 
and based on anecdotal reports from individuals who inquired but did not consent for the 
study, many individual under work stress perceive making time for an intervention 
program as an additional stressor.  If their level of concern is not significant, they may be 
less reluctant to participate in an intervention program.  Thus, researchers of future 
dismantling studies may want to focus on issues such as depression, anxiety, or weight 
loss, which individuals may have more motivation to address. 
A significant issue with respect to choosing an appropriate methodology to 
investigate ACT is whether ACT as an intervention can be dismantled without 
diminishing is theoretical and therapeutic framework.  Each of the six components in 
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ACT is conceptualized as a skill that builds on and interacts with the others within a 
“hexaflex” model of therapeutic change (Hayes et al., 2006).  Within ACT treatment 
protocols, the mindfulness components are taught not as stand alone interventions but 
with the aim of enabling individual to overcome the cognitive and emotional barriers to 
values-based action (e.g., Eifert & Forsyth, 2005).  Such interactive and dependent 
relationships between the components also encourage dynamic and flexible 
administration.  Thus, breaking apart these connections may arguably be counter to the 
stance and aims of ACT. 
Although a dismantling design is arguably the highest standard of research 
methodology for assessing differential and additive effects of components in a multi-
component treatment, it may be advisable to utilize other approaches as an initial strategy 
to ascertain similar aims and to investigate the processes underling ACT’s components 
without breaking apart the interplay among them. These approaches include path 
analysis, structural equation modeling, and hierarchical analysis.  Hierarchical regression 
models that test the additive contribution of values clarification in accounting for 
variance in outcomes beyond that of mindfulness could be useful in examining 
mechanisms of ACT following the provision of the complete protocol.  Alternatively, 
path analyses could compare the fit of predictor-outcome models with the fit of predictor-
mediator-outcome models with cross-sectional or longitudinal data of substantial sample 
size.  Such methodologies avert the resource, time, and recruitment challenges inherent in 
clinical trials and may serve to actually inform subsequent dismantling investigations as 
to the most appropriate and efficient procedural and assessment protocols.    
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Limitations with respect to administration of the treatment in the present study are 
also evident. The fact that the two interventions had a different number of sessions leaves 
open the possibility that any differences in effects between the groups were in fact related 
to length of participation rather than the presence or absence of specific components of 
the intervention. Groups within each intervention were also only 3 participants or less in 
size.  Thus, results may not be generalizable to investigations that utilize larger groups or 
individual treatment.  In addition, due to limited resources, the study intervention was 
both facilitated and researched by the same individual and the principal investigator of 
the study.  Although this reduces potential effects from use of numerous facilitators, it is 
recognized that it introduces issues of bias, which cannot be fully resolved.  Furthermore, 
although the lead facilitator was not unpracticed in ACT, she had not administered the 
intervention in a group format prior to the study and her level of ACT experience was not 
expert in nature.  The observation by session raters that the facilitators explained 
metaphors to participants rather than having the group verbalize them out may have 
reflected this level of experience.  Explaining metaphors may have reduced the impact or 
retention of concepts underling therapeutic metaphors, thus lessening treatment 
effectiveness.  Future dismantling investigations ought to involve seasoned expert 
clinicians of ACT. 
With respect to the sample, this study used groups of self-referred individuals, 
whose noted homogeneity limits generalizability of findings to more diverse less 
educated populations employed in blue-collar or manual work. Future dismantling 
research will benefit from larger and more diverse cohorts of participants to ensure a 
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statistically significant sample size and greater applicability of findings outside of study 
participants.   
In the domain of data collection, the extensive amount of assessments, which 
participants anecdotally reported required an average 90 minutes to complete, may have 
led to responding that was nonchalant, hurried, or, more generally, not mindful.  
Although most participants welcomed the opportunity to use online survey assessment, it 
is worthwhile to note that 4 of the 16 participants chose paper packets for completion of 
measures. Thus, future research would be well served by offering both approaches to 
participants.  In addition, although the intervention was administered in such a manner 
that each session represented a unique component of ACT, this study did not capitalize 
on the opportunity to investigate component-specific effects via assessment of outcomes 
at each session.  Furthermore, the novel measure of value-to-action congruence requires 
further refinement and psychometric improvement 
Lastly, in order to ease examination of the relationship between extent of skills 
practice and outcomes, it would have been beneficial to provide participants with specific 
options in reporting their practice.  The use of an open-ended format in this study led 
participants to often omit information on extent of practice, provide estimates (e.g., 2 to 
3), or use varied metrics (e.g., number of practices during the week, minutes practiced), 
which precluded analyses.  
Summary and Conclusions 
 The present study represents an initial investigation utilizing a dismantling design 
to explore the effects of a complete version of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for 
work stress with a version that omitted the values-based components.  Expanding beyond 
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existing studies of ACT, a broad range of mental, physical health, functioning, quality of 
life, and work-related outcomes were examined pre-treatment, post-treatment, and at 
three follow-up assessments.  Various factors proposed to possibly mediate changes in 
outcomes for each version of the intervention, in addition to various therapy process 
measures, were also examined.   
 Due to a small sample size of 8 participants per intervention version, analyses 
involved nonparametric between- and within-group comparison tests, biserial correlation 
rather than mediation analyses, and examination of magnitudes of effect size of between- 
and within-group mean score differences.  Findings are preliminary and generalizability 
to other populations, clinical outcomes, and ACT-based programs is limited.  Results do, 
however, suggest that the intervention was well received by participants and administered 
with high fidelity to the ACT framework and therapeutic stance and with excellent 
discrimination between the two versions in terms of components included. 
 Study findings indicated that participants in the complete ACT group experienced 
meaningful changes in a greater number of outcomes and process variables than did 
participants in the AT group. There were no statistically significant differences between 
the AT and ACT groups at post-treatment or other assessment for any measure of stress, 
mental or physical health, quality of life, affect or cognition, or mindfulness.  Contrary to 
expectations, findings generally supported greater improvement in follow-up outcome 
scores for participants in the AT group, while maintenance of post-treatment gains was 
the case for participants in ACT.   
 Unexpectedly, meaningful decreases in frequency of job stressors were observed 
for both AT and ACT groups pre-treatment through the follow-up assessments, possibly 
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due to a redefining of the meaning of stressor by participants.  Interestingly, though AT 
appeared to be more effective for job stress, participants in ACT experienced greater 
improvement in life stressor impact post-treatment and at the first follow-up compared 
with the AT group.  In addition, the current findings on mental health outcomes and 
magnitude of effects for AT and ACT are consistent with past research showing 
improvements in depression, anxiety, and general distress. Participants in both groups 
also experienced meaningful improvements in job satisfaction, as well as work and 
general quality of life, at the second follow-up.  These findings suggest that outcomes 
involving ratings of satisfaction do not appear to be depend on explicit inclusion of 
values clarification but may require a greater time to become evident than other treatment 
outcomes.   
Looking across all measures, effect sizes for differences between the AT and 
ACT groups on mean scores across measures were generally small and few significant 
median differences between the AT and ACT groups were observed.  However, certain 
differences between the groups emerged.  Large group differences favored the ACT 
group and occurred for the measure of interference in social activities by physical health 
or emotional problems and job motivation.  Participants in ACT also reported being 
significantly less likely than those in the AT group to not do work or other activities as 
carefully as usual due to emotional problems at post-treatment.  In addition, participants 
in ACT, but not AT, experienced meaningful improvements in work locus of control and 
trait anxiety, suggesting that one function values clarification may play is changing more 
generalized attitudes and engrained response styles. 
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 Surprisingly, participants in neither ACT nor AT reported meaningful changes in 
psychological flexibility or its subscale of Willingness. This may have been simply due to 
lack of adequate sample size, as both groups did evidence a minimal increase in the AAQ 
at post-treatment and the second follow-up.  Moreover, it appears that the first four 
components of ACT are sufficient to bring about changes in certain facets of 
mindfulness, such as cognitive defusion, since frequency of and belief in negative 
automatic thoughts decreased for each group pre-treatment to follow-up and predicted 
outcomes for the AT group.  
 However, not all aspects of mindfulness were affected by the AT intervention. 
Only participants in ACT experienced improvement in the FFMQ and its subscales.  Also 
for this group, higher overall mindfulness predicted lower depression, while higher scores 
on the Acting with Awareness subscale predicted lower job stressor frequency and lower 
interference in social functioning due to mental or physical problems.  Moreover, higher 
scores on the Nonreactivity to Inner Experience FFMQ subscale predicted lower 
frequency of life stressors, lower impact of life stressors, lower state anxiety, lower 
general distress, and higher overall quality of life.  Whether mindfulness as defined with 
non-ACT interventions is in fact embodied within ACT and how it differs from 
psychological flexibility remains to be investigated in future studies.    
Findings that changes in value placed on and use of avoidance coping for 
participants in AT and decreases in engagement in avoidance coping and increases in 
engagement in approach coping for ACT participants did not occur until follow-up 
suggest that impact on value-related outcomes and coping behavior require time.  The 
findings also suggest that, although intentions may have changed for participants in AT 
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and less avoidance behavior was evident later in time, the value components may be 
crucial for initiation of adaptive coping behaviors, in addition to decreases of maladaptive 
ones and with little need to address intentions. As such, the values components may assist 
individuals in initiating structured behavioral goal planning, increase motivation, and 
encourage quicker follow-through.  This is also suggested by the findings that meaningful 
change on the Action subscale of psychological flexibility occurred at post-treatment for 
the ACT group, but not until the second follow-up for the AT group, and that participants 
in ACT engaged in a greater variety of acceptance and stress management approaches 
and techniques than participants in AT.  
Future research studies using larger sample sizes are needed to elucidate the 
validity and generalizability of these preliminary findings.  Such research holds promise 
of greater understanding of the effects and mechanisms of ACT in its entirety, the 
particular roles of its components and their synergistic relationships, and how ACT 
relates to other third-wave approaches in theory and practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
Valued Coping in Action Questionnaire, Values (VCAQ-V) and Action (VCAQ-A) 
 
VCAQ-V 
INSTRUCTIONS: Below you will find a list of some of the ways that individuals react to 
difficult or stressful situations.  Please indicate to what extent, you find each of the 
following coping reactions to stress as a good thing, as something to strive for in your 
own behavior.  We would like to know how positively you think of each reaction, your 
honest opinion, and NOT the extent you yourself react to stress in these ways. Please use 
the following scale to respond: 
 
Not a good response     A not-so-good       Neither good         A good           A very good  
           at all                         response                 nor bad            response             response 
   1                                  2                           3                        4                          5 
 
___ 1. Try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. 
___ 2. Turn to work or other substitute activities to take your mind off things. 
___ 3. Get upset and letting your emotions out. 
___ 4. Try to get advice from someone about what to do. 
___ 5. Concentrate your effort on doing something about it. 
___ 6. Say to yourself “this isn’t real”. 
___ 7. Put your trust in God. 
___ 8. Laugh about the situation. 
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___ 9. Admit to yourself that you can’t deal with it, and quit trying. 
___ 10. Restrain yourself from doing anything too quickly. 
___ 11. Discuss your feelings with someone. 
___ 12. Use alcohol or drugs to make yourself feel better. 
___ 13. Get used to the idea that it happened. 
___ 14. Talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 
___ 15. Keep yourself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 
___ 16. Daydream about things other than the situation. 
___ 17. Get upset, and be really aware of it. 
___ 18. Seek God’s help. 
___ 19. Make a plan of action. 
___ 20. Make jokes about the situation. 
___ 21. Accept that the situation has happened and that it can’t be changed. 
___ 22. Hold off doing anything about it until the situation permit. 
___ 23. Try to get emotional support from friends or relatives. 
___ 24. Just give up trying to reach your goal. 
___ 25. Take additional actions to try to get rid of the problem. 
___ 26. Try to lose yourself for awhile by drinking alcohol or take drugs. 
___ 27. Refuse to believe that it has happened. 
___ 28. Let your feelings out. 
___ 29. Try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
___ 30. Talk to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. 
___ 31. Sleep more than usual. 
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___ 32. Try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
___ 33. Focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other things slide a little. 
___ 34. Try to get sympathy and understanding from someone. 
___ 35. Drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less. 
___ 36. Kid around about it. 
___ 37. Give up the attempt to get what you want. 
___ 38. Look for something good in what is happening. 
___ 39. Think about how you might best handle the problem. 
___ 40. Pretend that the situation hasn’t really happened. 
___ 41. Make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 
___ 42. Try hard to prevent other things from interfering with your efforts at dealing with 
   this. 
___ 43. Go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less. 
___ 44. Accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 
___ 45. Ask people who have had similar experiences what they did. 
___ 46. Feel a lot of emotional distress and find yourself expressing those feelings a lot. 
___ 47. Take direct action to get around the problem. 
___ 48. Try to find comfort in your religion. 
___ 49. Force yourself to wait for the right time to do something. 
___ 50. Make fun of the situation. 
___ 51. Reduce the amount of effort you’re putting into solving the problem. 
___ 52. Talk to someone about how you feel. 
___ 53. Use alcohol or drugs to help get through it. 
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___ 54. Learn to live with it. 
___ 55. Put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this. 
___ 56. Think hard about what steps to take. 
___ 57. Act as though it hasn’t even happened. 
___ 58. Do what has to be done, one step at a time. 
___ 59. Learn something form the experience. 
___ 60. Pray more than usual. 
197 
VCAQ - A 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a moment to think about what you have generally done 
and felt when experiencing difficult or stressful situations at work in the past few weeks. 
Now, indicate to what extent you generally engaged in the following behaviors in your 
response to the situation. Please be honest. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Please use the following rating scale to respond to each item: 
 
     I did this  I did this     I did this       I did this          I did this 
    Not at all           A little bit           Somewhat          Quite a bit            A lot 
          1                             2                          3                         4                         5       
 
___ 1. I took direct action to get around the problem. 
___ 2. I tried to find comfort in my religion. 
___ 3. I acted as though it hadn’t even happened. 
___ 4. I did what had to be done, one step at a time. 
___ 5. I tried to grow as a person as a result of the experience. 
___ 6. I turned to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off things. 
___ 7. I accepted that the situation had happened and that it couldn’t be changed. 
___ 8. I held off doing anything about it until the situation permitted. 
___ 9. I slept more than usual. 
___ 10. I tried to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
___ 11. I made sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 
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___ 12. I tried hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing   
  with it. 
___ 13. I reduced the amount of effort I put into solving the problem. 
___ 14. I talked to someone about how I felt. 
___ 15. I got upset and let my emotions out. 
___ 16. I tried to get advice from someone about what to do. 
___ 17. I got used to the idea that it happened. 
___ 18. I talked to someone to find out more about the situation. 
___ 19. I tried to get emotional support from friends or relatives. 
___ 20. I just gave up trying to reach my goal. 
___ 21. I focused on dealing with the problem, and if necessary let other things slide a   
  little. 
___ 22. I tried to get sympathy and understanding from someone. 
___ 23. I went to movies or watched TV, to think about it less. 
___ 24. I discussed my feelings with someone. 
___ 25. I used alcohol or drugs to make myself feel better. 
___ 26. I accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 
___ 39. I got upset, and was really aware of it. 
___ 40. I sought God’s help. 
___ 41. I refused to believe that it had happened. 
___ 42. I let my feelings out. 
___ 27. I used alcohol or drugs to help get me through it. 
___ 28. I learned to live with it. 
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___ 29. I kept myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 
___ 30. I daydreamed about things other than the situation. 
___ 31. I took additional actions to try to get rid of the problem. 
___ 32. I tried to lose myself for awhile by drinking alcohol or take drugs. 
___ 45. I made a plan of action. 
___ 46. I made jokes about the situation. 
___ 50. I restrained myself from doing anything too quickly. 
___ 51. I tried to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
___ 52. I talked to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. 
___ 53. I thought about how I might best handle the problem. 
___ 47. I put my trust in God. 
___ 48. I laughed about the situation. 
___ 54. I pretended that the situation hadn’t really happened. 
___ 55. I learned something form the experience. 
___ 56. I prayed more than usual. 
___ 33. I drank alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less. 
___ 34. I kidded around about it. 
___ 35. I asked people who have had similar experiences what they did. 
___ 36. I felt a lot of emotional distress and found myself expressing those feelings a lot. 
___ 37. I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on the situation. 
___ 38. I thought hard about what steps to take. 
___ 43. I gave up the attempt to get what I wanted. 
___ 44. I looked for something good in what is happening. 
200 
___ 49. I admitted to myself that I couldn’t deal with it, and quit trying. 
___ 57. I forced myself to wait for the right time to do something. 
___ 58. I made fun of the situation. 
___ 59. I concentrated my effort on doing something about it. 
___ 60. I said to myself “this isn’t real”. 
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APPENDIX B 
Tables of Median Rank Differences Within and Between Groups 
 
Table B.1. 
Median rank differences within and between groups for job stress (JSS) and life 
 
 stress (SRLE) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z  p n Mdn z p U p
JSS-F 1 8 45.00 8 43.00  27.50 .636
2 8 35.00 -1.76 .079* 8 38.50 -1.68 .092* 26.00 .528
3 8 25.00 -2.52 .012** 7 40.00 -1.19 .236 27.00 .955
4 6 32.50 -1.99 .046** 6 33.00 -0.53 .599 17.00 .873
5 5 34.00 -0.41 .686 3 42.00 -1.60 .109 7.00 .881
JSS-I 1 8 40.50  8 33.50  26.00 .528
2 8 28.50 -2.24  .025** 8 32.50 -0.63 .528 30.50 .875
3 8 26.00 -2.10  .036** 7 35.00 -1.01 .310 27.50 .954
4 6 21.00 -1.99  .046** 6 27.00 -0.31 .753 14.00 .522
5 5 18.00 -1.21  .225 3 27.00 -1.07 .285 7.00 .881
SRLE-F 1 7 50.00  7 68.00  17.00 .337
2 7 46.00 -0.73  .463 6 53.50 -1.58 .114 17.00 .568
3 6 37.00 -1.68  .093* 6 47.50 -1.76 .078* 17.00 .873
4 5 22.00 -1.75  .080* 5 63.00 -1.75 .080* 6.00 .175
5 3 25.00 -1.07  .285 3 60.00 -1.07 .285 3.00 .513
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Table B.1. Continued 
SRLE-I 1 7 42.00  7 61.00  16.00 .276
2 7 49.00 -1.01  .310 6 54.00 -1.48 .138 16.50 .520
3 6 37.00 -1.57  .116 6 43.50 -1.75 .080* 16.00 .748
4 5 25.00 -1.21 .225 5 48.00 -1.75 .080* 6.00 .175
5 3 18.00 -1.07 .285 3 42.00 -1.60 .109 3.00 .700
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second 
follow-up, 5 = third follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-
Whitney test statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.2. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for depression (JBDI), 
state anxiety (STAIS), general distress (GHQ), and general physical ill health (SF-1) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z p n Mdn z p U p 
BDI 1 8 19.00 7 14.00  22.00 .485
2 8 13.00 -1.97 .049** 7 10.00 -1.86 .063* 21.00 .415
3 6 4.00 -2.20 .028** 6 11.00 -1.83 .068* 11.00 .260
4 5 4.00 -1.76 .078* 5 4.00 -1.83 .068* 11.50 .834
5 3 4.00 -1.07 .285 3 12.00 -1.34 .180 4.00 .827
STAI-S 1 8 48.00  8 48.50  30.50 .875
2 8 40.50 -1.19 .236 8 42.00 -2.03 .043** 32.00 1.00
3 8 36.50 -2.03 .042** 7 55.00 -0.51 .612 20.50 .384
4 6 39.50 -1.36 .173 6 38.50 -1.79 .074* 16.50 .810
5 5 39.00 -0.67 .500 3 45.00 -1.07 .285 6.00 .655
GHQ 1 8 19.50  8 19.50  31.50 .958
2 8 20.50 -1.41 .158 8 14.50 -1.96 .050** 21.50 .269
3 8 15.00 -2.53 .011** 7 14.00 -2.21 .027** 27.0 .907
4 6 14.00 -1.16 .248 6 12.50 -1.57 .116 16.00 .747
5 5 19.00 -0.73 .465 3 15.00 -1.07 .285 4.00 .297
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Table B.2. Continued 
SF-1 1 7 3.00  7 3.00  17.00 .313
2 5 3.00 -1.41 .157 8 2.00 -1.63 .102 14.5 .389
3 4 2.50 .0.00 1.00 8 2.00 -1.41 .157 13.5 .632
4 2 3.00 -1.00 .317 8 1.50 -1.73 .084* 4.500 .338
5 1 3.00 5 3.00 -1.63 .102 1.50 .480
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 
5 = third follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.3. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for not doing work or 
other activities as carefully as usual due to emotional problems (SF-5c), interference in 
social activities by physical health or emotional problems (SF-6), overall quality of life 
(QoL), and work quality of life (QoL-W) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z p n Mdn z p U p
SF-5c 1 7 Y = 2  7 Y = 3   1.000^
2 5 Y = 4  .625+ 8 Y = 1  .625+   .032^**
3 4 Y = 2 1.00+ 8 Y = 1  .625+   .236^
4 2 Y = 1 1.00+ 8 Y = 3 1.00+  1.00^
5 1 Y = 1 1.00+ 5 Y = 0  .250+   .167^
SF-6 1 7 2.00  7 3.00  17.00  .304
2 5 3.00 -1.34 .180 8 1.50 -1.82  .068* 8.00  .062*
3 4 2.00 0.00 1.00 8 1.00 -2.07  .038** 7.00  .081*
4 2 3.50 -1.41 .157 8 1.00 -1.73  .084 0.50  .035**
5 1 3.00  5 2.00 -1.63  .102 0.00  .114
QoL 1 8 17.00  8 15.00  30.00  .833
2 8 15.00 -0.42 .674 8 15.50 -0.70  .483 25.0  .462
3 8 22.50 -0.49 .624 7 17.00 -0.68  .498 22.0  .487
4 6 39.50 -0.94 .345 6 21.00 -2.02  .043** 13.00  .422
5 5 23.00 -0.81 .416 3 8.00 -1.07  .285 7.00  .881
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Table B.3. Continued 
QoL-
W 
1 8 -1.00 8 -1.00  27.00  .588
2 8 0.50 -1.23 .221 8 -2.00 0.00 1.000 18.50  .149
3 8 1.00 -0.55 .581 7 0.00 -0.11  .916 20.00  .348
4 6 1.50 -0.96 .339 6 1.00 -1.84  .066* 12.00  .329
5 5 1.00 -1.09 .276 3 -2.00 -0.82  .414 7.50 1.000
 
Note. For SF-5c, Y = number of participants indicating “Yes”. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = 
Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = third follow-up. Mdnn = Median, z = 
Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
+Binomial test, ^Fisher exact test. 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.4. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for job satisfaction 
(JSAT), motivation (IJM), meaning (WIS), and importance (HONS) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z p n Mdn z p U p
JSAT 1 8 73.00 8 65.00  24.00 .400
2 8 73.50 -1.19 .233 8 62.50 0.00 1.000 21.50 .269
3 8 78.50 -1.36 .175 7 68.00 -0.68   .498 21.00 .418
4 6 86.50 -1.89 .058* 6 81.00 -1.99   .046** 12.00 .337
5 5 78.00 -0.14 .892 3 74.00 -0.54   .593 7.00 .881
IJM 1 8 35.00  8 37.50  26.50 .562
2 8 35.00 -0.59 .553 8 35.00 -0.63   .528 31.50 .958
3 8 34.50 -1.55 .121 6 36.50 -0.21   .833 11.00 .090*
4 5 35.00 -0.55 .581 6 36.00 -0.53   .596 8.50 .226
5 5 36.00 -0.18 .854 3 31.00 0.00 1.000 1.50 .070*
WIS 1 8 29.00  8 29.00  30.50 .874
2 8 29.00 -0.67 .500 8 31.00 -0.51   .609 26.00 .526
3 6 31.00 -0.42 .674 7 28.00 -0.34   .733 19.00 .771
4 5 31.00 -0.68 .496 5 34.00 -0.68   .498 10.00 .599
5 2 30.00 -1.41 .157 3 24.00 -0.45   .655 2.00 .564
      
      
      
208 
Table B.4. Continued 
HONS 1 7 35.00  7 37.00  23.00 .846
2 7 38.00 -0.33 .739 6 37.50 -0.32   .752 20.00 .885
3 6 35.00 -0.68 .498 7 39.00 -0.68   .498 15.00 .383
4 5 36.00 0.00 1.00 5 37.00 -1.84 .066* 12.50 1.00
5 2 36.50 -0.45 .655 3 40.00 -0.27 .785 3.00 1.00
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-
up, 5 = third follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.5. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for work locus of 
control (WLoC), negative affect (NAS), positive affect (PAS), and trait anxiety 
(STAI-T) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z p n Mdn z p U p
WLoC 1 8 67.50 8 63.50  27.50   .635
2 8 69.50 -0.21   .833 8 65.50 -1.54 .123 31.50   .958
3 8 67.00 -0.34   .733 7 69.00 -1.87 .062* 20.50   .384
4 6 70.00 0.00 1.000 6 64.00 -1.89 .058* 15.50   .687
5 5 70.00 -0.82   .414 3 66.00 -.535 .593 7.00   .881
NAS 1 8 21.50  8 20.50  27.00   .598
2 8 20.50 -0.28   .779 8 17.50 -2.52 .012** 30.50   .875
3 6 15.50 -2.21   .027* 7 20.00 -2.05 .041** 11.50   .171
4 5 13.00 -2.03   .042* 5 20.00 -1.75 .080* 4.50   .094*
5 2 17.50 0.00 1.000 3 17.00 -1.60 .109 3.00 1.000
PAS 1 8 26.00  8 27.50  28.00   .673
2 8 27.00 -0.93   .352 8 31.50 -1.10 .271 19.50   .829
3 6 28.00 0.00 1.000 7 30.00 -0.32 .752 19.50   .829
4 5 28.00 -0.37   .715 5 32.00 -0.41 .680 12.00   .917
5 2 35.50 -1.34   .180 3 36.00 -1.07 .285 2.00   .564
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Table B.5. Continued 
STAI-T 1 8 45.00  8 50.50  31.00   .916
2 8 43.50 -0.68   .499 8 39.50 -1.19 .233 26.50   .563
3 5 45.00 -1.21 .225 8 43.50 -1.12 .262 16.00 .557
4 2 45.00 -0.45 .655 8 37.00 -1.89 .058* 3.00 .190
5 1 46.00  4 35.50 -1.07 .285 1.00 .480
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 
5 = third follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.6. 
Median differences within and between treatment groups for frequency of automatic 
negative thoughts (ATQ-NF), belief in automatic negative thoughts (ATQ-NB), 
frequency of automatic positive thoughts (ATQ-PF), and belief in automatic positive 
thoughts (ATQ-PB) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z  p n Mdn z p U p
ATQ-
NF 
1 7 43.00 7 58.00  13.00 .141
2 7 46.00 -1.19   .235 6 44.50 -0.94 .345 16.50 .519
3 6 38.50 -0.95   .344 6 41.50 -1.48 .138 14.00 .522
4 5 39.00 -1.21   .225 5 49.00 -1.84 .066* 6.00 .175
5 3 40.00 -0.45   .655 3 53.00 -1.34 .180 3.00 .513
ATQ-
NB 
1 7 54.00  7 52.00  19.00 .482
2 7 44.00 -1.19   .236 6 52.50 -0.95 .344 14.50 .352
3 6 37.50 -1.36   .173 6 43.00 -1.76 .078* 14.00 .522
4 5 32.00 -2.02   .043** 5 44.00 -2.04 .041** 4.00 .076*
5 3 36.00 -0.45   .655 3 42.00 -1.07 .285 4.00 .827
ATQ- 
PF 
1 7 58.00  7 74.00  20.00 .565
2 7 69.00 -0.53   .596 6 60.50 -0.31 .753 14.00 .317
3 6 71.50 -0.11   .917 7 60.00 -1.79 .074* 20.50 .943
4 5 76.00 -0.14   .893 5 61.00 -1.48 .138 8.00 .341
5 2 68.50 -0.45   .655 3 58.00 -0.54 .593 2.00 .564
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Table B.6. Continued 
ATQ-
PB 
1 7 81.00  7 74.00  20.50 .607
2 7 96.00 -0.85   .397 6 80.50 -0.73 .463 12.50 .224
3 6 84.00 -0.11   .916 7 91.00 -0.67 .500 20.00 .886
4 5 105.00 -0.14   .893 5 81.00 -0.14 .893 5.50 .142
5 2 77.50 0.00 1.00 3 72.00 -1.07 .285 2.00 .564
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.7. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for psychological 
flexibility (AAQ) and the Willingness (AAQ-W) and Action subscales (AAQ-A) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z  p n Mdn z p U p
AAQ 1 8 70.00  8 70.00   32.00 1.000
2 8 74.00 -0.42 .674 8 75.50 -0.85   .395 30.00   .833
3 8 68.50 -0.93 .351 5 67.00 -1.08   .279 17.00   .660
4 5 78.00 -0.18 .854 6 73.50 -0.95   .343 11.00   .464
5 5 73.00 -1.10 .273 3 74.00  0.00 1.000   6.50   .764
AAQ-W 1 8 31.00  8 32.00   31.50   .958
2 8 29.50 -0.21 .833 8 31.00 -0.09   .933 26.55   .561
3 8 29.00 -0.53 .599 5 28.00 -1.00   .317 16.50   .603
4 5 31.00 -1.83 .068* 6 33.50 -0.14   .892 10.00   .359
5 5 30.00 -0.92 .357 3 32.00  0.00 1.000   4.50   .368
AAQ-A 1 8 39.50  8 39.50   27.50   .635
2 8 42.00 -1.38 .167 8 44.50 -1.26   .208 31.00   .916
3 8 40.00 -1.28 .202 5 40.00 -1.08   .279 19.50   .941
4 5 46.00 -1.10 .273 6 40.50 -1.17   .244   5.50   .081*
5 5 43.00 -1.68 .102 3 42.00  0.00 1.000   6.00   .651
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-
up, 5 = third follow-up. Mdnn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney 
statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.8. 
Median differences within and between treatment groups overall mindfulness (FFMQ) 
and its subscales of Nonreactivity (FFMQ-NR), Observing (FFMQ-O), Acing with 
Awareness (FFMQ-A), Describing (FFMQ-D), and Nonjudging (FFMQ-NJ) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z  p n Mdn z p U p
FFMQ 1 8 126.50  8 122.50   30.50 .875
2 8 130.50 0.00 1.000 8 133.00 -1.89 .058* 27.50 .636
3 8 129.50 -0.07   .944 6 135.00 -1.68 .093* 16.50 .332
4 5 123.00 -1.46   .144 6 135.00 -1.63 .104 13.00 .715
5 5 117.00 0.00 1.000 3 129.00 -0.54 .593   6.00 .655
FFMQ-
NR 
1 8 18.00  8 18.00   24.50 .425
2 8 17.00 -0.85   .398 8 18.50 -0.94 .350 23.50 .367
3 8 18.00 -0.77   .441 6 20.50 -1.63 .104 14.00 .187
4 5 14.00 -2.06   .039** 6 20.50 -1.38 .168   8.50 .233
5 5 20.00 -0.37   .715 3 20.00 -1.09 .276   7.50 1.00
FFMQ-
O 
1 8 20.50  8 24.00   24.00 .399
2 8 26.50 -0.35   .725 8 27.50 -1.27 .203 25.00 .460
3 8 26.50 -0.93   .352 6 28.50 -0.11 .916 21.00 .697
4 5 27.00 -0.68   .498 6 26.00 -1.38 .167 13.00 .714
5 5 30.00 -0.94   .345 3 25.00 -1.34 .180   6.00 .653
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Table B.8. Continued 
FFMQ-
A 
1 8 25.50  8 23.00   22.00 .291
2 8 27.00 0.00 1.000 8 27.50 -1.26 .176 28.00 .673
3 8 27.00 -0.17 .865 6 27.50 -1.78 .075* 19.50 .556
4 5 29.00 -0.55 .581 6 28.00 -1.47 .141 12.50 .640
5 5 25.00 -0.67 .500 3 29.00 -1.07 .285   5.00 .456
FFMQ-
D 
1 8 25.50  8 26.50   29.50 .792
2 8 27.00 -0.07 .944 8 28.00 -0.85 .396 32.00 1.00
3 8 29.00 -0.77 .440 6 27.50 -1.81 .071* 23.00 .897
4 5 25.00 -0.68 .498 6 29.00 -1.22 .223 10.50 .410
5 5 26.00 -0.81 .416 3 27.00 -1.34 .180   7.00 .881
FFMQ-
NJ 
1 8 30.50  8 30.50   30.00 .833
2 8 33.00 -0.17 .866 8 33.50 -1.02 .310 24.50 .422
3 8 29.50 -0.84 .398 6 33.00 -1.21 .225 14.50 .219
4 5 33.00 -1.29 .197 6 31.00 0.00 1.00 13.00 .714
5 5 26.00 -0.14 .893 3 29.00 -0.45 .655   4.00 .297
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.9. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for value placed on 
approach coping (ApprchC-V), use of approach coping (ApprchC-A), value placed on 
avoidance coping (AvoidC-V), and use of avoidance coping (AvoidC-A) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z p n Mdn z p U p
Apprch
C-V 
1 8 31.50  8 32.50   26.50 .560 
2 8 30.50 -0.86   .389 7 32.00 -0.11   .916 15.00 .128
3 8 32.00 -0.53   .598 6 33.00 -0.21   .833 17.00 .359
4 5 34.00 -0.18   .854 6 34.50 -1.89   .059* 11.50 .517
5 5 30.00 -0.37   .713 3 34.00 -0.45   .655   1.50 .065
Apprch
C-A 
1 8 21.00  8 23.50   28.00 .673 
2 8 25.00 -0.85   .395 8 22.00 -0.77   .440 26.50 .562
3 8 21.50 -0.57   .572 5 26.00 -1.60   .109 16.50 .607
4 5 24.00 0.00 1.000 6 25.50 -0.95   .344 12.00 .582
5 5 23.00 -0.68   .498 3 27.00 -1.60   .109   5.00 .456
AvoidC-
V 
1 8 14.00  8 12.50   24.00 .393 
2 8 14.50 -0.18 .861 7 13.00  0.00 1.000 23.50 .600
3 8 12.00 -1.71 .087* 6 13.00 -1.29   .197 23.00 .896
4 5 12.00 -1.76 .078* 6 12.00 -0.82   .414 11.00 .460
5 5 13.00 -0.37 .715 3 15.00  0.00 1.000   5.00 .451
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Table B.9. Continued 
AvoidC- 
A 
1 8 12.50  8 11.00   32.00 1.000 
2 8 10.50 -1.39 .163 8 10.00 -1.27   .206 29.00   .750
3 8 12.00 -0.37 .715 5   8.00 -1.84   .066* 13.50   .327
4 5 9.00 -1.07 .285 6   8.50 -1.05   .292 14.00   .846
5 5 9.00 -1.34 .180 3 12.00  0.00 1.000   7.50 1.000
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 
5 = third follow-up. Mdnn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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Table B.10. 
Median rank differences within and between treatment groups for values-to-action 
incongruence for all coping strategies (VCAQ-VA), for approach coping 
(ApprchC-VA), and for avoidance coping (AvoidC-VA) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n Mdn z p n Mdn z p U p
VCAQ-
VA 
1 8 54.50 8 53.50 29.50 .793
2 8 44.00 -0.98 .326 7 50.00 -0.09 .932 21.00 .417
3 8 51.00 -0.56 .575 5 47.00 -1.48 .138 15.50 .509
4 5 48.00 -1.29 .197 6 47.00 -0.52 .600 11.00 .463
5 5 39.00 -1.21 .225 3 39.00 -1.60 .109 6.50 .764
Apprch
C-VA 
1 8 8.50 8 9.50 28.00 .673
2 8 6.00 -1.53 .127 7 10.00 -0.09 .932 13.50   .091*
3 8 8.50 -0.07 .944 5 7.00 -1.22 .223 15.50 .507
4 5 8.00 -0.68 .496 6 8.50 -0.84 .399 14.00 .851
5 5 4.00 -0.67 .500 3 9.00 -1.07 .285 7.50 1.000
AvoidC-
VA 
1 8 3.50 8 2.50 28.00 .670
2 8 2.50 -0.42 .672 7 3.00 -0.41 .679 25.50 .768
3 8 2.00 -0.71 .481 5 1.00 -0.58 .564 16.50 .597
4 5 1.00 -1.29 .197 6 3.00 -0.78 .480 7.50 .159
5 5 4.00 -0.37 .715 3 3.00 0.00 1.00 4.50 .368
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = 1st follow-up, 4 = 2nd follow-up, 5 
= 3rd follow-up. Mdn = Median, z = Wilcoxon sign test statistic, U = Mann-Whitney statistic. 
*p < .10, **p < .05. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Tables of Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Outcomes 
 
Table C.1. 
Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Stress Outcomes for Each 
Group 
 JSS-F JSS-I SRLE-F SRLE-I
 AT ACT AT AT ACT AT ACT
NAS  0.20 -0.07 0.60  0.40  0.80**  0.60  0.80**
ATQ-NF  0.20  0.07 0.60  0.80**  0.60  0.60  0.60
ATQ-NB -0.20  0.08 0.20  0.40  0.60  0.20  0.60
VCAQ-VA  0.41  0.33 0.28  0.95**  0.00  0.74*  0.00
AvoidC-V  0.00  0.14 -0.11  -0.32  
[AAQ-A]  0.74*       
[AvoidC-V & -A]   0.89**     
WLoC  -0.74*    0.11   0.11
STAI-T   0.14   -0.20  -0.20
FFMQ  -0.60   -0.20  -0.20
FFMQ-NR  -0.40   -0.80**  -0.80**
FFMQ-A  -1.00***   -0.20  -0.20
AvoidC-A   0.91*    0.55   0.55
ApprchC.A  -0.33    0.00   0.00
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Table C.1. Continued 
ApprchC-VA   0.67    0.33   0.33
 
Note. Process variables in brackets are meaningfully improved T4 (second follow-up) process variables 
that significantly predict the specified T4 outcome, included because no process variable at T3 
correlated with the outcome in question. 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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Table C.2. 
Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Mental Health 
Outcomes for Each Group 
 BDI STAI-S GHQ 
 AT ACT AT ACT AT ACT 
NAS  .74*  .20  .60 .33  .32  .60* 
ATQ-NF  .74*  .00  .20 .47  .11  .20 
ATQ-NB  .32  .00 -.20 .47 -.32  .20 
VCAQ-VA  .67 -.33  .14 .00 -.07  .00 
AvoidC-V -.22  -.41  -.71*  
[ATQ-NF]    .80**    
WLoC  -.53  -.11  -.32 
STAI-T   .00   .00  -.14 
FFMQ  -.80*  -.40  -.60 
FFMQ-NR  -.60  -1.00***  -.80** 
FFMQ-A  -.40  -.40  -.60 
AvoidC-A   .55   .55   .55 
ApprchC.A   .33   .00   .00 
ApprchC-VA   .00   .33  .33 
 
Note. Process variables in brackets are meaningfully improved T4 (second follow-up) 
process variables that significantly predict the specified T4 outcome, included because no 
process variable at T3 correlated with the outcome in question. 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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Table C.3. 
 
Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 
Physical Illness & Functional Interference Outcomes in ACT
 SF-1 SF-6
NAS  .29  .28
ATQ-NF  .45  .18
ATQ-NB  .45  .18
VCAQ-VA  .36  .32
WLoC -.18 -.36
STAI-T  .17  .42
FFMQ -.26 -.55
FFMQ-NR -.60 -.37
FFMQ-A -.45 -.76*
AvoidC-A       1.00*** .76
ApprchC.A -.36 -.32
ApprchC-VA  .36  .63
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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Table C.4. 
Tau Correlations Between T3 Process Variables and T4 Quality of Life 
and Job Satisfaction Outcomes for Each Group 
 QoL-Work QoL JSAT
 AT ACT ACT AT ACT 
NAS -.11  .07 -.55  .00 -.20 
ATQ-NF  .11 -.07 -.41 -.40 -.33 
ATQ-NB  .53 -.07 -.41 -.40 -.33 
VCAQ-VA .07 -.18  .00    -.83**  .00 
AvoidC-V -.14   -.28  
[ATQ-NB]   .74*     
WLoC  -.12 .22   .53 
STAI-T   .59 .07  -.41 
FFMQ   .22 .53   .40 
FFMQ-NR   .45      .95**   .60 
FFMQ-A   .22  .53   .40 
AvoidC-A   .00 -.55   -.91* 
ApprchC.A  .18  .00    .00 
ApprchC-VA  .18 -.33  -.33 
[ATQ-PF]      .94**    
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Table C.4. Continued 
[ApprchC-V]      .89**    
 
Note. Process variables in brackets are meaningfully improved T4 (second follow-up) 
process variables that significantly predict the specified T4 outcome, included 
because no process variable at T3 correlated with the outcome in question. 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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APPENDIX D 
Tables of Means, Mean Differences, and Hedge’s g Effect Sizes  
Within and Between Groups 
 
Table D.1. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for job stress (JSS) and life stress (SRLE) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
JSS-F 1 8 47.13   8 41.38   5.75 0.30 
2 8 40.00 -7.13 0.36 8 34.25 -7.13 0.40 5.75 0.31
3 8 31.75 -15.38 0.77* 7 30.86 -10.52 0.49 0.89 0.04
4 6 30.67 -16.46 0.80** 6 32.67 -8.71 0.52* -2.00 -0.11
5 5 36.20 -10.93 0.59* 3 33.67 -7.71 0.37 2.53 0.12
JSS-I 1 8 42.50   8 36.63   5.88 0.31 
2 8 31.88 -10.63 0.54* 8 29.88 -6.75 0.40 2.00 0.11
3 8 28.63 -13.88 0.64* 7 27.71 -8.91 0.43 0.91 0.04
4 6 22.17 -20.33 0.43 6 30.67 -5.96 -0.04 -8.50 -0.41
5 5 27.20 -15.30 0.21 3 27.33 -9.29 0.16 -0.13 -0.01
SRLE-F 1 7 55.14   7 67.29   -12.14 -0.53* 
2 7 48.14 -7.00 0.27 6 57.33 -9.95 0.37 -9.19 -0.31
3 6 40.67 -14.48 0.65* 6 45.17 -22.12 0.82** -4.50 -0.17
4 5 29.60 -25.54 1.10** 5 49.00 -18.29 0.71* -19.40 -0.72*
5 3 31.67 -23.48 1.05** 3 52.67 -14.62 0.53* -21.00 -0.64*
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Table D.1. Continued 
SRLE-I 1 7 54.14   7 72.14   -18.00 -0.58* 
2 7 43.43 -10.71 0.35 6 53.33 -18.81 0.66* -9.90 -0.35
3 6 36.00 -18.14 0.66* 6 42.33 -29.81 1.00** -6.33 -0.25
4 5 27.00 -27.14 1.00** 5 44.20 -27.94 0.98** -17.20 -0.78*
5 3 24.33 -29.81 1.02** 3 44.33 -27.81 0.83** -20.00 -0.60*
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = 
AT Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size. 
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Table D.2. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment groups 
for depression (JBDI), state anxiety (STAIS), general distress (GHQ), and general 
physical health (SF-1) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
BDI 1 8 16.63   7 14.71   1.91 0.27 
2 8 12.63 -4.00 0.50* 7 9.71 -5.00 0.72* 2.91 0.36
3 6 5.83 -10.79 1.49** 6 9.67 -5.05 0.83** -3.83 -0.60*
4 5 5.00 -11.63 1.81** 5 7.00 -7.71 1.07** -2.00 -0.31
5 3 6.67 -9.96 1.25** 3 8.67 -6.05 0.87** -2.00 -0.21
STAI-S 1 8 47.75   8 48.63   -0.88 -0.08 
2 8 43.13 -4.63 0.36 8 41.63 -7.00 0.65* 1.50 0.11
3 8 39.38 -8.38 0.76* 7 46.86 -1.77 0.14 -7.48 -0.57*
4 6 37.50 -10.25 1.00** 6 39.83 -8.79 0.88** -2.33 -0.24
5 5 44.00 -3.75 0.29 3 40.00 -8.63 0.70* 4.00 0.23
GHQ 1 8 20.00   8 19.88   0.13 0.02 
2 8 17.75 -2.25 0.32 8 14.25 -5.63 1.12** 3.50 0.51*
3 8 13.88 -6.13 0.97** 7 14.71 -5.16 1.06** -0.84 -0.14
4 6 14.17 -5.83 1.10** 6 14.33 -5.54 1.01** -0.17 -0.03
5 5 17.60 -2.40 0.40 3 15.00 -4.88 1.15** 2.60 0.49
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SF-1 1 7 2.43   7 3.00   -0.57 -0.59* 
2 5 2.80 0.37 -0.42 8 2.38 -0.63 0.62* 0.43 0.45
3 4 2.75 0.32 -0.34 8 2.50 -0.50 0.54* 0.25 0.28
4 2 3.00 0.57 -0.56* 8 2.13 -0.88 0.68* 0.88 0.58*
5 1 3.00  5 2.20 -0.80 0.71* 0.80 0.58* 
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = AT 
Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size. 
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Table D.3. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for interference in social activities by physical health or emotional problems 
(SF-6), overall quality of life (QoL), and work quality of Life (QoL-W) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT  
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g 
SF-6 1 7 2.00   7 2.43   -0.43 -0.50* 
2 5 2.80 0.80 -0.71* 8 1.50 -0.93 1.32** 1.30 1.35** 
3 4 2.00 0.00 0.00 8 1.25 -1.18 1.75** 0.75 1.17** 
4 2 3.50 1.50 -1.66** 8 1.50 -0.93 1.13** 2.00 2.41** 
5 1 3.00 1.00 -1.06** 5 1.60 -0.83 1.09** 1.40 2.04** 
QoL 1 8 21.88   8 15.88   6.00 0.17 
2 8 22.75 0.88 -0.03 8 12.00 -3.88 0.11 10.75 0.33 
3 8 25.50 3.63 -0.11 7 16.00 0.13 0.00 9.50 0.32 
4 6 37.00 15.13 -0.48 6 23.50 7.63 -0.24 13.50 0.50* 
5 5 16.00 -5.88 0.18 3 19.67 3.79 -0.10 -3.67 -0.10 
QoL-W 1 8 -0.38   8 -1.38   1.00 0.33 
2 8 0.38 0.75 -0.20 8 -1.38 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.59* 
3 8 0.00 0.38 -0.10 7 -1.14 0.23 -0.09 1.14 0.36 
4 6 1.67 2.04 -0.62* 6 0.00 1.38 -0.62* 1.67 0.68* 
5 5 -0.60 -0.23 0.06 3 -1.00 0.38 -0.15 0.40 0.10 
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = 1st follow-up, 4 = 2nd follow-up, 5 = 3rd 
follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between pre-treatment mean and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = AT 
Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size. 
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Table D.4. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for job satisfaction (JSAT), motivation (IJM), meaning (WIS), and importance 
(HONS) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T N M T-T1  g N M T-T1 g Diff g
JSAT 1 8 68.88   8 64.38   4.50 0.28 
2 8 71.00 2.13 -0.10 8 64.25 -0.13  0.01 6.75 0.41
3 8 71.63 2.75 -0.13 7 67.14 2.77 -0.24 4.48 0.24
4 6 81.00 12.13 -0.65* 6 77.50 13.13 -1.21** 3.50 0.26
5 5 72.20 3.33 -0.17 3 69.33 4.96 -0.37 2.87 0.15
IJM 1 8 35.25   8 33.38   1.88 0.30 
2 8 35.50 0.25 -0.08 8 35.63 2.25 -0.35 -0.13 -0.03
3 8 33.50 -1.75  0.53* 6 36.50 3.13 -0.47 -3.00 -0.88**
4 5 35.20 -0.05  0.02 6 33.17 -0.21  0.02 2.03  0.26
5 5 36.60 1.35 -0.46 3 32.00 -1.38  0.18 4.60  1.25**
WIS 1 8 28.13   8 29.13   -1.00 -0.14 
2 8 28.75 0.63 -0.10 8 29.38 0.25 -0.03 -0.63 -0.09
3 6 30.67 2.54 -0.43 7 29.00 -0.13  0.02 1.67  0.33
4 5 30.00 1.88 -0.31 5 28.40 -0.73  0.08 1.60  0.17
5 2 30.00 1.88 -0.26 3 24.00 -5.13  0.61* 6.00  0.47
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HONS 1 7 37.29   7 37.00   0.29  0.08 
2 7 37.57 0.29 -0.08 6 37.33 0.33 -0.10 0.24  0.08
3 6 36.00 -1.29 0.32 7 37.71 0.71 -0.21 -1.71 -0.46
4 5 37.00 -0.29 0.08 5 36.80 -0.20  0.06 0.20  0.05
5 2 36.50 -0.79  0.18 3 37.00 0.00  0.00 -0.50 -0.07
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = 
AT Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size.
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Table D.5. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for work locus of control (WLoC), negative affect (NAS), positive affect (PAS), 
and trait anxiety (STAI-T) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
WLoC 1 8 64.75   8 63.38   1.38  0.13 
2 8 65.38 0.63 -0.06 8 67.13 3.75 -0.39 -1.75 -0.18
3 8 65.50 0.75 -0.07 7 68.43 5.05 -0.51* -2.93 -0.29
4 6 68.00 3.25 -0.30 6 65.67 2.29 -0.24 2.33  0.26
5 5 68.40 3.65 -0.29 3 68.67 5.29 -0.49 -0.27 -0.02
NAS 1 8 21.75  8 25.25   -3.50 -0.41 
2 8 20.38 -1.38  0.19 8 20.13 -5.13  0.60* 0.25  0.03
3 6 15.67 -6.08 1.16** 7 20.00 -5.25  0.60* -4.33 -0.80**
4 5 15.80 -5.95  0.95** 5 22.20 -3.05  0.32 -6.40 -0.90**
5 2 17.50 -4.25  0.68* 3 18.67 -6.58  0.67* -1.17 -0.17
PAS 1 8 29.13  8 28.00   1.13  0.12 
2 8 26.88 -2.25  0.20 8 31.63 3.63 -0.47 -4.75 -0.46
3 6 30.33 1.21 -0.10 7 27.57 -0.43  0.06 2.76  0.27
4 5 29.40 0.27 -0.03 5 30.40 2.40 -0.35 -1.00 -0.16
5 2 35.50 6.38 -0.54* 3 33.33 5.33 -0.73* 2.17  0.16
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STAI-T 1 8 46.75  8 48.13   -1.38 -0.16 
2 8 45.00 -1.75  0.18 8 42.38 -5.75  0.66* 2.63  0.27
3 5 44.60 -2.15  0.25 8 43.00 -5.13 0.65* 1.60  0.21
4 2 45.00 -1.75  0.17 8 38.63 -9.50 1.26** 6.38  0.77*
5 1 46.00 -0.75  0.07 4 38.50 -9.63 1.10** 7.50  0.51*
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 
= third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff 
= AT Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size. 
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Table D.6. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment groups 
for frequency of automatic negative thoughts (ATQ-NF), belief in automatic negative 
thoughts (ATQ-NB), frequency of automatic positive thoughts (ATQ-PF), and belief in 
automatic positive thoughts (ATQ-PB) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
ATQ-
NF 
1 7 53.00   7 62.14   -9.14 -0.40 
2 7 51.43 -1.57  0.06 6 55.17 -6.98 0.29 -3.74 -0.14
3 6 42.67 -10.33  0.50* 6 47.50 -14.64 0.65* -4.83 -0.24
4 5 37.80 -15.20  0.79* 5 50.20 -11.94 0.57* -12.40 -0.83**
5 3 41.00 -12.00  0.54* 3 54.67 -7.48 0.31 -13.67 -0.57
ATQ-
NB 
1 7 52.14   7 58.14   -6.00 -0.37 
2 7 48.86 -3.29  0.17 6 66.33 8.19 -0.25 -17.48 -0.52
3 6 42.17 -9.98  0.60* 6 44.67 -13.48 0.90** -2.50 -0.16
4 5 33.60 -18.54  1.28** 5 45.20 -12.94 0.93** -11.60 -1.16**
5 3 40.00 -12.14  0.72* 3 47.33 -10.81 0.62* -7.33 -0.36
ATQ- 
PF 
1 7 71.86   7 79.71   -7.86 -0.26 
2 7 78.57 6.71 -0.23 6 69.33 -10.38 0.41 9.24  0.38
3 6 73.50 1.64 -0.05 7 66.86 -12.86 0.48 6.64  0.24
4 5 75.00 3.14 -0.10 5 61.00 -18.71 0.82** 14.00  0.63*
5 2 68.50 -3.36  0.10 3 71.00 -8.71 0.29 -2.50 -0.06
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Table D.6. Continued 
ATQ-
PB 
1 7 90.71   7 82.14   8.57  0.26 
2 7 97.71 7.00 -0.23 6 86.67 4.52 -0.14 11.05  0.36
3 6 82.17 -8.55  0.25 7 88.43 6.29 -0.19 -6.26 -0.18
4 5 94.40 3.69 -0.11 5 79.60 -2.54  0.09 14.80  0.55*
5 2 77.50 -13.21  0.35 3 88.67 6.52 -0.18 -11.17 -0.20
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = AT 
Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size. 
 
 
 
236 
 
 
Table D.7. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for psychological flexibility (AAQ), the Willingness subscale (AAQ-W), and the 
Action subscale (AAQ-A) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
AAQ 1 8 72.50   8 71.38   1.13 0.11 
2 8 74.13 1.63 -0.15 8 74.75 3.38 -0.40 -0.63 -0.07
3 8 71.13 -1.38 0.13 5 70.80 -0.58 0.06 0.33 0.03
4 5 76.40 3.90 -0.40 6 74.50 3.13 -0.39 1.90 0.34
5 5 72.40 -0.10 0.01 3 74.33 2.96 -0.34 -1.93 -0.24
AAQ-W 1 8 31.50   8 31.50   0.00 0.00 
2 8 31.63 0.13 -0.02 8 32.00 0.50 -0.11 -0.38 -0.08
3 8 31.00 -0.50 0.08 5 30.20 -1.30 0.26 0.80 0.16
4 5 30.80 -0.70 0.11 6 32.83 1.33 -0.30 -2.03 -0.52*
5 5 30.20 -1.30 0.20 3 32.33 0.83 -0.16 -2.13 -0.44
AAQ-A 1 8 41.00   8 39.88   1.13 0.23 
2 8 42.50 1.50 -0.29 8 42.75 2.88 -0.61* -0.25 -0.05
3 8 40.13 -0.88 0.17 5 40.60 0.73 -0.16 -0.48 -0.10
4 5 45.60 4.60 -1.01** 6 41.67 1.79 -0.38 3.93 0.97**
5 5 42.20 1.20 -0.24 3 42.00 2.13 -0.49 0.20 0.05
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Table D.7. Continued 
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 
= third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff 
= AT Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size.
 
 
238 
 
Table D.8. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment groups 
for overall mindfulness (FFMQ) and its subscales of Nonreactivity (FFMQ-NR), Observing 
(FFMQ-O), Acing with Awareness (FFMQ-A), Describing (FFMQ-D), and Nonjudging 
(FFMQ-NJ) 
  AT ACT AT-ACT 
 T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
FFMQ 1 8 126.75   8 124.00   2.75 0.16 
2 8 126.38 -0.38 0.02 8 134.13 10.13 -0.56* -7.75 -0.38
3 8 127.00 0.25 -0.01 6 137.17 13.17 -0.65* -10.17 -0.49
4 5 126.60 -0.15 0.01 6 132.50 8.50 -0.55* -5.90 -0.30
5 5 126.20 -0.55 0.02 3 133.33 9.33 -0.58* -7.13 -0.28
FFMQ-
NR 
1 8 19.00   8 17.13   1.88  0.52* 
2 8 17.00 -2.00  0.45 8 18.63 1.50 -0.44 -1.63 -0.38
3 8 17.63 -1.38  0.36 6 20.50 3.38 -0.86** -2.88 -0.70*
4 5 15.20 -3.80  0.76* 6 18.83 1.71 -0.42 -3.63 -0.64*
5 5 19.40 0.40 -0.09 3 19.67 2.54 -0.90** -0.27 -0.06
FFMQ-
O 
1 8 23.75   8 25.88   -2.13 -0.28 
2 8 24.75 1.00 -0.11 8 27.50 1.63 -0.30 -2.75 -0.38
3 8 25.50 1.75 -0.22 6 27.33 1.46 -0.23 -1.83 -0.28
4 5 27.40 3.65 -0.38 6 26.00 0.13 -0.03 1.40  0.19
5 5 24.80 1.05 -0.11 3 25.33 -0.54  0.11 -0.53 -0.07
        
239 
Table D.8. Continued 
FFMQ-
A 
1 8 27.38   8 24.00   3.38  0.53* 
2 8 26.63 -0.75  0.13 8 28.38 4.38 -0.67* -1.75 -0.30
3 8 27.00 -0.38  0.07 6 28.83 4.83 -0.71* -1.83 -0.31
4 5 29.20 1.83 -0.28 6 28.50 4.50 -0.67* 0.70  0.10
5 5 26.60 -0.77  0.10 3 30.67 6.67 -0.99** -4.07 -0.46
FFMQ-
D 
1 8 27.00   8 26.38   0.63  0.10 
2 8 27.50 0.50 -0.07 8 27.25 0.88 -0.16 0.25  0.04
3 8 28.38 1.38 -0.21 6 28.17 1.79 -0.30 0.21  0.03
4 5 25.80 -1.20  0.17 6 28.33 1.96 -0.34 -2.53 -0.41
5 5 29.00 2.00 -0.26 3 26.67 0.29 -0.06 2.33  0.32
FFMQ-
NJ 
1 8 29.63   8 30.63   -1.00 -0.15 
2 8 30.50 0.88 -0.14 8 32.38 1.75 -0.38 -1.88 -0.41
3 8 28.50 -1.13  0.16 6 32.33 1.71 -0.36 -3.83 -0.66*
4 5 29.00 -0.63  0.07 6 30.83 0.21 -0.05 -1.83 -0.25
5 5 26.40 -3.23  0.43 3 31.00 0.38 -0.08 -4.60 -0.70*
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 5 = 
third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = AT 
Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size.
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Table D.9. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for value placed on approach coping (ApprchC-V), use of approach coping 
(ApprchC-A), value placed on avoidance coping (AvoidC-V), and use of avoidance 
coping (AvoidC-A) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
Apprch
C-V 
1 8 31.75   8 32.25   -0.50 -0.17 
2 8 30.50 -1.25  0.30 7 32.43 0.18 -0.08 -1.93 -0.50*
3 8 31.25 -0.50  0.16 6 32.50 0.25 -0.10 -1.25 -0.43
4 5 32.20 0.45 -0.11 6 34.00 1.75 -0.68* -1.80 -0.47
5 5 30.20 -1.55  0.48 3 34.00 1.75 -0.68* -3.80 -1.24**
Apprch
C-A 
1 8 22.38   8 22.63   -0.25 -0.03 
2 8 25.88 3.50 -0.41 8 22.63 0.00  0.00 3.25  0.45
3 8 24.63 2.25 -0.30 5 26.00 3.38 -0.51* -1.38 -0.20
4 5 25.60 3.23 -0.39 6 25.83 3.21 -0.53* -0.23 -0.04
5 5 24.40 2.03 -0.27 3 27.67 5.04 -0.70* -3.27 -0.46
Avoid.C
-V 
1 8 14.63   8 13.38   1.25  0.32 
2 8 14.75 0.13 -0.04 7 14.00 0.63 -0.14 0.75  0.18
3 8 12.38 -2.25 0.84** 6 13.33 -0.04  0.01 -0.96 -0.26
4 5 11.20 -3.43 1.33** 6 13.67 0.29 -0.06 -2.47 -0.59*
5 5 13.00 -1.63 0.46 3 14.00 0.63 -0.14 -1.00 -0.24
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Table D.9. Continued 
Avoid.C
-A 
1 8 12.00   8 12.13   -0.13 -0.04 
2 8 11.38 -0.63  0.18 8 11.13 -1.00 0.28 0.25  0.07
3 8 12.50 0.50 -0.11 5 10.20 -1.93 0.58* 2.30  0.50*
4 5 9.80 -2.20  0.61* 6 9.83 -2.29 0.79* -0.03 -0.01
5 5 12.40 0.40 -0.08 3 11.67 -0.46 0.14 0.73  0.12
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = First follow-up, 4 = Second follow-up, 
5 = third follow-up. T-T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. 
Diff = AT Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size. 
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Table D.10. 
Means, mean differences, and Hedge’s g effect sizes within and between treatment 
groups for values-to-action incongruence for all coping strategies (VCAQ-VA), for 
approach coping (ApprchC-VA), and for avoidance coping (AvoidC-VA) 
 AT ACT AT-ACT 
T n M T-T1  g n M T-T1 g Diff g
VCAQ-
VA 
1 8 56.38   8 58.75   -2.38 -0.13 
2 8 47.00 -9.38  0.46 7 54.86 -3.89 0.19 -7.86 -0.35
3 8 49.50 -6.88  0.51* 5 44.40 -14.35 0.62* 5.10  0.28
4 5 59.00 2.63 -0.18 6 56.50 -2.25 0.09 2.50  0.11
5 5 44.40 -11.98  0.86** 3 40.33 -18.42 0.82** 4.07  0.25
Apprch
C-VA 
1 8 9.38   8 9.88   -0.50 -0.08 
2 8 6.13 -3.25  0.58* 7 9.71 -0.16 0.03 -3.59 -0.77*
3 8 8.13 -1.25  0.24 5 6.80 -3.08 0.54* 1.33  0.33
4 5 8.60 -0.78  0.13 6 8.17 -1.71 0.31 0.43  0.10
5 5 7.00 -2.38  0.38 3 6.33 -3.54 0.54* 0.67  0.10
Avoid.C
-VA 
1 8 3.63    8 3.25   0.38  0.12 
2 8 3.38 -0.25  0.07 7 3.29 0.04 -0.01 0.09  0.03
3 8 2.63 -1.00  0.36 5 2.00 -1.25 0.45 0.63  0.31
4 5 1.80 -1.83  0.67* 6 4.50 1.25 -0.33 -2.70 -0.79*
5 5 4.20 0.58 -0.17 3 2.33 -0.92 0.29 1.87  0.58*
 
Note. T = Time, with 1 = Pre-treatment, 2 = Post-treatment, 3 = 1st follow-up, 4 = 2nd follow-up, 5 = 3rd follow-up. T-
T1 = Difference between mean at pre-treatment and mean at subsequent Time. Diff = AT Mean – ACT Mean.  
*medium effect size, **large effect size.
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APPENDIX E 
Table of Expectancies for the Program and Table of Post-treatment and  
Follow-up Assessment of Skills Practice 
 
Table E.1. 
Extent Expectancies for the Program were Met Across Assessments for Each 
Group 
 Extent distress from work-related stressors reduced 
   AT ACT 
Time U p n Mdn n Mdn 
Post 17.50 .934 6 4.50 6 4.00 
1st FU 23.50 .594 8 3.00 7 3.00 
2nd FU 14.00 .492 6 4.00 6 3.50 
3rd FU 4.00 .282 5 3.00 3 4.00 
 Extent distress from stressors outside of work reduced 
Post 12.00 .394 6 4.50 6 5.00 
1st FU 19.00 .282 8 3.50 7 2.00 
2nd FU 10.00 .167 6 4.00 6 4.50 
3rd FU 3.00 .167 5 2.00 3 4.00 
 Extent satisfaction or fulfillment in work increased 
Post 14.00 .589 6 3.50 6 4.00 
1st FU 23.50 .588 8 3.00 7 2.00 
2nd FU 17.00 .858 6 3.00 6 3.00 
3rd FU 2.00 .079 5 3.00 3 2.00 
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Table E.1. Continued 
 Extent satisfaction or fulfillment in life increased
Post 14.00 .589 6 4.00 6 4.00 
1st FU 26.50 .858 8 3.00 7 3.00 
2nd FU 12.00 .309 6 4.00 6 4.50 
3rd FU 4.50 .365 5 3.00 3 5.00 
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Table E.2. 
Post-treatment and Follow-up Assessment of Skills Practice for each Group 
 Awareness of Your Experience, Your Mind on a Card, Tin Can Monster, 
or Observer Exercise? 
 AT ACT  
Time n Indicating Yes n Indicating Yes p (Fisher’s Exact Test) 
Post 7 of 8 (87.5%) 6 of 8 (75.0%) 1.000
1st FU 4 of 8 (50.0%) 5 of 7 (71.4%) .608
2nd FU 4 of 6 (66.7%) 1 of 6 (16.7%) .242
3rd FU 2 of 5 (40.0%) 2 of 3 (66.7%) 1.000
 Other acceptance/mindfulness practice(s) from program or other 
practice(s) made up or learned outside of the program? 
Post 4 of 8 (50.0%) 6 of 8 (75.0%) .608
1st FU 3 of 8 (37.5%) 4 of 7 (57.1%) .619
2nd FU 2 of 4 (33.3%) 3 of 6 (50.0%) 1.000
3rd FU 2 of 5 (40.0%) 2 of 3 (66.7%) 1.000
 Other stress reduction/management strategies?
Post 2 of 8 (25.0%) 5 of 8 (62.5%) .315
1st FU 4 of 8 (50.0%) 4 of 7 (57.1%) 1.000
2nd FU 3 of 6 (50.0% 5 of 6 (83.3%) .545
3rd FU 0 of 5 (0.0%) 3 of 3 (100.0%) .018
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APPENDIX F 
Working with Stress - Manual Adherence Checklist 
 
TAPE ID: _____________________                 Rater ID: _____ 
 
Indicate whether or not each concept listed was discussed in this session and the extent the 
discussion followed the wording and actions specified in the manual: 
 
 Concept Discussed? Adherence
1 
Participants’ experience of internal and external 
sources of stress 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
2 
Aim of program is not to change the sources of 
stress, but how participants react to stressful 
events 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
3 
What mind tells you to do to control external and 
internal stress, and how these solutions don’t 
work 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
4 
Mind’s solutions to stress are actually the 
problem, paying attention to experience is the 
solution 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
5 Man in the Hole Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
6 Distinguish blame from response-ability Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
7 Tug-of-War with a Monster Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
8 
Assignment of “How do you Struggle with 
Stress?” diary as homework 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
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9 
The Rule-of-Private Events: If you aren’t willing 
to have it, you’ve got it 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
10 Polygraph Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
11 Don’t-Think-of-a-Chocolate-Cake Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
12 
How the mind gets programmed with arbitrary 
rules 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
13 Rules of the Game of Life Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
14 Two Scales Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
15 
Willingness is an activity, an action, not a feeling 
or a thought; you can be willing even if you don’t 
like the consequences 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
16 Quicksand Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
17 Clean vs. Dirty Discomfort - Pain vs. Suffering Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
18 Box Full of Stuff Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
19 
Assigned “Rules of the Game of Life Exercise” 
homework 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
20 Assigned “Pain & Suffering Diary” Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
    
21 Your Mind is Not Your Friend Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
22 
The problem with Reason-giving: Are you going 
to be right, or are you going to be happy? 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
23 And vs. But Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
24 
Bad Bottle Metaphor – Confusing evaluation with 
description 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
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25 Passengers on the Bus Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
26 Milk, Milk, Milk Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
27 The Parade/Leaves on a Stream Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
28 What Mindful Acceptance is and is not Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
29 
Assigned “Practicing Awareness of Experience” 
homework 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
30 Assigned “Your Mind on a Card” homework Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
    
31 Tin Can Monster Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
32 Chessboard Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
33 Observer Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
34 
Review of mindfulness components of program 
and their usefulness for work stress 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
35 Assigned “Observer Exercise” homework Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
36 Assigned “Tin Can Monster Exercise” homework Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
    
37 
Emotions and thoughts as language-based barriers 
to living according to our values 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
38 
Defining a “value” as a compass heading and 
“valuing” as taking action in that direction 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
39 Write Your Own Epitaph Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
40 
Goals are concrete obtainable events, situations, 
or objects. 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
41 
Following our values does not mean our paths are 
always straight and problems don’t come up, so 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
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taking perspective and making a commitment is 
needed 
42 My Work-Life Values Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
43 
Work-Related Values, Goals, Actions, and 
Barriers Assessment 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
44 
Assigned continued work on “My Work-Life 
Values” and “My Work-Life Values, Goals, 
Actions, and Barriers Assessment” 
as homework 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
45 
Encouraged “What Do You Want Your Life to 
Stand For?” and “Full-Life Values Assessment” 
exercises as homework 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
    
46 Identify barriers to committed action Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
47 
Willingness to observe and acknowledge barriers 
can support commitment  
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
48 Joe the Bum Metaphor Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
49 
Willingness to commit as the necessary first step 
toward your desired outcome 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
50 
Three culprits that contribute to your failure to 
complete committed actions 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
51 The ACT on FEAR Card Exercise Y  -  N Min   Mod   High
52 
Every single moment you are building behavioral 
patterns, think of your own ways to practice 
mindful acceptance 
Y  -  N Min   Mod   High 
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Indicate the extent to which the facilitator(s) ran the session in the manner specified: 
 
1 
Discussed homework from 
previous session at start of this 
one 
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
2 
Expressed idea that she is in the 
same boat as participants and 
spoke from an equal and genuine 
point of view 
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
3 
Was compassionate towards 
participants distress and avoided 
judgment 
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
4 
Encouraged participants to pay 
attention to their own experience 
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
5 
Argued or attempted to convince 
the participants of things 
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
6 
Explained the meaning of 
metaphors rather than having 
group figure them out  
[leave blank if no metaphors 
presented] 
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
7 
Disclosed personal experiences 
or issues appropriate to the 
discussion  
Not at all         Min             Mod               High
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